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Abstract 
Insurance and reinsurance firms have seen a remarkable increase in underwriting 
losses associated with natural catastrophes during the past decade. Yet, the volume of 
global risk-financing capacity of catastrophe events has remained limited to date. 
This raises concerns over the effect of insolvencies and disruptions in insurance and 
reinsurance markets in the event of a severe natural catastrophe. Insurance 
securitization has long been hailed as an important tool to increase the underwriting 
capacity of firms exposed to catastrophe risk. Surprisingly, however, global volumes 
of insurance securitization have remained low to date. 
The thesis provides the first comprehensive analysis of the expected losses 
to U.S. insurers (as reflected in stock market returns) linked to a series of large 
natural catastrophes. The results show that, overall, the expected performance 
implications of mega-catastrophes are by no means devastating for insurers as the 
sample of natural catastrophes causes only relatively modest value losses for firms 
with catastrophe exposure. 
The thesis also provides the first empirical investigation into both the 
performance effects and the risk effects for insurance and reinsurance firms which 
engage in insurance securitization by issuing catastrophe bonds. The results show 
that insurance securitization provides issuers with potential cost advantages 
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(compared to other forms of catastrophe risk management) and that insurance 
securitization is an effective tool for hedging catastrophe risk. 
In sum, while the relatively modest performance effects of natural 
catastrophes on insurance firms put a ceiling on the potential benefits of insurance 
securitization to firms exposed to catastrophe risk, the thesis shows that catastrophe 
bonds have some benefits for their issuers. Therefore, this thesis argues that 
insurance securitization is less valuable as a tool for capacity building in the market 
for catastrophe underwriting and more useful as a tool to realize cost efficacies and 
hedging benefits for insurance and reinsurance firms. 
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1  
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Eight out of the ten most expensive natural catastrophes (in terms of insured losses) 
have occurred in the past ten years (Swiss Re, 2012b). Overall, the past decade has 
seen a remarkable increase in economic losses from natural catastrophes such as 
hurricanes, earthquakes and floods. The recent tsunami in Japan or Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005 which caused projected economic losses in excess of $200 billion and 
$100 billion respectively are two examples which bear testimony to this trend. 
To avoid large and unexpected losses from natural catastrophes, owners of 
physical capital (i.e. mainly households and business firms) have a strong incentive 
to share their exposure to catastrophe risks with others through the purchase of 
insurance. Insurance firms which underwrite these catastrophe risks also have an 
incentive to purchase insurance (referred to as reinsurance). Without reinsurance, 
insurance firms could risk major financial losses and even insolvency in the event of 
severe natural catastrophes (Froot, 2001 or Cummins et al., 2002). For example, four 
U.S. insurance firms became insolvent (amongst them the third largest homeowners’ 
insurer in Florida) as a result of the severe hurricane season in 2005 (A.M. Best 
Company, 2006). 
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However, the total volume of global risk-financing capacity of natural 
catastrophes in both insurance and reinsurance markets has remained limited to date 
(Froot, 2001; Cummins et al., 2002; Froot and O'Connell, 2008). As a result, the 
market for catastrophe risk is unable to share catastrophe risk widely and efficiently 
among market participants. Since this means that insurance firms face difficulties in 
transferring their catastrophe risk exposure to reinsurance firms (Froot, 2001; Froot 
and O'Connell, 2008), the bulk of economic losses linked to catastrophe risk is 
retained by individuals and business firms (see also D’Agostino, 2002). 
Next to capacity constraints in the market for catastrophe risk, two 
additional trends compound the risk that a large natural catastrophe may cause severe 
instability and numerous insolvencies in global insurance and reinsurance markets: 
(i) strong growth rates in the value of physical asset and (ii) growth in the population 
living in high-risk zones such as coastal areas for hurricanes. 
Prima facie, capital markets (rather than insurance and reinsurance markets) 
could be a viable source for firms exposed to catastrophe-related risks to increase the 
global risk-financing capacity for natural catastrophes. For example, Cummins et al. 
(2002) estimate a loss of $100 billion would equal approximately 30% of the equity 
capital of the U.S. property-liability (P&L) insurance industry (based on 1997 
capitalization), but would be less than 0.5% of the value of U.S. stock and bond 
markets. Further, the transfer of catastrophe risk to capital markets could be at 
considerably lower costs (as compared to the traditional transfer through 
reinsurance), because capital markets can draw on a larger, more liquid and more 
diversified pool of capacity than the equity of reinsurance firms (e.g., Jaffee and 
Russell, 1997; Durbin, 2001; Niehaus, 2002). 
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Insurance securitization in general, and catastrophe (Cat) bonds in 
particular, have long been hailed as the most promising vehicles for efficiently 
accessing capital markets for additional risk-financing capacity (e.g. Jaffee and 
Russell, 1997; Froot, 2001; Kunreuther and Heal, 2012). Cat bonds are the most 
commonly used securitization vehicles to date. In simple terms, a Cat bond is an 
insurance derivative whose payoffs depend on the occurrence of a catastrophe loss 
event. As such, the issuing firm may forfeit on principal and/or coupon payments 
when a specified catastrophe loss event occurs. 
While the market for Cat bonds has undergone rapid growth in response to 
recent increases in the amount of catastrophe-related underwriting losses, the overall 
volume of insurance securitization continues to lag behind expectations. For 
example, the total outstanding risk capital of Cat bonds issued between 1997 and 
2011 corresponds to only 8% of insured catastrophe losses during that period 
(according to calculations based on Swiss Re Sigma Reports dating from 1997 to 
2011). 
Given the capacity constraints in the market for catastrophe risk, the limited 
use of insurance securitization by both insurance and reinsurance firms raises two 
main set of questions. First, is there a need for additional underwriting capacity for 
insurance and reinsurance firms? Arguably, the hitherto low issuance volume of Cat 
bonds and other insurance securitization vehicles can be explained by the fact that 
the financial losses associated with natural catastrophes (and, relatedly, the need for 
additional underwriting capacity) are not as great as frequently argued (Froot, 2001; 
Cummins et al., 2002; Froot and O'Connell, 2008). The second question addresses 
concerns regarding the effectiveness of insurance securitization as a risk 
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management tool for insurance and reinsurance firms. If the benefits of insurance 
securitization for the firms which issue securities such as Cat bonds are limited (for 
instance, if Cat bonds are not effective in hedging catastrophe underwriting risk), this 
could equally explain the limited use of insurance securitization to date. 
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis 
Against the background of both an increase in underwriting losses from natural 
catastrophes and capacity constraints in the market for catastrophe risk, a clearer 
understanding of the need for additional risk-financing capacity by insurance and 
reinsurance firms as well as the effectiveness of insurance securitization as a risk 
management tool are important issues. For this purpose, this thesis analyses the 
performance implications of natural catastrophes and the performance and risk 
implications of insurance securitization for insurance and reinsurance firms. 
In three main empirical chapters, this thesis provides novel evidence. 
Specifically, the empirical chapters seek to answer the following three research 
questions: 
(i) Chapter 4: What are the performance implications of natural catastrophes 
for insurance and reinsurance firms? 
(ii) Chapter 5: What are the performance implications of insurance 
securitization for insurance and reinsurance firms which issue Cat bonds? 
(iii) Chapter 6: What are the risk implications of insurance securitization for 
insurance and reinsurance firms which issue Cat bonds? 
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Overall, the results presented in this thesis show a mixed picture. Chapters 5 
and 6 draw a positive picture of the usefulness and effectiveness of insurance 
securitization by showing that insurance securitization can provide insurance and 
reinsurance firms with cost advantages (as compared to other forms of catastrophe 
risk management) and that insurance securitization is an effective tool for 
transferring catastrophe risk to capital markets. 
However, Chapter 4 casts doubt on the need for insurance and reinsurance 
firms for additional underwriting capacity. This is because the empirical evidence 
provided in Chapter 4 reveals that the expected performance implications of mega-
catastrophes (as reflected in equity market valuations of insurers around the time a 
catastrophe event occurs) are by no means devastating for insurers. This finding 
challenges the view that firms exposed to catastrophe risks have much to gain from 
additional catastrophe risk underwriting capacity. 
In summary, the results presented in this thesis show that insurance and 
reinsurance firms have coped relatively well with large natural catastrophes. At the 
same time, firms which engage in insurance securitization by issuing Cat bonds 
realize some costs and hedging benefits. Put differently, while the potential benefits 
of insurance securitization to firms exposed to catastrophe risk are limited ex ante, 
the results presented in this thesis are the first to show that insurance and reinsurance 
firms still benefit from issuing Cat bonds. It could be argued, therefore, that the ex 
ante limited potential for firms to benefit from Cat bonds provides a possible 
explanation for the hitherto reluctance of insurance and reinsurance firms to make 
more extensive use of insurance securitization. 
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To provide a more detailed discussion of the findings as well as 
contributions of this thesis to the extant literature, the next three subsections 
summarize the contributions of each empirical chapter. 
1.2.1 The Performance Implications of Natural 
Catastrophes for Insurance and Reinsurance Firms 
The first empirical question that this thesis addresses is related to the performance 
implications of natural catastrophes for insurance and reinsurance firms. For this 
purpose, Chapter 4 uses a large dataset on homeowners’ insurance coverage by state, 
firm, and year to examine the stock returns of U.S. P&L insurers in response to a 
series of nineteen large U.S. natural catastrophes (mega-catastrophes) spanning from 
1996 to 2010. In doing so, Chapter 4 provides the first comprehensive analysis of the 
market performance effect of a series of natural catastrophes on the U.S. P&L 
insurance industry. Also, the chapter identifies new firm-specific and catastrophe-
specific factors which impact on the post loss stock price reaction of insurers. 
The rationale behind Chapter 4 is to gain some insights into the need for 
insurance and reinsurance firms for additional underwriting capacity by assessing the 
expected performance effects linked to mega-catastrophes (as reflected in insurer 
stock prices). Arguably, one of the reasons why insurance and reinsurance firms may 
have been reluctant to make more extensive use of insurance securitization to date 
could be that capacity constraints in the market for catastrophe risk may not pose as 
much of a risk to them as argued by various commentators (e.g. Froot, 2001; 
Cummins et al., 2002; Cummins and Trainar, 2009). 
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The capacity-constraint hypothesis posits that underwriting capacity is 
negatively related to underwriting profitability (Gron, 1994). That is, the lower the 
available capacity in the market for catastrophe risk the higher the expected profits 
from offering insurance against catastrophe risk. In line with the capacity-constraint 
hypothesis, natural catastrophes usually lead to additional premium earnings due to 
sharp price increases for catastrophe risk insurance (Zanjani, 2002 or Froot and 
O’Connel, 2008) as well as more profitable insurance business in the following non-
catastrophe years (Born and Viscusi, 2006). This raises the question whether, 
following a catastrophe event, the benefits of additional premium earnings due to 
sharp price increases for catastrophe risk insurance outweigh insurers’ initial 
underwriting losses. 
The overall performance effect of mega-catastrophes on insurance firms has 
remained unknown to date. This is because previous studies on the market valuation 
effects of catastrophes tend to focus on a single event (e.g. the San Francisco 
earthquake in 1989, Hurricane Andrew in 1992 or the Northridge earthquake in 
1994) and have reached conflicting conclusions over whether the value effect of 
mega-catastrophes on insurers is negative or positive. 
For example, Lamb (1995; 1998), Cagle (1996), and Cummins and Lewis 
(2003) find that insurers realize negative abnormal returns, on average, for the 
specific catastrophe events they study, while Shelor et al. (1992), Aiuppa et al. 
(1993) and Lamb and Kennedy (1997) find positive equity valuation effects linked to 
the specific events they study. Moreover, an additional challenge faced by research 
which focuses on a single (or a very low number of catastrophe events) is that these 
Chapter 1: Introduction 8 
 
 
studies cannot distinguish between effects which are unique about a particular event 
from the more general effects of a catastrophe on insurers. 
The findings reported in Chapter 4 have two main implications. First, 
Chapter 4 shows clear evidence that across the series of nineteen U.S. mega-
catastrophes examined, shareholders in U.S. P&L insurers realize wealth losses on 
average. Also, the results reveal that the stock price response varies significantly 
among firms based on the existence as well as the size of the loss exposure. Thus, by 
using detailed data on the underwriting activities of insurers (by state and type of 
catastrophe event) from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC), results show that only firms with exposure to mega-catastrophes experience 
wealth losses. That means the findings do not support the view that, subsequent to a 
mega-catastrophe, additional premium earnings due to sharp price increases for 
catastrophe risk insurance outweigh insurers’ initial underwriting losses. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of share price losses during the examined event 
period of less than 1.5% experienced by the sample as a whole are rather moderate. 
This casts doubt on the view that catastrophe events cause large and unexpected 
losses for insurers and that additional underwriting capacity is needed so that insurers 
can cope with the underwriting losses from natural catastrophes. 
In summary, Chapter 4 shows that, while natural catastrophes are associated 
with wealth losses for insurance and reinsurance firms with catastrophe risk 
exposure, the losses are not as severe as expected (Froot, 2001; Cummins et al., 
2002; Cummins and Trainar, 2009). This is interpreted as evidence that insurance 
and reinsurance firms are (on average) able to cope rather well with the losses linked 
to mega-catastrophes. Consequently, the results show that insurance securitization 
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vehicles, such as Cat bonds, may have a role to play in mitigating the effects of 
natural catastrophes on the firms which underwrite catastrophe risks. At the same 
time, however, the low negative returns (in absolute terms) associated with natural 
catastrophes put a ceiling on the potential benefits of Cat bonds to issuing firms and 
suggest that such benefits may be limited. 
1.2.2 The Performance Implications of Insurance 
Securitization for Insurance and Reinsurance Firms 
The second empirical question of this thesis relates to the performance implications 
of insurance securitization for insurance and reinsurance firms. For this purpose, 
Chapter 5 examines changes in the market value of an international sample of 
insurance and reinsurance firms which announce their engagement in insurance 
securitization by issuing Cat bonds. In doing so, Chapter 5 provides the first 
empirical investigation into the wealth benefits of issuing Cat bonds and, also, helps 
to understand the motivations as to why firms issue them. This is particularly 
important because previous work on Cat bonds has been mostly theoretical (e.g. 
Bantwal and Kunreuther, 2000; Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2006), leading to 
considerable uncertainty as to the actual effects of Cat bonds on the issuing firm. 
The focus of the analysis in Chapter 5 is on assessing the validity of the two 
most prominent arguments proposed by the literature as to why firms may benefit 
from issuing Cat bonds, namely, that (i) Cat bonds allow firms to hedge against 
catastrophe-related underwriting losses (e.g. Niehaus, 2002; Harrington and Niehaus, 
2003; Cummins et al., 2004) and that (ii) Cat bonds can help firms with catastrophe 
exposure to realize cost savings on catastrophe-related risk management (e.g. Jaffee 
and Russell, 1997; Niehaus, 2002; Kunreuther and Heal, 2012). 
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Consistent with the hitherto underwhelming contribution of insurance 
securitization to global risk financing capacity, Chapter 5 provides evidence that Cat 
bonds do not lead to strong wealth gains for shareholders in the issuing firm. 
Nevertheless, Chapter 5 also reports large variations in the distribution of wealth 
effects in response to the issue announcement. The results show that the wealth 
effects for shareholders in firms which issue Cat bonds appear to be driven by 
explanations according to which Cat bonds offer cost savings (relative to other forms 
of catastrophe risk management) and less by the potential of Cat bonds to hedge 
catastrophe risk. 
For example, the results in Chapter 5 show that the value effects linked to 
Cat bond issues are particularly pronounced for firms with less volatile losses from 
their insurance business. This is in line with the argument that this particular group of 
firms is likely to benefit from lower information acquisition costs in financial 
markets when they substitute reinsurance coverage using Cat bonds (see Gibson et al. 
2011). In the same vein, since Cat bond prices are fixed over a multi-year period and 
remain unaffected by future price increases in the market for catastrophe coverage, 
results show that issuer abnormal returns are particularly high during periods of low 
catastrophe reinsurance prices when the costs of raising capital via Cat bonds are 
relatively low too. 
Overall, the results of the analysis of the performance implications of 
insurance securitization for insurance and reinsurance firms provide evidence in 
support of the argument that insurance securitization can help firms with catastrophe 
exposure to realize costs savings on catastrophe-related risk management (as 
proposed by Jaffee and Russell, 1997, Niehaus, 2002 or Kunreuther, 2012). 
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However, Chapter 5 also casts doubt on the effectiveness of insurance securitization 
in general (and Cat bonds in particular) in hedging underwriting risks. The latter 
finding offers another possible explanation for the underwhelming use of insurance 
securitization by firms exposed to catastrophe risks to date and, therefore, is further 
examined in the subsequent chapter. 
1.2.3 The Risk Implications of Insurance Securitization for 
Insurance and Reinsurance Firms 
The final empirical question of this thesis analyses the risk implications of insurance 
securitization for insurance and reinsurance firms. In doing so, Chapter 6 helps to 
further assess the findings of the previous chapter which challenge the effectiveness 
of insurance securitization in hedging underwriting risks. For this purpose, Chapter 6 
examines the impact of Cat bonds on the default risk of an international sample of 
insurance and reinsurance firms which issue them. 
The motivation for this investigation are concerns that underwriting losses 
linked to catastrophe events may prove so large that they cause distress and, 
ultimately, have an effect on the default-likelihood of an insurer (Cummins et al., 
2002; Harrington and Niehaus, 2003). Consequently, if Cat bonds are effective in 
transferring catastrophe underwriting risk from issuers to market investors, they 
should lead to a commensurate reduction in the issuers’ default risk. 
Using the Merton distance to default model to gauge default risk, Chapter 6 
provides the first empirical evidence that Cat bonds lower the default risk of the 
firms which issue them. Also, and consistent with explanations according to which 
insurance securitization reduces exposure to catastrophe risk and to default risk more 
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generally, the results reveal that Cat bonds lead to larger risk reductions for issuers 
with higher exposures to either catastrophe or default risk. Finally, Chapter 6 shows 
that basis risk (which results when Cat bond payouts are independent of the issuers’ 
realized losses) does not prevent issuers from realizing risk benefits. 
Therefore, Chapter 6 shows that insurance securitization in general, and Cat 
bonds in particular, are effective vehicles for insurance and reinsurance firms for 
transferring catastrophe-related underwriting risks to capital markets. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. 
 Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 both serve as background chapters to the three 
empirical chapters of this thesis. For this purpose, Chapter 2 presents an 
institutional setting for insurance and reinsurance including both an 
explanation of the fundamentals of risk and insurance as well as a detailed 
discussion of the development of the private insurance and reinsurance 
industry in recent years. This is followed by Chapter 3, which provides an 
overview of the market for catastrophe risk and insurance securitization. 
Also, the concept of insurance securitization in general (and Cat bonds in 
particular) is explained in detail. 
 Chapter 4 (the first of the following three empirical chapters) analyses the 
performance implications of natural catastrophes on insurance and 
reinsurance firms by examining the impact of a series of natural 
catastrophes on the stock market valuation of a sample of U.S insurance and 
reinsurance firms. 
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 Chapter 5 examines the performance implications of insurance 
securitization on insurance and reinsurance firms by analyzing changes in 
the stock market valuation of an international sample of insurance and 
reinsurance firms which announce their engagement in insurance 
securitization by issuing Cat bonds. 
 Chapter 6 assesses the risk implications of insurance securitization for 
insurance and reinsurance firms by analyzing the impact of Cat bonds on the 
default risk of an international sample of insurance and reinsurance firms 
which issue them. 
 Chapter 7 draws together the conclusions, policy implications and 
limitations of this thesis. Also, directions for further research are discussed 
in this chapter. 
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2  
Insurance and Reinsurance - 
Fundamentals and Institutional Setting 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first of the two background chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) of this 
thesis and presents an overview of the institutional setting for insurance and 
reinsurance. The discussion consists of a description of the market participants as 
well as the development of the private insurance and reinsurance industry including 
recent developments and future challenges. In order to lay out the foundations for 
this discussion, the chapter starts by explaining the fundamentals of risk and 
insurance. For this purpose, the concept of insurance is described in the context of 
modern risk management, and the nature and functions of insurance as well as the 
different types of insurance are laid out. 
The chapter provides an important motivation for this thesis, by giving 
evidence that insurance and reinsurance firms have become more vulnerable than 
ever before to the financial consequences of large underwriting losses and that, as a 
result, the management of the exposure to large underwriting losses has become 
crucially important for insurance and reinsurance firms in order to remain profitable. 
Two reasons for this development are offered in this chapter. First, insurance and 
Chapter 2: Insurance and Reinsurance – Fundamentals and Institutional Setting 15 
 
 
reinsurance firms have been struggling to generate significant premium growth in 
recent years. Second, insurance and reinsurance firms increasingly face difficulties in 
maintaining high levels of investment income and, therefore, can no longer rely on 
the investment income to offset underwriting losses. 
2.2 Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance 
Before the institutional setting for insurance and reinsurance is investigated, this 
subsection first lays out the fundamentals of risk and insurance. It starts by providing 
an introduction to modern risk management as well as a description of the nature and 
functions of insurance. Finally, the elements of an insurable risk are presented and 
the different types of insurance are discussed. 
From the discussion below, it will become evident how the concept of 
insurance is integrated into modern risk management theory and why insurance firms 
are crucial in the process of insuring and managing the risks that individuals and 
business firms are exposed to. 
2.2.1 Introduction to Modern Risk Management 
Modern risk management in its current practice is a relatively new and evolving 
discipline which has its roots in the early 1950s.1 As such, risk management has been 
defined in a range of different ways which vary in detail. Nonetheless, according to 
Vaughan and Vaughan (2003, pg. 15), all definitions of risk management offered 
                                                 
1 One of the earliest references to the concept of risk management can be found in the article ‘Risk 
Management: A New Phase of Cost Control’ by Gallagher (1956) published in the Harvard Business 
Review. 
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thus far share principally the same key characteristics and, therefore, can be 
summarized in one universal definition as follows: 
“Risk management is a scientific approach to dealing with pure risks by 
anticipating possible accidental losses and designing and implementing procedures 
that minimize the occurrence of loss or the financial impact of the losses that do 
occur.” 
According to this definition, risk management is fundamentally concerned 
with pure risks and involves different tools to managing those risks. As a result, to 
fully appreciate the concept of risk management, it is important to distinguish 
between the meaning risk and pure risk, and to be aware of the different risk 
management tools available. 
Until today, the literature lacks a universally accepted definition of the term 
risk. Thus, risk is variously defined and includes (i) the possibility or chance of loss, 
(ii) the dispersion of actual from expected results, (iii) uncertainty, or (iv) the 
probability of any outcome different from the one expected. All definitions have in 
common that they either refer to an indeterminate outcome or that at least one of the 
possible outcomes is undesirable, i.e. it involves the possibility of loss. In this 
context, risk can be classified as either pure risk or speculative risk (as in Mowbray 
and Blanchard, 1961, pgs. 6-7).2 The term pure risk refers to a condition which 
involves only the possibility of loss or no loss, such as the possibility that a person’s 
                                                 
2 Next to the distinction between pure risk and speculative risk, risk may also be classified in other 
ways. These classifications include the distinction between financial and non-financial risks, static and 
dynamic risks (Willett, 1951, pgs. 14-19) as well as fundamental and particular risks (Kulp, 1956, pgs. 
3-4). 
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house is damaged or destroyed. The term speculative risk, in contrast, describes a 
condition in which there is a possibility of loss, but also the possibility of gain. 
Gambling and almost all investment activities are examples of speculative risks. 
In order to deal with pure risk, risk management offers different risk 
management tools. These tools are usually grouped into two broad approaches, 
namely (i) risk control and (ii) risk financing. 
Risk control comprises of techniques which are designed to minimize the 
risk of losses to which individuals and business firms are exposed to. Risk control 
includes risk avoidance techniques as well as risk reduction techniques. Risk 
avoidance techniques aim at preventing a risk from even coming into existence (e.g. 
to avoid the risk of damages to an automobile, individuals and business firms can 
decide not to buy an automobile at all). Risk reduction techniques, however, are 
designed to reduce the likelihood of loss or the potential severity of losses (e.g. to 
reduce the likelihood of vandalism to a building, individuals and business firms can 
install security cameras or put up fences surrounding the building). 
Risk financing ultimately deals with all remaining risks which cannot be 
avoided or reduced through risk control. In contrast to risk control, risk financing 
consists of techniques which guarantee the availability of funds to meet losses 
associated with the occurrence of pure risks. For this purpose, individuals or business 
firms can either transfer or retain the risks they are exposed to. The primary approach 
to transfer risk is the purchase of insurance. An alternative approach of transferring 
risk is the use of insurance securitization. Since insurance securitization is the subject 
of Chapters 5 and 6, it will be explained in a separate chapter (Chapter 3). Finally, all 
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risks which cannot be avoided, reduced or transferred, have to be retained by 
individuals and business firms. 
So far, the discussion implicitly assumed that individuals and business firms 
are aware of all risks which they are exposed to. However, the overall risk exposure 
of individuals and business firms generally consists of both perceived as well as 
unperceived risks. For obvious reasons, risks cannot be intentionally managed, when 
they are not recognized as such. For example, the decision to avoid, reduce, transfer 
or retain a certain risk can only be deliberately taken if individuals and business 
firms are in fact aware of this particular risk. In the absence of this awareness, risks 
will be retained unintentionally. Yet, the amount of unperceived risks is usually 
reduced as a result of managing the perceived risks. For example, if individuals or 
business firms decide not to buy an automobile, they simultaneously avoid all 
unperceived risks associated with owning an automobile. Figure 2-1 summarizes the 
aforementioned risk management techniques and various stages involved in the risk 
management process. 
Next to knowing about the different risk management tools, it is equally 
important for individuals and business firms to know which risks are ideally to be 
avoided, reduced, transferred or retained. For this purpose, risk is usually broken 
down into two main criteria, namely (i) the severity of risk potential (i.e. the degree 
of potential damage) and (ii) the frequency of risk potential (i.e. the probability of the 
risk occurring). Depending on the combination of both severity and frequency of the 
risk potential, some risk management tools are more preferable than others. 
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Figure 2-2 shows a so called risk matrix (as in Alexander and Marshall, 
2006) which illustrates the different combinations of severity and frequency of the 
risk potential as well as the preferred risk management tools to deal with them. 
Accordingly, individuals and business firms are recommended to avoid any risks 
which bear both a high frequency and a high severity of risk potential, to reduce risks 
which bear a high frequency but a low severity of risk potential, to transfer risks 
which bear a low frequency but a high severity of risk potential, and to retain those 
risks which bear both a low frequency and a low severity of loss exposure. 
Therefore, individuals and business firms are best off insuring those risks which 
rarely happen but, if they do, usually cause substantial damages. 
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Figure 2-2 
Risk Matrix 
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Source: Alexander and Marshall (2006). 
2.2.2 Nature and Functions of Insurance 
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that insurance is a risk management 
tool which belongs to the group of risk financing techniques aimed at transferring 
pure risks away from individuals and business firms. The transfer of risk, however, is 
only one of the two fundamental characteristics of insurance. The sharing (or 
pooling) of losses associated with the transferred risks among the members of a 
group (on some equitable basis) is equally essential for insurance to work properly. 
To better understand the way in which insurance works and to appreciate why 
insurance firms are crucial to the process of insuring those risks which individuals 
and business firms are exposed to, the following example is presented. 
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For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that there are 1,000 individuals who 
each own a house worth $100,000. Further, each of those houses is exposed to the 
pure risk of catching fire. Consequently, each owner of a house faces the risk that a 
fire may result in a financial loss of up to $100,000. Given the realistic assumption 
that the event of all houses catching fire within the next year is highly unlikely, it can 
be expected that some owners will suffer a financial loss (of up to $100,000) due to a 
fire and some will not. However, if all 1,000 individuals agree to share the cost of 
losses equally among each other as they occur, individuals no longer had to face the 
risk of suffering a $100,000 loss. Instead, individuals would now have to pay a share 
of up to $100 each time a house catches fire. As a result, through the agreement to 
share the losses (i.e. the insurance agreement), the economic burden of an individual 
(i.e. the risk that an individual’s house catches fire and causes an individual’s 
financial loss of up to $100,000) is spread among the group of 1,000 individuals. In 
other words, 
“insurance does not decrease the uncertainty for the individual as to 
whether an event will occur, nor does it alter the probability of occurrence, but it 
does reduce the probability of financial loss connected with the event” (Vaughan and 
Vaughan, 2003 pg. 34). 
Since some members of the group might refuse to pay their proportionate of 
the amount of the loss in case of a house catching fire, members must pay their share 
in advance. This, however, creates problems, as the actual number of houses catching 
fire in the next year and the amount of the share members must pay to offset these 
future losses is unknown a priori. This is why insurance firms are crucial, because 
they can predict the future amount of losses on the basis of past experience within 
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rather narrow limits. The reason why insurance firms are able to more accurately 
predict future losses (as compared to individuals and business firms) is based on the 
law of large numbers. According to the law of large numbers, the accuracy of 
empirical statistics (i.e. the proportionate individuals have to pay in order to offset 
future losses) tends to improve with the numbers of trials (i.e. the number of 
individuals which are exposed to the risk of their houses catching fire). Thus, by 
pooling thousands of homogeneous exposure units, insurance firms are able to make 
more accurate predictions for the exemplified group. 
In doing so, insurance provides a more optimal utilization of capital as 
compared to retaining the risk. This is because individuals and business firms would 
have to maintain relatively large capital reserves to meet the risks they assume if 
insurance did not exist. Yet, through insurance, individuals and business firms can 
substitute a small certain cost (the insurance premium) for a large uncertain financial 
loss (the contingency insured against), and can use the released funds for investments 
possibilities. 
Theoretically, all possibilities of losses could be insured. Nevertheless, for 
practical reasons, insurance firms are not willing to accept all risks which individuals 
and business firms seek to transfer to them. This is why the next subsection explains 
which elements a risk must meet in order to be accepted by insurance firms as an 
insurable risk. 
2.2.3 Elements of an Insurable Risk 
According to Vaughan and Vaughan (2003), risks which are typically insured by 
insurance firms ideally share the following characteristics: 
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(i) Large number of homogeneous exposure units: As mentioned earlier, 
successful insurance markets are based on the operation of the law of large 
numbers. Consequently, a large number of homogeneous exposure units 
increases the accuracy of future loss predictions by insurance firms. 
(ii) Definite and measurable loss: For losses to be insurable, they need to be 
relatively difficult to counterfeit (i.e. the insurance firm must be able to tell 
when a loss has actually taken place), and they need to be financially 
measurable (i.e. the insurance firm must be able to put a price to the extent 
of it). 
(iii) Fortuitous or accidental loss: The loss needs to be fortuitous, i.e. the event 
that constitutes the trigger of a claim must be something that may or may 
not happen. An event which is certain to happen (such as depreciation) is 
generally not considered insurable. Further, the event should be beyond the 
control of the insured. If the event was not beyond the control of the 
insured, losses would not occur as a result of chance and the prediction of 
future losses (which are based on the assumption that past experience was a 
result of chance happening) would be unreliable. 
(iv) Limited risk of dependent and very large losses: Insurable losses are ideally 
independent, meaning that it is unlikely that a single loss event affects a 
very large number of exposure units at the same time, and that individual 
losses are not severe enough for an insurance firm to become insolvent. 
As mentioned above, in order to be accepted by insurance firms as 
insurable, risks should ideally meet all of the aforementioned characteristics. 
However, it is possible for certain risks to be insured, even though they do not meet 
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all of the characteristics listed above. One example of a risk which can be insured 
although it collides with at least one of the characteristics of an insurable risk is a 
natural catastrophe (such as a hurricane), as it bears the potential of affecting many 
exposure units at once as well as severely threatening an insurance firm’s solvency. 
The discussion of natural catastrophes is, however, postponed until Chapter 3. 
2.2.4 Types of Insurance 
Next to knowing about the nature and functions of insurance as well as the elements 
of an insurable risk, another important issue relates to how the risks which 
individuals and business firms seek insurance for can be classified and how these 
different classifications of risk form the various types of insurance. 
According to Vaughan and Vaughan (2003), all risks which exist for 
individuals and business firms can be classified under one of the following: 
(i) personal risks (such as the loss of income due to premature death or 
unemployment), (ii) property risks (such as the loss or loss of use of property due to 
natural catastrophes), (iii) liability risks (such as the unintentional injury of other 
persons or damage to their property), or (iv) risks arising from failure of others (such 
as the failure of a contractor to complete a construction project as scheduled). 
In several countries, for some of these risks, it is required by law to buy 
insurance cover against the financial losses which might result from them. This type 
of insurance is generally referred to as social insurance. Social insurance is usually 
(but not always) organized and operated by the government and its primary emphasis 
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is on social adequacy.3 One of the most prominent examples of social insurance is 
the unemployment insurance, in which case workers contribute a fixed percentage of 
their gross salary in order to be entitled to some benefits (such as living allowances) 
in the case of unemployment. 
Insurance which covers all remaining risks, for which there is no legal 
requirement to buy insurance for, is referred to as private insurance. Private 
insurance, therefore, consists of insurance programs which are (for the most part) 
voluntary for individuals and business firms. Private insurance is generally viewed as 
two distinct segments, i.e. life insurance and non-life insurance (which is sometimes 
referred to as general insurance). Life insurance is designed to protect individuals or 
their dependents against the financial losses of premature death or superannuation 
(i.e. the risk of outliving one’s income-earning ability) by providing lump sums or 
annuities in the case of an insured event. Non-life insurance, on the other hand, is 
designed to protect against financial losses resulting from damage or loss of property 
(i.e. property insurance), financial losses arising from legal liability (i.e. liability 
insurance) as well as financial losses caused by sickness or accidental bodily injury 
(i.e. health insurance). This is why in some countries, for example the U.S., non-life 
insurance is further broken down into property and liability (P&L) insurance as well 
as health insurance. For a better overview, Figure 2-3 illustrates the different types of 
insurance. 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking, insurance can still be considered as a form of social insurance even though it is not 
organized and operated by the government. One example is workers compensation in the U.S. (which 
provides benefits to workers in case of occupational injury or disease) which is sold by private 
insurance firms. 
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2.3 The Institutional Setting for Insurance and 
Reinsurance 
This section now turns to the institutional setting for insurance and reinsurance. 
Since this thesis deals with firms of the private insurance and reinsurance industry, 
the institutional setting is concerned with the private insurance and reinsurance 
industry only. As a result, social insurance is not further investigated. The section 
starts by describing the different market participants as well as the most common 
forms of ownership for private insurance and reinsurance firms. Next, a detailed 
analysis of both the private insurance and reinsurance industry with a focus on recent 
developments and future challenges is presented. Finally, the importance of the 
investment income for both insurance and reinsurance firms is explained. 
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2.3.1 Market Participants and Forms of Ownership 
Basically, the private insurance industry comprises of three main participants, i.e. 
(i) the buyers of insurance, (ii) the providers of insurance, as well as (iii) the 
distributors of insurance. Individuals and business firms (i.e. the policyholders) are 
generally referred to as the buyers of insurance, while insurance firms are referred to 
as the providers of insurance. Finally, brokers and agents are referred to as the 
distributors of insurance which interact between the insurance buyers and providers. 
The main difference between brokers and agents is that agents are generally 
seen as the representatives of the insurance firm, while brokers are seen as the 
representatives of the policyholder. Brokers and agents mainly function as the 
marketing systems of the insurance industry, i.e. they mainly sell and consult both 
the buyers and providers of insurance. Yet, neither brokers nor agents are mandatory 
for the process of transferring risk from policyholders to insurance firms, i.e. 
policyholders can buy insurance directly without the intermediation of brokers or 
agents at all. 
However, insurance firms themselves may buy insurance from other 
insurance firms. This process is called reinsurance and the insurance firms which 
offer reinsurance are referred to as reinsurance firms. As a result, insurance firms can 
act as providers as well as buyers of insurance. Likewise, reinsurance firms may buy 
reinsurance (either directly or through agents and brokers), a practice known as 
retrocession. Reinsurance firms which sell reinsurance are commonly referred to as 
retrocessionaires. For a better understanding, the relationships between the different 
market participants in insurance and reinsurance markets are summarized in Figure 
2-4. 
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Based on their form of ownership, insurance and reinsurance firms can be 
classified as either stock insurers or mutual insurers.4 The most common form of 
ownership is the stock insurer which is owned by its stockholders who, ultimately, 
assume the risks which are being transferred by the policyholders. As such, 
policyholders and owners are separated in the case of a stock insurer. Stock insurers 
generally provide two types of diversification benefits. First, stock insurers diversify 
the assumed risks internally (by issuing policies to many different policyholders in 
different lines of businesses and geographical regions). Second, the stockholders 
                                                 
4 There exist even more forms of ownership for insurance and reinsurance firms (e.g. reciprocals, 
Lloyd’s associations, health expense associations or government insurers). However, these forms of 
ownership account for only a very small percentage of global insurance and reinsurance firms and, as 
a result, are left out for the sake of simplicity. 
Chapter 2: Insurance and Reinsurance – Fundamentals and Institutional Setting 29 
 
 
offer additional diversification benefits by holding diversified portfolios (consisting 
of stocks of firms in other industries) which eliminate firm-specific risks. Since 
mutual insurers are owned by their policyholders, the latter diversification benefits 
cannot be released. 
Another distinguishing characteristic between stock insurers and mutual 
insurers is that stock insurers require an upfront capital investment by their 
stockholders which is used to guarantee solvency in the event of adverse loss 
experiences. This is because the premium which stock insurers charge their 
policyholders is final, i.e. the premium does not include some form of contingent 
liability as in the case of mutual insurers. Thus, mutual insurers may collect further 
funds from policyholders at any time if the premium income is not sufficient to cover 
operating expenses and reimbursements to policyholders. 
The need to access capital and the desire for further diversification benefits 
have caused several mutual insurers to change their ownership structure to a stock or 
modified stock insurer in recent years. Also, many insurance firms nowadays operate 
in groups (sometimes referred to as fleets), which consist of a number of insurance 
firms under common management and common ownership. Insurance groups were 
initially formed during the so called monoline era when the writing of both property 
and casualty business within one insurance firm was prohibited. Although this reason 
no longer exists, insurance groups expanded to now include not only life insurance 
firms, but also reinsurance firms under one roof. For example, the world’s largest 
reinsurance firm Munich Re owns Ergo, which writes both life and non-life business. 
Also, Allianz (one of the biggest insurance firms in the world) writes both life and 
non-life business and owns a reinsurance firm called Allianz Re. 
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After the fundamentals of risk and insurance as well as the different 
participants of the insurance and reinsurance market have been described, the next 
three subsections will now give a broad overview of the recent developments and 
future challenges of both the private insurance and reinsurance industry. Also, an 
explanation of why the income from investment activities is fundamental for 
insurance and reinsurance firms is given. In doing so, the following subsections can 
provide a better understanding of the market size of the private insurance and 
reinsurance industry as well as the business activities of insurance and reinsurance 
firms in general. 
2.3.2 The Private Insurance Industry: 
Recent Developments and Future Challenges 
In 2011, the volume of global insurance premiums (including both life and non-life 
business) reached a record of $4,597 billion. With a total of $1,205 billion in total 
premium volume, the U.S. constituted by far the largest share of the global insurance 
market, followed by Japan ($655 billion), the UK ($ 320 billion) and France 
($273 billion). Among the top ten countries in terms of total insurance premiums in 
2011 (Figure 2-5 Panel A), most countries generated relatively higher premium 
incomes from life business as compared to non-life business. This is consistent with 
the historical trend in the global insurance market where the share of life premiums 
in global premium volume has ranged between 57% and 62% between 1998 and 
2011 (Figure 2-5 Panel B). 
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Figure 2-5 
Global Insurance Premium Volume by Year and Class of Business 
Panel A: Top 10 Countries by Global Insurance Premium Volume in 2011 
 
Panel B: Global Insurance Premium Volume by Class of Business 
 
Notes: Insurance premiums are based on written premiums and are from Swiss Re (2012a). 
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The recent development of global insurance premium income is illustrated 
in Figure 2-6. The figure shows both the nominal (not adjusted for inflation) global 
insurance premium income as well as the percentage of global insurance premiums 
to global GDP for the period 1998 to 2011. It becomes apparent that, even though the 
volume of global insurance premiums has more than doubled during 1998 to 2011, 
the insurance market has recently struggled to generate significant premium growth. 
For example, the global insurance premium income increased by only less than 8% 
between 2008 and 2011. Also, the ratio of global insurance premium to global GDP 
fell from 7.8% in 2002 to 6.5% in 2011. This is a critical development for the 
insurance industry as it suggests that the premium growth in global insurance 
markets has underperformed global economic growth in the past ten years. 
Figure 2-6 
Nominal Global Insurance Premiums 
 
Notes: The figure shows nominal (not adjusted for inflation) global insurance premiums (including 
life and non-life business) and the percentage of global insurance premiums to global GDP for the 
period 1998 to 2011. Insurance premium data are based on written premiums and are from Swiss Re 
(2012a). GDP data are from IMF (International Financial Statistics database). 
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The recent trend towards low growth rates in global premium income is 
even more evident when global premiums are expressed in real terms as in Figure 
2-7 which shows inflation-adjusted premium growth rates for the period 1980 to 
2011 for (i) global insurance markets, (ii) advanced markets (i.e. North America, 
Western Europe, Continental Europe, Japan and Oceania) and (iii) emerging markets 
(i.e. South and East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and Eastern 
Europe, Africa as well as Middle East and Central Asia). Thus, not only have the real 
growth rates in global insurance markets steadily declined since 1986 (when the 
insurance industry experienced its record year-to-year increase in premium income 
of nearly 18%), global growth rates have turned negative in the case of three years 
since 2008. 
When comparing the growth rates in advanced markets with the growth 
rates in emerging markets, it becomes obvious that the downward trend in global 
insurance market premium income is clearly driven by advanced markets. Thus, 
there is a high correlation between growth rates in global insurance markets and 
growth rates in advanced markets. In contrast to the trend in both the global market 
and advanced markets, emerging markets have been able to generate significant 
premium growth throughout the past 20 years of nearly 8.5% per annum (p.a.). Yet, 
the relatively small share of emerging markets in global premium income of less than 
20% has, so far, prevented a more noticeable influence on global premium growth. 
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Figure 2-7 
Real Global Premium Growth 
 
Source: The figure shows the real (inflation-adjusted) global premium growth (including life and non-
life business) as well as the premium growth for both advanced and emerging markets for the period 
1980 to 2011. The real growth rates are calculated using written premiums in local currencies which 
are adjusted for inflation using the individual consumer price index for each country. The data are 
from Swiss Re (2012a). 
Figure 2-8 provides a closer look at the real (inflation-adjusted) premium 
growth rates in selected regions for both advanced markets (Panel A) and emerging 
markets (Panel B) for the period 1999 to 2011. The figure shows that, while the 
advanced markets North America and Western Europe have been struggling to 
generate positive premium growth rates in recent years (Panel A), the emerging 
markets Latin America, South East Asia or Middle East/Central Asia have had 
premium growth rates well in excess of 10% (Panel B). Among the emerging 
markets, especially South and East Asia have witnessed some of the strongest 
premium increases of up to 21% in 2006. 
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Figure 2-8 
Real Premium Growth in Selected Regions 
Panel A: Advanced Markets 
 
Panel B: Emerging Markets 
 
Notes: The figure shows real (inflation-adjusted) global premium growth (including life and non-life 
business) for a selection of countries in both advanced (Panel A) and emerging markets (Panel B) for 
the period 1999 to 2011. The real growth rates are calculated using written premiums in local 
currencies which are adjusted for inflation using the individual consumer price index for each country. 
The data are from Swiss Re (2012a). 
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One effect of the substantial premium growth rates in countries such as 
Latin America or South East Asia in recent years is the shift in global market share 
of emerging markets. To illustrate this shift, Figure 2-9 shows the market share of 
North America, Western Europe and Japan (i.e. the vast majority of advanced 
markets) as compared to the rest of the world (i.e. mostly emerging markets) for the 
period 1998 to 2011. This comparison is done for the total insurance business 
including both life and non-life business (Panel A), as well as for life business (Panel 
B) and non-life business (Panel C), respectively. 
Since 2004, Western Europe has replaced North America as the world’s 
largest insurance market and, in 2011, Western Europe accounted for nearly 34% of 
global premium income (Panel A). The relative loss in market share of North 
America is mostly ascribed to two reasons. First, Western Europe and Japan have 
experienced a significant increase in their market share in life business during 2002-
2007 and 2008-2011, respectively (Panel B). Second, North America, which has 
always been the largest non-life insurance market, has lost substantial market share 
in this business sector to emerging markets (Panel C). Thus, North America’s share 
in non-life business dropped from 50% in 2001 to only 37% in 2011. 
Nevertheless, Western Europe too has lost market share to both emerging 
markets as well as Japan in recent years. As a result, while the combined market 
share of Western Europe and North America accounted for nearly 70% in 2007, it 
dropped to 57% in 2011. During the same time period, emerging markets have 
almost doubled their market share from 10% in 2007 to nearly 18% in 2011, while 
Japan’s market share increased by nearly 4% to 20%. 
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Figure 2-9 
Market Share by Region and Business Class 
Panel A: Total Business (Non-life and Life Business) 
 
Panel B: Non-life Business 
 
Panel C: Life Business 
 
Notes: The figure shows the changes in market share by region and year for total business (Panel A), 
non-life business (Panel B) and life business (Panel C). The data are from Swiss Re (2012a). 
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The substantial premium increase in both emerging markets as well as Japan 
is also evident in Table 2-1 which shows the world’s 25 largest insurance firms in 
terms of premium income in 2010. For example, the two largest insurance firms Axa 
S.A. ($108 billion) and Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. ($54 billion) which are both 
domiciled in Western Europe experienced only marginal premium income growth 
rates of less than 3% in 2010. At the same time, the Japanese insurer Meiji Yasuda 
Life Insurance Company as well as the Indian insurer Life Insurance Corporation of 
India could generate premium increases of nearly 22% and 18%, respectively. 
Table 2-1 
World’s Largest Insurance Firms by Premium Income 2010 
 Company Name Country 
of Domicile 
2010 Net Insurance 
Premiums Written 
USD (millions) 
% Change 
since 2009 
1. Axa S.A.  France 107,912  0.20  
2. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.  Italy 87,166  2.87  
3. UnitedHelath Group Inc.  U.S. 85,405  7.68  
4. Allianz SE  Germany 84,433  6.25  
5. Japan Post Insurance Co. Ltd.  Japan 80,985  -4.77  
6. National Mut Ins Fed of Agricultural Co-ops  Japan 63,643  2.08  
7. Munich Reinsurance Co.  Germany 57,841  9.78  
8. WellPoint Inc.  U.S. 54,109  -2.51  
9. Aviva plc  UK 53,237  7.15  
10. China Life Insurance Co.  China 52,873  15.48  
11. Nippon Life Insurance Co.  Japan 52,182  -4.40  
12. State Farm Group  U.S. 55,296  2.32  
13. American International Group Inc.  U.S. 46,227  -5.34  
14. Kaiser Foundation Group of Health Plans  U.S. 45,025  -5.59  
15. Zurich Financial Services Ltd.  Switzerland 44,282  -7.69  
16. CNP Assurances  France 41,655  -0.46  
17. Life Insurance Corporation of India  India 41,326  18.32  
18. Dai-ichi Life Insurance Co. Ltd.  Japan 39,968  12.47  
19. Prudential plc  UK 37,456  21.20  
20. Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance Co.  Japan 35,630  21.97  
21. ING Groep N.V.  Netherlands 34,247  -9.50  
22. Sumitomo Life Insurance Co.  Japan 33,369  20.30  
23. Humana Inc.  U.S. 32,712  9.31  
24. Berkshire Hathaway  U.S. 30,916  10.88  
25. Tokio Marine Holdings Inc.  Japan 29,755  -4.26  
Notes: Insurance premiums include both life and non-life business and are from A.M. Best (2012). 
Chapter 2: Insurance and Reinsurance – Fundamentals and Institutional Setting 39 
 
 
It is expected that advanced markets such as Western Europe and North 
America will continue to face difficulties in generating significant premium growth 
in the next years. Emerging markets, however, are expected to benefit from future 
premium growth rates and, consequently, are likely to further increase their global 
market share in both life and non-life business segments. To provide evidence for 
this expectation, Figure 2-10 compares the insurance density (Panel A) as well as the 
insurance penetration (Panel B) for selected countries in both advanced and emerging 
markets in 2011. Both measures are commonly used to gauge the growth and 
development potential of insurance markets. While insurance density measures the 
per capita spending on insurance, insurance penetration measures premiums as a 
share of GDP. Lower than average insurance densities or insurance penetrations are 
generally interpreted as signals of future growth opportunities. 
The global average per capita spending in 2011 totaled $661, including both 
life business ($378) and non-life business ($283). While it is less surprising to find 
that advanced countries are above this average, it is interesting to note that the 
insurance density varies extremely among countries, reflecting different stages of 
economic development. For example, the highest per capita spending of more than 
$8,000 is found in Switzerland while the emerging markets China and India 
produced a per capita spending of only $163 and $59, respectively. Similar results 
can be found as regards the insurance penetration in 2011. Thus, for most advanced 
markets the ratio of premiums to local GDP is weigh above the global average of 
6.8% while the ratios in emerging markets such as China and Turkey are 3% and 
1.3%, respectively. As a result, both the insurance density and insurance penetration 
point towards future premium growth in the insurance industry of emerging markets. 
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Figure 2-10 
Insurance Density and Penetration for Selected Countries in 2011 
Panel A: Insurance Density (Premiums per Capita, 2011) 
 
Panel B: Insurance Penetration (Premium in % of GDP, 2011) 
 
Source: Swiss Re (2012a). 
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2.3.3 The Private Reinsurance Industry: 
Recent Developments and Future Challenges 
Reinsurance, as mentioned above, is the technique whereby insurance firms may 
transfer parts of the risks they assume (in insuring individuals and business firms) to 
other insurance firms (referred to as reinsurance firms). The risks which insurance 
firms transfer (or ‘cede’) to reinsurance firms are typically restricted to low-
frequency but high-severity events such as natural catastrophes. As a result, the size 
of the global reinsurance industry should be much smaller as compared to the size of 
the global insurance industry. 
Figure 2-11 illustrates the size of the global reinsurance industry in terms of 
total reinsurance premium income (including life and non-life business) for the 
period 2007 to 2011. Also, the figure reports the premium income for North 
America, Western Europe, Japan and Korea as well as the aggregates for emerging 
markets (Panel A), and shows the corresponding growth rates (Panel B) during that 
time period. 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from Figure 2-11. First, the 
volume of global reinsurance premiums has grown from less than $180 billion in 
2007 to approximately $210 billion in 2011 (Panel A). This means that the global 
reinsurance industry (in terms of premium income) is indeed much smaller than the 
insurance industry (where the volume of global premium income has ranged between 
$4,000 billion and $4,600 billion during the same time period; see Figure 2-6). 
Second, and similar to the insurance industry, the advanced markets North America 
and Western Europe have struggled to produce significant premium growth in recent 
years as compared to emerging markets (such as China, India or South and East 
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Asia) or Japan and Korea (Panel B). Thus, while the average annual premium growth 
rate in North America and Western Europe was only 1% p.a. during 2007 and 2011, 
emerging markets and Japan/Korea grew (on average) by 14% and 9%, respectively. 
Figure 2-11 
Reinsurance Premium Income and Growth by Region 
Panel A: Global Reinsurance Premium Income by Region 
 
Panel B: Reinsurance Premium Growth by Region 
 
Notes: Insurance premiums are based on nominal (not adjusted for inflation) written premiums 
(including both life and non-life business) and are from Guy Carpenter (2012b). 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
(bn USD) (bn USD) 
North America Western Europe Emerging Markets 
Japan/Korea Total (right-hand-scale) 
-10% 
-5% 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
North America Western Europe Emerging Markets Japan/Korea 
Chapter 2: Insurance and Reinsurance – Fundamentals and Institutional Setting 43 
 
 
Nevertheless, despite the strong growth rates in emerging markets in recent 
years, amongst the 25 largest reinsurance firms (in terms of written premium) in 
2010 which are displayed in Table 2-2, there are only two reinsurance firms 
domiciled in emerging markets, i.e. China Reinsurance Group Inc. ($4 billion) and 
General Insurance Corporation of India ($3 billion). The largest reinsurance firms 
are Munich Reinsurance Co. ($31 billion), followed by Swiss Reinsurance Co. Ltd. 
($25 billion) and Hannover Rueckversicherung AG ($15 billion). 
Table 2-2 
World’s Largest Reinsurance Firms by Premiums Written 2010 
 Company Name Country 
of Domicile 
Reinsurance 
Premiums 
Written 
USD (millions) 
Life & Non-life 
Reinsurance 
Premiums 
Written 
USD (millions) 
Non-life only 
1. Munich Reinsurance Co.  Germany 31,280  20,809  
2. Swiss Reinsurance Co. Ltd.  Switzerland 24,756  13,783  
3. Hannover Rueckversicherung AG  Germany 15,147  8,401  
4. Berkshire Hathaway Inc.  U.S. 14,374  9,171  
5. Lloyd’s of London  UK 12,977  12,977  
6. SCOR SE  France 8,872  4,849  
7. Reinsurance Group of America  U.S. 7,201  0  
8. Allianz SE  Germany 5,736  5,320  
9. PartnerRe Ltd.  U.S. 4,881  4,132  
10. Everest Re Group Ltd.  U.S. 4,201  4,201  
11. Transatlantic Holdings Inc.  U.S. 4,133  4,133  
12. Korean Reinsurance Company  Korea 4,114  4,114  
13. China Reinsurance Group Inc.  China 3,796  2,526  
14. London Reinsurance Group Inc.  UK 3,266  0  
15. MAPFRE RE Companies de Reaseguros SA  Spain 3,143  2,766  
16. General Insurance Corporation of India  India 2,573  2,566  
17. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.  Italy 2,463  776  
18. AEGON N.V.  Netherlands 2,391  0  
19. QBE Insurance Group Ltd.  Australia 2,280  2,280  
20. XL Group plc  UK 2,255  1,843  
21. MS&AS Insurance Group Holdings Inc.  Japan 2,206  2,206  
22. The Toa Reinsurance Company Ltd.  U.S. 2,021  2,021  
23. Axis Capital Holdings Ltd.  Bermuda 1,834  1,834  
24. Caisse Centrale de Reassurance  France 1,814  1,682  
25. Odyssey Re Holdings Co.  U.S. 1,625  1,625  
Notes: Reinsurance premiums include both life and non-life business and are from A.M. Best (2012). 
Chapter 2: Insurance and Reinsurance – Fundamentals and Institutional Setting 44 
 
 
Against the background that the global reinsurance premium income in 
2010 accounted for only $200 billion, Table 2-2 shows that the global reinsurance 
market is dominated by a few large reinsurance firms. To illustrate this fact, Figure 
2-12 reports the market share of the ten largest reinsurance firms (in terms of 
reinsurance premium income in 2010). In doing so it becomes apparent that, while 
the three largest reinsurance firms account for more than one third of global 
reinsurance premiums, the ten largest reinsurance firms account for more than two 
thirds. It is estimated that the remaining 31% are shared globally among another 190 
different reinsurance firms. 
In sum, the reinsurance industry is relatively smaller (in terms of premium 
income) and much more concentrated as compared to the insurance industry. Yet, the 
reinsurance industry faces similar difficulties as the insurance industry, as it has 
recently struggled to generate significant premium growth in advanced markets. 
Figure 2-12 
Market Share Based on Reinsurance Premium Written 2010 
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Notes: Reinsurance premiums include both life and non-life business and are from A.M. Best (2012). 
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2.3.4 The Importance of Investment Income 
Insurance and reinsurance firms usually have substantial funds at their disposal for 
investments. The main reason is that insurance and reinsurance firms usually collect 
premiums from policyholders in advance of paying claims on the corresponding 
policies. Depending on the type of insurance policy, the time lag between collecting 
the premiums and paying off claims to policyholders can be significant. Especially in 
the case of life insurance contracts this time period can last up to several decades. 
Figure 2-13 shows that in 2010 global insurance and reinsurance 
investments totaled $22.6 trillion. This is equal to 12% of global financial assets in 
2010 according to the Geneva Association (2011). The vast majority of funds is held 
by life insurers and reinsurers who account for $18.7 trillion or nearly 83% of global 
insurance investments. Non-life insurers and reinsurers, on the contrary, only account 
for $3.9 trillion or less than 18% of global insurance investments. Geographically, 
Europe and North America are the largest investors in 2010 accounting for $10.5 
trillion and $6.4 trillion in insurance investments, respectively. 
Figure 2-13 
Insurance and Reinsurance Investments by Region in 2010 
 
Source: Geneva Association (2011, Figure 6). 
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The income from investment activities is crucial for insurance firms in order 
to remain profitable. This is because most insurance and reinsurance firms do not 
generate profits from their underwriting operations. For example, according to 
several Swiss Re sigma reports (dating from 2000 to 2011), the insurers’ combined 
ratio (which is a commonly used measure for underwriting performance, defined as 
the percentage of the premium dollar spent on claims and expenses) in North 
America has only been below 100% in 2004, 2006 and 2007 since 2000. This means 
that in the other nine years for the average of North American insurers, claims and 
expenses exceeded premium income, i.e. North American insurers produced 
underwriting losses. However, insurance and reinsurance firms usually offset these 
underwriting losses with the income from their investment activities. 
Since most of the collected premiums by insurance and reinsurance firms 
need to be available at some future time (which us unknown in most cases) to 
reimburse policyholders for the insured losses, insurance firms are restricted in their 
investment opportunities by insurance regulation. As a result, two-thirds of global 
insurance investments are in bonds (Geneva Association, 2011). Stocks are less 
popular as an investment class as they are less liquid (in a case of a major insurance 
or market disaster) and exhibit more market risk as compared to bonds. However, 
long-term interest rates on bonds have been declining in the past decades and have 
reached a historical low at the beginning of 2012. Figure 2-14 illustrates this trend by 
showing the historical interest rates on ten-year government bonds for the UK, the 
U.S., Germany as well as Japan during the time period 1990 to the beginning of 
2012. In the UK, for example, long-term interest rates declined from nearly 13% in 
1990 to less than 2% at the beginning of 2012. 
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Figure 2-14 
Long-term Interest Rates 
 
Notes: The figure shows the historical interest rates on ten-year government bonds for selected 
countries during the period 1990 to 2012 (March). The data are from Datastream. 
As a result of the declining long-term interest rates in the past decades, 
insurance and reinsurance firms increasingly face difficulties in maintaining their 
high levels of investment incomes. This becomes evident when the investment 
income is expressed as a % of premium income as in Figure 2-15 (Panel A). Thus, 
while the investment income for the sample of all listed insurance and reinsurance 
firms on Datastream accounted for more than 28% of premium income in 1991, it 
dropped to nearly 9% in 2009. Since then, the ratio has slightly recovered but still 
remains at a relatively low level (as compared to historical values) of 16%. As 
mentioned above, lower investment incomes are critical for insurance firms’ 
profitability as insurers can no longer rely on this source of income to offset 
underwriting losses. This is illustrated in Figure 2-15 (Panel B) which shows the 
return on equity of all listed insurance and reinsurance firms on Datastream for the 
period 1987 to 2011. Though the return on equity is highly volatile (ranging from 
21% in 1988 to -6% in 2011) the overall historical trend is clearly downward facing. 
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Figure 2-15 
Investment Income and Return on Equity 
Panel A: Investment Income as a % of Premiums Income 
 
Panel B: Return on Equity 
 
Notes: The figure reports the investment income as a % of premium income (Panel A) as well as the 
return on equity (Panel B) for all insurance and reinsurance firms listed on Datastream for the period 
1987 to 2011. 
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2.4 Summary and Conclusions 
As the first of two background chapters to the thesis (Chapters 2 and 3), this chapter 
started off by explaining the fundamentals of risk and insurance, which was followed 
by a discussion of the institutional setting for the private insurance and reinsurance 
industry. 
By explaining the fundamentals of risk and insurance, it could be shown that 
insurance can be interpreted as a risk management tool which belongs to the group of 
risk financing techniques. Also, the two fundamental characteristics of insurance (i.e. 
the transfer of risk and pooling of losses) were explained and it was argued that (due 
to the law of large numbers and pooling thousands of homogeneous risk exposure 
units) insurance firms are better able to predict future losses within rather narrow 
limits as compared to individuals and business firms. Finally, it was shown that 
insurance provides a more optimal utilization of capital, and that individuals and 
business firms are best off purchasing insurance against those risks which rarely 
happen but, if they do, usually cause substantial financial losses. 
The discussion of the institutional setting revealed that global insurance and 
reinsurance markets have been struggling to generate significant premium growth in 
recent years. At the same time, historically low interest rates have caused the 
investment income of both insurance and reinsurance firms to significantly decline. 
This means that insurance and reinsurance firms can no longer rely on their 
investment income to offset underwriting losses. As a result, insurance and 
reinsurance firms are increasingly put at risk of suffering major financial losses in the 
event of large underwriting losses. This requires insurance and reinsurance firms to 
manage their exposure to large underwriting losses more carefully than ever before. 
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3  
The Market for Catastrophe Risk and 
Insurance Securitization
5
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter shows that for insurance and reinsurance firms the management 
of their exposure to large underwriting losses (i.e. their exposure to catastrophe risk) 
has become more important than ever before in order to remain profitable. This 
chapter (the second of two background chapters to this thesis) now provides an 
overview of the market for catastrophe risk, including both the development in 
economic and insured losses from catastrophe risks as well as the problems faced by 
individuals, business firms and insurers in transferring catastrophe risks through 
insurance and reinsurance. Further, and following the overview of the market for 
catastrophe risk, an alternative approach of transferring catastrophe risk is discussed, 
namely the securitization of catastrophe risk. This discussion consists of the concept 
of insurance securitization in general (and of Cat bonds in particular), as well as a 
brief overview of the development of the Cat bond market. 
                                                 
5 Parts of this chapter have been published in Hagendorff, B., Insurance-linked Securities – Here to 
Stay? (Master thesis, 2009, Chapter 2). 
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From the discussion below, it will become evident that capacity constraints in 
the market for catastrophe risk prevent an efficient sharing of catastrophe risk among 
market participants (leaving individuals, business firms and insurers no choice but to 
retain the vast majority of their catastrophe risk exposure) and that insurance 
securitization could ease the markets’ constraints by providing additional 
underwriting capacity for firms exposed to catastrophe risk. However, while the 
market for insurance securitization has undergone rapid growth in response to a 
general increase in the amount of catastrophe-related underwriting losses, global 
volumes of insurance securitization still lag behind expectations. This raises 
questions about the general need of insurance and reinsurance firms for additional 
risk-financing capacity and casts doubt on the usefulness and effectiveness of 
insurance securitization as a risk management tool. 
3.2 The Market for Catastrophe Risk 
The past decades have seen a remarkable increase in economic losses from 
catastrophe risks (i.e. mainly losses from natural catastrophes such as hurricanes, 
earthquakes, wind and ice storms, floods, etc). This trend becomes evident in Figure 
3-1 which shows global economic losses associated with natural catastrophes for the 
period 1980 to 2011. Especially low-frequency but high-severity events, such as the 
recent tsunami in Japan (or Hurricane Katrina in 2005) which caused more than 
$200 billion ($100 billion) of economic losses, have contributed to the increase in 
catastrophe losses from natural catastrophes. This trend is expected to continue, 
given the growth rates in both physical asset values as well as population in high-risk 
zones (Froot, 2001). 
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Figure 3-1 
Economic Losses from Natural Catastrophes with Trend 
 
Source: Munich Re (2012). 
To avoid large and unexpected losses from natural catastrophes, owners of 
physical capital (i.e. mainly individuals and business firms) can share their 
catastrophe risk exposure with others through the purchase of insurance (as explained 
in Chapter 2). As a result of this risk transfer and the increase in economic losses 
from natural catastrophes, insurance firms too have experienced a dramatic increase 
in both the magnitude as well as frequency of underwriting losses linked to natural 
catastrophes in recent years. For example, Table 3-1 reveals that eight out of the ten 
most expensive natural catastrophes for insurance firms (in terms of insured losses) 
have occurred in the past ten years. 
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Table 3-1 
Ten Most Costly Natural Catastrophes in Terms of Insured Losses 
One of the main problems associated with the recent increase in 
underwriting losses from natural catastrophes for insurance firms is that the global 
risk-financing capacity of natural catastrophes in the insurance industry has remained 
limited to date. For example, in case of a $200 billion catastrophe the U.S. P&L 
insurance industry could only pay 78.6% of losses (based on 1997 capitalization), 
leaving open the prospect of insolvencies and instability in global insurance markets 
in the event of a severe natural catastrophe (Cummins et al., 2002). Owing to the 
limited risk-financing capacity, insurance firms have been willing to insure only 
fractions of the economic losses caused by natural catastrophes, while the great bulk 
of economic losses is retained by individuals and business firms (see also 
D’Agostino, 2002). To illustrate this behavior, Figure 3-2 shows the deficit of 
insurance cover for natural catastrophes as a percentage of total economic losses 
from natural catastrophes for the period 1980 to 2011. It becomes evident that the 
deficit of insurance cover for natural catastrophes has ranged between 53% and 94% 
during this time period. 
Insured Loss 
(bn USD) 
Date 
(start) 
Event Country 
74,686   25.08.2005   Hurricane Katrina U.S., Gulf of Mexico, Bahamas 
35,000  11.03.2011  Earthquake triggers tsunami Japan 
25,641   23.08.1992   Hurricane Andrew U.S., Bahamas 
21,239   17.01.1994   Northridge earthquake U.S. 
21,141   06.09.2008   Hurricane Ike U.S., Caribbean, et al. 
15,350  02.09.2004  Hurricane Ivan U.S., Caribbean, Barbados, et al. 
14,468   19.10.2005   Hurricane Wilma U.S., Mexico, Jamaica, Haiti, et al. 
12,000  27.07.2011  Flood Thailand 
12,000  22.02.2011  Earthquake New Zealand 
11,625  20.09.2005  Hurricane Rita U.S., Gulf of Mexico, Cuba 
Notes: Losses are in constant 2011-USD terms based on the Consumer Price Index (All Urban 
Consumers) and are from Swiss Re (2012b). 
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Figure 3-2 
Deficit of Insurance Cover for Natural Catastrophes 
 
Notes: Figures are in constant 2011-USD terms based on the Consumer Price Index (All Urban 
Consumers) and are from various Swiss Re Sigma Reports dating from 1998 to 2012 as well as 
Munich Re (2012). The deficit of insurance cover for natural catastrophes is calculated as the 
percentage of uninsured losses to total economic losses from natural catastrophes. 
In order to increase the risk-financing capacity of natural catastrophes, 
insurance firms can purchase reinsurance to share their exposure to catastrophe risk 
with reinsurance firms. However, Froot (2001) finds that insurance firms purchase 
relatively little reinsurance against catastrophe losses, even though risk management 
theory suggests protection against the losses of large catastrophe events is most 
valuable (Froot et al., 1993). 
Figure 3-3 shows the retention rate for natural catastrophe risks of U.S. 
insurance firms for the period 1989 to 2007 and illustrates that insurance firms have 
continuously been retaining more natural catastrophe risks, especially in recent years. 
This is problematic as the limited ability to share catastrophe risks with reinsurance 
firms increases the risk of major financial losses and potential insolvencies in 
insurance markets in the event of a severe natural catastrophe (Froot, 2001). 
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Figure 3-3 
Retention Rate for Natural Catastrophe Risk of U.S. Insurers 
 
Source: Approximation of Guy Carpenter (2007). 1989 = base year set to 100. Figures for 2008 to 
2011 were not available at the point this thesis was completed. 
One of the main reasons as to why insurance firms make only little use of 
catastrophe reinsurance is that the reinsurance industry is also subject to capacity 
constraints (Weiss and Chung, 2004; Cummins, 2007). As a result, insurance firms 
too face difficulties in transferring their exposure to catastrophe risk. For example, 
due to capacity constraints in the reinsurance market, catastrophe reinsurance proves 
to be relatively expensive (with premiums for catastrophe cover being usually a 
multiple of expected losses, see Froot, 2001 or Froot and O’Connell, 2008). Also, the 
capacity constraints cause severe price instability for catastrophe reinsurance, a 
phenomenon known as the underwriting cycle, which poses difficulties in accurately 
predicting the costs of risk management via reinsurance. The underwriting cycle is 
characterized by periods when reinsurance prices are relatively low and coverage is 
readily available (soft markets) and periods when reinsurance prices are high and 
coverage supply is restricted (hard markets). 
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Figure 3-4 shows the global Guy Carpenter catastrophe reinsurance rate on 
line (ROL) index for the period 1990 to 2011. The index is calculated by dividing the 
contractual reinsurance premium by the reinsurance limit and converting the results 
into a percentage. Figure 3-4 reveals two important findings. First, prices for 
catastrophe coverage have varied substantially (up to 400 per cent) during the period 
1990 to 2011. Second, it becomes evident that hard markets are usually triggered by 
large natural catastrophes. Thus, the ROL index spiked dramatically in response to 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the World Trade Centre terrorist attacks in 2001 as well 
as Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Similar evidence for price cycles can also be found in 
insurance markets (see Gron, 1994). 
Figure 3-4 
Catastrophe Reinsurance Rate on Line Index 
 
Source: Guy Carpenter (2012a). 1990 = base year set to 100. 
In sum, the past decades have seen a remarkable increase in economic and 
underwriting losses from natural catastrophes. This poses great risks to owners of 
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physical capital and insurance firms, as evidence shows that the current market for 
catastrophe risk is subject to capacity constraints which prevent an efficient sharing 
of the exposure to catastrophe risk among market participants. As a result, 
individuals and business firms have no choice but to retain most of their exposure to 
catastrophe risk and face the possibility of major financial losses in the event of a 
severe natural catastrophe. In the same vein, insurance firms are increasingly put at 
risk of becoming concentrated warehouses of catastrophe exposure (leading to the 
increasing possibility of catastrophe-induced insolvencies) as the capacity to transfer 
catastrophe risk to reinsurance firms is limited and causes prices for catastrophe 
reinsurance to remain at relatively high levels. 
3.3 Insurance Securitization: 
The Case of Catastrophe Bonds 
Capital markets can draw on a larger, more liquid and more diversified pool of 
capacity than the equity of insurance and reinsurance firms (Durbin, 2001). 
Consequently, capital markets seem to be a viable source for insurance and 
reinsurance firms to markedly increase the global risk-financing capacity of natural 
catastrophes and to establish a more efficient sharing of the exposure to catastrophe 
risk among the participants in the market for catastrophe risk. 
Insurance securitization has long been hailed as a promising vehicle for 
accessing capital markets for providing additional risk-financing capacity (e.g. Jaffee 
and Russell, 1997; Froot, 2001). Insurance securitization is a general term that covers 
various instruments designed to transfer both non-life as well as life insurance risks 
to capital markets. Depending on how strictly the term insurance securitization is 
defined, instruments range from pure financial instruments to so called hybrid 
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products, which combine features of financial instruments and traditional insurance 
and reinsurance.6 Cat bonds are pure financial instruments and, irrespective of which 
insurance securitization definition is applied, have been by far the most successful 
securitization vehicle (as measured by total issued risk capital) for transferring 
insurance-related underwriting risks to capital markets to date (Cummins and 
Trainar, 2009). 
Cat bonds are sometimes referred to as insurance-linked securities (ILS). 
Strictly speaking, however, the term ILS serves as a subordinate for bonds whose 
coupons and principal payments are contingent on the performance of a pool or index 
of insurance-related risks. Based on the underlying risk type of these bonds, ILS can 
be categorized into either catastrophe bonds and non-catastrophe bonds, or into 
property and casualty (P&C) bonds and life bonds. Until recently, Cat bonds had 
solely been used to transfer extreme P&C risks such as hurricanes and earthquakes to 
the capital markets, whereas life bonds had preliminarily provided financing backed 
by future premium flows (life securitization). During that time literature used the 
terms Cat bonds and P&C bonds synonymously which could be clearly defined to 
life bonds. Meanwhile, some life bonds have been issued to purely transfer 
catastrophe mortality risk (Cowley and Cummins, 2005).7 Cat bonds and life bonds 
are, therefore, no longer mutually exclusive terms given that “some life bonds are 
now Cat bonds” (Helfenstein and Holzheu 2006, pg. 4). 
                                                 
6 Pure financial instruments are amongst others catastrophe swaps and options, as well as contingent 
capital. Examples of hybrid products include sidecars, industry loss warranties and finite reinsurance. 
For more details on financial instruments and hybrid products refer to Cummins and Weiss (2009). 
7 The first such bond was the Swiss Re mortality bond known as VITA I which came to market in 
December 2003 (see Helfenstein and Holzheu, 2006). 
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To avoid any confusion over terminology, this thesis uses the following 
categorization of Cat bonds as shown in Figure 3-5. The term Cat bond comprises all 
bonds which are designed to transfer catastrophe risks to capital markets. This 
includes all P&C bonds as well as those life bonds which are based on catastrophe 
mortality risks (morality bonds). All other life bonds which do not refer to the 
transfer of catastrophe risks (i.e. longevity bonds and life securitizations) are not 
subsumed under the term Cat bond and are not further examined in this thesis. 
Figure 3-5 
Terminology Used in the Thesis 
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3.3.1 A Typical Catastrophe Bond Structure 
The unique characteristic of Cat bonds is that coupons and principal payments are 
contingent on the performance of a pool or index of insurance-related risks. 
Consequently, Cat bonds are insurance derivatives whose payoffs depend on the 
occurrence of a catastrophe loss event. Most of the Cat bonds issued to date have 
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been linked to natural catastrophes such as hurricanes and earthquakes, although 
some bonds have also been linked to mortality events. A typical Cat bond structure is 
shown in Figure 3-6. The transaction usually involves an issuer (sometimes referred 
to as sponsor), a special purpose vehicle (SPV), a total return swap (TRS) 
counterparty and several investors. 
Figure 3-6 
Typical Catastrophe Bond Structure 
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Based on Cummins and Weiss (2009). 
The first step in the transaction is the formation of the SPV which issues the 
Cat bonds to investors and invests the proceeds in low risk, short-term securities such 
as government bonds which are held in a trust account. Embedded in the bonds is a 
call option that is triggered by a defined event (trigger event), which can for example 
be the occurrence of a specific magnitude of an earthquake in the case of P&C 
bonds, or the occurrence of a certain attachment point of a mortality index in the case 
of mortality bonds. 
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On the occurrence of the trigger event, the proceeds are released from the 
SPV and passed on to the issuer leading to a partial or total loss of principal to 
investors, and/or future coupons to investors are reduced. If no trigger event occurs 
during the term of the bonds - which on average is between three to four years - the 
principal is returned to the investors upon the bonds’ expiration. In return for taking 
the risk of losing principal and/or coupon payments, investors receive a risk 
premium - also referred to as ‘spread’ - from the issuer. In addition, investors are 
compensated for the time value of their money by receiving the fixed returns on the 
securities held in the trust account. Originally, these fixed returns were swapped for 
floating returns based on London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) or some other 
widely accepted index by a TRS counterparty in order to minimize interest rate risk. 
However, the TRS counterparty gave rise to counterparty risk. This was 
revealed when Lehman Brothers - acting as the TRS counterparty on four Cat 
bonds - went bankrupt which caused the impairment of the collaterals behind.8 This 
is why more recent Cat bond issuances have been structured without any TRS 
counterparties (‘pass trough approach’) or with the intervention of a clearing house 
between the issuer and the repurchase counterparty (‘three party repurchase 
approach’). 
                                                 
8 The four Cat bonds where Lehman Brothers acted as the TRS counterparty were Ajax, Carillon, 
Newton Re and Wilow Re. Investors incurred a loss of 80 points on Ajax and around 40 points on the 
other three deals. 
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3.3.2 The Trigger Event: Basis Risk vs. Moral Hazard 
A crucial issue in the design of a Cat bond is the choice of the trigger event. The 
trigger event is stated in the contract between the issuer and the SPV and, eventually, 
defines the conditions under when payouts to investors are made. 
The features of the different trigger events (i.e. mainly the degree of basis 
risk and moral hazard associated with each trigger event) play an important role in 
understanding the risk implications and performance implications of insurance 
securitization in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this thesis. Consequently, this subsection 
explains the features of the different trigger events in detail, including their pros and 
cons for issuers and investors. 
There are basically three types of trigger events: (i) indemnity based 
triggers, where payouts are based on the actual loss experience of the issuer’s own 
book of business, (ii) index based triggers, where payouts are based on an index 
which is not directly tied to the issuer’s own book of business and (iii) hybrid 
triggers, which blend more than one trigger in a single bond. 
The issuers’ choice of the trigger type from 1997 through 2011 is illustrated 
in Figure 3-7. It shows that, for the period as a whole, index and hybrid triggers 
accounted for 60% of total issue volume. However, an observable trend in the use of 
a particular trigger cannot be exposed. 
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Figure 3-7 
Catastrophe Bond Issues by Trigger Type 
 
Notes: The relative use of the different trigger types are expressed in percentage of total issue volume. 
Figures are taken from Swiss Re (2012d). 
Doherty (1997) explains that the choice between indemnity and index based 
triggers is shaped by the trade-off between the relative cost of moral hazard and basis 
risk. As defined by the American Academy of Actuaries9, 
“Basis risk is the risk that there may be a difference between the 
performance of the hedge and the losses sustained from the hedged exposure. It is the 
risk that the value of the underlying or index used and/or structure of the settlement 
(in cash) of the derivative may not provide the desired offset to the insurer’s loss.” 
While basis risk is resolved via the use of indemnity based indices, this 
gives rise to moral hazard. Moral hazard could cause the issuer failing to take actions 
to reduce future losses (ex ante moral hazard) or relaxing settlement practices (ex 
post moral hazard). Index based triggers on the other hand, reduce moral hazard but 
                                                 
9 Kist and Meyers (1999). 
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increase basis risk. Therefore, when choosing an index based trigger, it is favorable 
for issuers when the index is highly correlated with the actual loss experience of their 
own books of business to minimize basis risk, while it is favorable for investors 
when the issuer has little or no control over the index which increases the 
transparency of the transaction by reducing moral hazard. 
There are three broad types of indices which can be used as Cat bond 
triggers: (i) industry loss indices in the case of non-life bonds, or mortality indices in 
the case of mortality bonds, (ii) modelled-loss indices, and (iii) parametric indices 
(Cummins, 2008). 
Industry loss indices are based on industry-wide indices of losses, e.g. the 
Property Claim Service index, where payoffs on the bonds are triggered when 
estimated industry-wide losses from an event exceed a specified threshold. Similarly, 
mortality indices are based on a particular index of mortality rates, e.g. the 
LifeMetrics index, which is usually broken down by age and gender for different 
countries. Payoffs on mortality indices are triggered when events such as major 
natural catastrophes or avian flu pandemics cause the index to exceed a specified 
rate. Payoffs on modelled-loss indices, however, are determined by inputting actual 
physical parameters into an agreed-upon, fixed model to calculate losses (Helfenstein 
and Holzheu, 2006). Finally, parametric indices determine the payoffs on the bond 
on actual reported physical events such as the magnitude of an earthquake or the 
wind speed of a hurricane. 
Both industry loss indices and mortality indices, as well as modelled-loss 
indices are considered to have a moderate degree of basis risk and transparency 
(Helfenstein and Holzheu, 2006). Parametric indices, on the contrary, are regarded to 
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involve the highest degree of basis risk for issuers but also the highest degree of 
transparency for investors. These characteristics are summarized in Figure 3-8. It 
becomes evident that there is no such thing as a superior trigger type. 
Figure 3-8 
Transparency and Basis Risk for Various Types of Triggers 
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Source: Helfenstein and Holzheu (2006, Figure 2). 
3.3.3 The Catastrophe Bond Market 
The idea of accessing capital markets by issuing Cat bonds was borne out of the 
desire to increase reinsurance capacity in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 
1992. However, the first ever successful Cat bond issuance - named KOVER 
initialized by Hannover Re - was not performed until 1994.10 
                                                 
10 The first Cat bonds are sometimes referred to as ‘Act of God’ bonds. 
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The development of the Cat bond market is reflected in Figure 3-9 which 
shows the total Cat bond risk capital issued and outstanding from 1997 through 
2011.11 It becomes evident that the Cat bond market has grown steadily from less 
than $1 billion of total risk capital outstanding and issued in 1997 to its record-high 
of nearly $17 billion in 2007, whereupon the market stagnated at around $14 billion 
in the following years. 
Figure 3-9 
Outstanding and Issued Catastrophe Bond Volume 
 
Source: Swiss Re (2012c, Figure 6) 
The significant market growth is mostly ascribed to the heavily accelerating 
volume of new Cat bond issuances throughout the 2004 to 2007 period, during which 
the volume quadrupled to reach $8 billion in 2007. The main reason for this increase 
                                                 
11 Amount of risk capital outstanding represents the face value of all bonds still in effect in each year. 
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in the new issue volume were severe capacity constraints in the insurance and 
reinsurance industry following the 2005 losses of hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma 
in excess of $100 billion. Hereafter, however, the volume of new issued Cat bonds 
collapsed to nearly $3 billion in 2009 and, since then, has not really recovered. Thus, 
the total outstanding risk capital of Cat bonds issued between 1997 and 2011 
corresponds to only 8% of insured catastrophe losses during that period (according to 
calculations based on various Swiss Re Sigma Reports dating from 1997 to 2011). 
In theory, each party with catastrophe risk exposure could issue Cat bonds. 
However, as shown in Figure 3-10 which illustrates the risk capital by issuer type 
from 1997 through 2011, the market is dominated by insurers and reinsurers. As only 
a small fraction of risk capital accounts for corporate/government, this thesis focuses 
on insurance and reinsurance firms only.12 Since the first successful Cat bond 
issuance in 1994, there have been approximately 70 different issuers participating in 
the market. An important characteristic of these issuers is that they are all 
particularly large relative to their market competitors. One explanation is that only 
large companies possess the financial sophistication and adequate mass to produce 
transactions of sufficient size to amortize the high costs of structuring, and that larger 
companies are more likely to have easier access to a broader pool of investors due to 
their own asset management entities (see Cummins and Trainar, 2009). 
                                                 
12 The first Cat bond issued by a non-insurance company was in 1999 by Oriental Land Company, 
Ltd., the owner of Tokyo Disneyland, which covered earthquake losses. 
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Figure 3-10 
Catastrophe Bond Issues by Issuer Type 
 
Source: Guy Carpenter (2008) and Swiss Re (2012d). 
The motivation for investors to engage in the Cat bond market is simple. 
Aside from earning potentially higher investment returns as compared to assets 
having the same risk profile, investors expect Cat bonds “as a new asset class” 
(Litzenberger et al. 1996) to show no or little correlation with traditional asset classes 
and, therefore, to offer attractive risk/return opportunities when included in 
diversified stock and bond portfolios. Investments in Cat bonds are restricted to 
qualified institutional investors as defined in rule 144A of the U.S. Securities Act.13 
Also, Cat bonds are not publicly traded and, therefore, not subject to the SEC’s full 
registration and disclosure requirements. As a result, there is only limited data 
available regarding the different investor types. 
                                                 
13 The only opportunity for private investors to indirectly invest in Cat bonds is to use the two public 
funds managed by Switzerland’s Bank Leu, which solely invest into Cat bonds. 
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Figure 3-11 compares the issue volume purchased by investor type of the 
years 1999 and 2011. It becomes apparent that, unlike in 1999, the Cat bond market 
is now able to attract new capital from outside the insurance market into the 
financing of catastrophe risk. Thus, in 2011 insurers and reinsurers accounted for 
only 7% of supply, as compared to 55% in 1999. Specialized catastrophe-oriented 
funds (dedicated Cat funds) make up the vast majority of investments in Cat bonds in 
2011, accounting for 71% of the market, followed by money managers (20%), and 
hedge funds (2%). 
Figure 3-11 
Catastrophe Bond Issues by Investor Type 
 
Source: Swiss Re (2012d). 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter (i.e. the second of two background chapters to this thesis) argues that 
insurance securitization in general (and Cat bonds in particular) which are designed 
to access capital markets for additional underwriting capacity can ease the current 
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capacity constraints in the market for catastrophe risk and can help to establish a 
more efficient sharing of catastrophe risk among market participants. However, the 
chapter also reveals that, while the market for insurance securitization has undergone 
rapid growth in response to a general increase in the amount of catastrophe-related 
underwriting losses, global volumes of insurance securitization have lagged behind 
expectations. 
This raises various questions including whether insurance and reinsurance 
firms would actually benefit from additional underwriting capacity or whether 
insurance securitization is effective in transferring catastrophe risks to capital 
markets as argued in various, largely theoretical, studies (e.g. Niehaus, 2002; 
Harrington and Niehaus, 2003; Cummins et al., 2004). 
In order to provide answers to these questions, the following chapters 
empirically examine the performance implications of natural catastrophes 
(Chapter 4), the performance implications of insurance securitization (Chapter 5), 
and the risk implications of insurance securitization (Chapter 6) for insurance and 
reinsurance firms. 
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4  
The Performance Implications of Natural 
Catastrophes: Insurer Stock Returns 
around Mega-Catastrophes 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 demonstrates a remarkable increase in both the frequency and magnitude 
of underwriting losses from natural catastrophes. Also, it shows that capacity 
constraints in the market for catastrophe risk prevent an efficient sharing of 
catastrophe risk among market participants. As a result, insurance firms face 
difficulties in transferring their catastrophe risk exposure to reinsurance firms and are 
increasingly put at risk of becoming concentrated warehouses of catastrophe 
exposure. 
Various commentators argue that large natural catastrophes pose the risk of 
causing severe instability and insolvencies in global insurance and reinsurance 
markets (e.g. Cummins et al., 2002 or Cummins and Trainar, 2009). It is, therefore, 
surprising to find that insurance and reinsurance firms have been rather reluctant in 
making use of insurance securitization which could provide additional underwriting 
capacity and ease the catastrophe markets’ constraints. One possible explanation for 
this might be the fact that the demand for additional underwriting capacity is limited, 
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because the performance implications of natural catastrophes for insurance and 
reinsurance firms are not as severe as suggested. 
Natural catastrophes pose great financial risks to insurance firms (Cummins 
et al., 2002 or Kunreuther and Heal, 2012). Mega-catastrophes, such as Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 or the recent earthquake and tsunami in Japan, are high-severity and 
low-frequency events which can be particularly costly to insurance firms. The high-
severity nature of mega-catastrophes causes large underwriting losses, while the low 
frequency nature of mega-catastrophes means they are difficult to predict and 
incorporate into the premium pricing for catastrophe coverage. 
If insurers are likely to pay substantial amounts to reimburse policyholders 
for the insured losses caused by a mega-catastrophe, it appears obvious that mega-
catastrophes should have negative performance implications for insurance firms. 
However, mega-catastrophes may equally improve the performance of insurers. For 
instance, in the aftermath of a catastrophe event, mega-catastrophes can heighten 
demand for catastrophe risk coverage (Zanjani, 2002; Froot and O’Connel, 2008), 
thus, boosting insurance rates and insurer profitability in the catastrophe risk market 
(Born and Viscusi, 2006). Additionally, supply side factors such as insurers updating 
their catastrophe risk models (Winter, 1994; Cummins and Danzon, 1997) or 
softening regulatory attitudes towards price increases (Angbazo and Narayanan, 
1996) may also lead to higher prices and improved insurer performance. The overall 
effect of mega-catastrophes on insurance firms is, therefore, uncertain ex ante. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the expected 
performance implications of mega-catastrophes on U.S. P&L insurance firms. Using 
detailed data on homeowners’ insurance coverage by state, firm and year, the market 
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revaluation effects realized by P&L insurers with at least some relevant risk exposure 
to mega-catastrophes in response to nineteen U.S. mega-catastrophes are computed. 
Against the background of the remarkable increase in both the magnitude 
and frequency of underwriting losses from catastrophe events in recent years, the 
performance implications of mega-catastrophes on insurance firms are an important 
issue. However, empirical work that studies the performance effects of catastrophe 
events on the market valuations of insurers tends to focus on a single catastrophe 
event. For instance, studies have analyzed the market revaluation effects linked to the 
San Francisco earthquake in 1989 (Shelor et al., 1992; Aiuppa et al., 1993), the 
Northridge earthquake in 1994 (Lamb and Kennedy, 1997), Hurricane Hugo in 1989 
(Cagle, 1996) or Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (Lamb, 1995; 1998). Cummins and 
Lewis (2003) study Hurricane Andrew, the Northridge earthquake and the World 
Trade Centre attacks in 2001 in a single study, but their study analyzes the 
performance implications of each event separately. 
The main challenge faced by an analysis of the performance effects of 
catastrophe events that is based on a single event is to distinguish effects that are 
unique about a particular event from the more general effects of mega-catastrophes 
on insurers. It is, therefore, not surprising that the extant literature has been unable to 
draw general inferences about the performance effect of mega-catastrophes on 
insurers. By means of illustration, Lamb (1995; 1998), Cagle (1996), and Cummins 
and Lewis (2003) find that insurers realize negative abnormal returns on average for 
the specific catastrophe events they study, while Shelor et al. (1992), Aiuppa et al. 
(1993) as well as Lamb and Kennedy (1997) find positive equity valuation effects 
linked to the specific events they study. 
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For these reasons, the present investigation is based on a sample of nineteen 
large catastrophes (mega-catastrophes) and their impact on the equity valuations of 
U.S. insurance firms. The sample of insurers used in this chapter is substantial and 
includes the near population of publicly traded U.S. P&L insurers with loss exposure 
to homeowner’s business during 1996 to 2010. The empirical design is meant to help 
better understand the expected performance effect of catastrophes on insurers. By 
doing so, it is also examined which theoretical explanation—the pessimistic theory 
which predicts a decline in market valuations following a mega-catastrophe or the 
market hardening theory which predicts an increase in market valuations—best 
describes the observed empirical relationships (see Marlett et al., 2000). 
The analysis starts by demonstrating that across the series of nineteen U.S. 
mega-catastrophes examined, shareholders in U.S. P&L insurers realize wealth 
losses on average. However, the relatively small magnitude of share price losses 
suggests that the expected performance effects of mega-catastrophes are by no means 
devastating. Next, detailed information on the geographic and business line origin of 
insurers’ premium income is used to understand the loss exposure of insurers to each 
catastrophe. If the negative stock returns reflect expected increases in underwriting 
losses, the value losses should be largely confined to insurance firms with loss 
exposure. This is what the analysis finds and this is interpreted as consistent with the 
pessimistic theory. While some evidence is found that insurers benefit from the 
prospect of market hardening in the aftermath of a mega-catastrophe, results show 
that this is only the case when insurers have no loss exposure and predominantly 
operate in states with low competition (i.e., when insurers benefit from the prospect 
of higher premium income without facing underwriting losses). 
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This chapter makes two important contributions. First, it provides the first 
comprehensive analysis of the market performance effect of a series of natural 
catastrophes on the U.S. P&L insurance industry. Critically, the present analysis 
differs from previous empirical works which are limited to the analysis of a single 
catastrophe event (e.g. Lamb, 1995; 1998; Cagle, 1996; Cummins and Lewis 2003). 
Overall, results of this chapter provide empirical support for the pessimistic theory. 
Since the results also demonstrate that factors such as the type of catastrophe event 
and competition in the geographic region insurers operate in shape the market 
valuation effects of an event, the results highlight the importance of analyzing a 
cross-section of catastrophe events rather than a single event. 
Second, and related to the first point, the equity revaluation effects vary 
significantly across P&L insurers and this chapter helps to indentify some of the 
event-specific and time-specific factors that explain the expected performance 
changes for insurers linked to a catastrophe event. The empirical design of previous 
work (which studies a single catastrophe event) is unable to do so. For instance, the 
cross-sectional analysis shows that hurricanes have less negative value implications 
for insurers than other catastrophe events. Further, catastrophes that occurred after 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 receive a less negative market reaction than catastrophes 
which occurred before Katrina. The latter finding is in line with explanations that 
Hurricane Katrina caused the insurance industry to upwardly revise its expectations 
of the potential magnitude and frequency of mega-catastrophes. Put differently, post-
Katrina, the insured losses caused by mega-catastrophes have been better anticipated 
by insurers (and have been reflected in the premium income of P&L insurers). 
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
discusses the data and empirical strategy used to gauge changes in insurers’ firm 
values in response to mega-catastrophes. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 present the results of 
the univariate and multivariate analysis, respectively. Finally, Section 4.5 reports the 
results of several tests to evaluate the robustness of the results before Section 4.6 
concludes. 
4.2 Data and Methodology 
4.2.1 Data 
Two main types of data are used to analyze the impact of mega-catastrophes on the 
performance of publicly traded P&L insurers during the period 1996 to 2010: data on 
the magnitude and geographic spread of mega-catastrophes as well as financial data 
on P&L insurers. 
To collect data on mega-catastrophes, statistics on insured property losses 
are obtained from Property Claims Service (PCS), a division of the Insurance 
Services Office (ISO). The PCS data include information about the date, value of 
first insured loss estimates, and the states affected by catastrophe events that cause 
$25 million or more in direct insured losses to property.14 Since this study is 
concerned with homeowners’ exposure, the sample of catastrophe events is restricted 
to natural catastrophes, i.e. events which are caused by natural forces. Terrorism 
attacks or man-made disasters (such as aviation accidents and explosions) are not 
                                                 
14 The threshold of $25 million of insured losses applies to the total event, i.e. insured losses at the 
state level can be (much) smaller than $25 million. 
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included in the sample, because these disasters are more likely to impact on 
commercial (rather than homeowners’) lines and because they only affect a small 
number of policies. Further, only catastrophe events with first insured loss estimates 
in excess of $1 billion are included and these events are called mega-catastrophes.15 
From an initial sample of 24 mega-catastrophes, five catastrophes are 
excluded to avoid overlaps in the examination period of up to 20 trading days after 
the event occurred.16 The final sample, therefore, consists of nineteen mega-
catastrophes which can be broken down into 191 state-level catastrophes.17 This 
sample is substantial. It covers more than $80 billion in first insured loss estimates 
(which corresponds to nearly 40 % of total first insured loss estimates) during 1996 
to 2010 according to the PCS data.18 
Table 4-1 provides descriptives on the mega-catastrophes included in this 
analysis. The data presented in Panel A include the catastrophe date, the peril type 
(hurricane, storm, etc.), the affected states as well as first insured loss estimates for 
all nineteen mega-catastrophes. Panel B presents the number of mega-catastrophes 
broken down by state. With a total of nine events, hurricanes make up the majority of 
the sample of mega-catastrophes. Further, Florida and Massachusetts are the states 
most frequently hit by mega-catastrophes in the sample (i.e. eleven times each). 
                                                 
15 First insured loss estimates are adjusted for inflation using the All Urban Consumer Price Index for 
the United States (CPI-U) for a base year 2010. 
16 The omitted mega-catastrophes are Hurricane France (04.09.2004), Hurricane Jeanne and Ivan 
(both 15.09.2004), as well as Hurricane Gustav (31.08.2008) and Hurricane Ike (12.09.2008). 
17 The number of state-level catastrophes is obtained by summing up the number of states which are 
affected by a mega-catastrophe. For example, if a hurricane affects four states, four state-level 
catastrophes are counted. 
18 The PCS database holds record on 414 individual natural catastrophe events during the period 1996 
to 2010 which have caused total first insured loss estimates of nearly $215 billion. 
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Table 4-1 
Sample of Mega-Catastrophes during 1996-2010 
Panel A: Mega-Catastrophe Characteristics 
Date 
 
Peril States Affected 
First Insured Loss Estimate 
(in million USD) 
25.08.2005  Hurricane Katrina  AL, FL, GA, LA, MS, TN 38,360 
13.08.2004  Hurricane Charley  FL, NC, SC 7,850 
24.10.2005  Hurricane Wilma  FL 6,809 
20.09.2005  Hurricane Rita  AL, AR, FL, LA, MS, TN, TX 5,243 
25.10.2003  Wildland Fire  CA 2,412 
05.09.1996  Hurricane Fran  MD, NC, OH, PA, SC, VA, WV 2,224 
03.05.1999  Wind/Thunderstorm 
Event 
 AL, AR, FL, GA, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MO, MS, NC, 
NE, OH, OK, SC, TN, TX 
1,944 
02.05.2003  Wind/Thunderstorm 
Event 
 AL, AR, CO, GA, IA, IL, IN, KS, KY, MO, MS, NC, 
NE, OH, OK, SC, SD, TN 
1,837 
14.09.1999  Hurricane Floyd  CT, DE, FL, GA, MA, MD, ME, NC, NH, NJ, NY, 
PA, RI, SC, VA, VT 
1,734 
05.06.2001  Tropical Storm 
Allison 
 FL, LA, MS, NJ, PA, TX 1,502 
04.04.2003  Winter Storm  AL, IL, IN, LA, MI, MO, MS, NY, TN, TX 1,440 
18.09.2003  Hurricane Isabel  DE, MD, NC, NJ, NY, PA, VA, WV 1,387 
21.10.2007  Wildland Fire  CA 1,262 
12.05.2010  Wind/Thunderstorm 
Event 
 IL, MD, OK, PA; TX 1,065 
31.01.1996  Winter Storm  AL, AR, CT, DE, FL, GA, IA, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, 
MA, MD, MI, MN, MO, MS, NC, NE, NJ, NY, OH, 
OK, PA, SC, TN, TX, VA, WI, WV 
1,021 
01.01.1999  Winter Storm  AL, AR, CT, DE, FL, GA, IL, IN, LA, MA, MD, ME, 
MO, MS, NC, NJ, NY, OH, OK, PA, RI, SC, TN, TX, 
VA, WV 
1,014 
13.04.2007  Wind/Thunderstorm 
Event 
 CT, DE, GA, LA, MA, MD, ME, MS, NC, NH, NJ, 
NY, PA, RI, SC, TX, VA, VT 
1,013 
09.07.2005  Hurricane Dennis  AL, FL, GA, MS 1,005 
21.09.1998  Hurricane Georges  AL, FL, LA, MS 1,003 
Panel B: Total Number of Mega-Catastrophes broken down by State, 1996-2010 
State Events State Events State Events State Events State Events 
AK - HI - ME 3 NJ 6  SD 1 
AL 9 IA 3 MI 2 NM -  TN 7 
AR 5 ID - MN 1 NV -  TX 8 
AZ - IL 6 MO 5 NY 6  UT - 
CA 2 IN 4 MS 11 OH 5  VA 6 
CO 1 KS 3 MT - OK 5  VT 2 
CT 4 KY 3 NC 9 OR -  WA - 
DE 5 LA 8 ND - PA 9  WI 1 
FL 11 MA 4 NE 3 RI 3  WV 4 
GA 9 MD 7 NH 2 SC 8  WY - 
Notes: The sample consists of nearly all U.S. natural catastrophes during 1996 to 2010 with first 
insured loss estimates exceeding 1 billion USD (mega-catastrophes). According to the Property 
Claims Service (PCS) database this sample of mega-catastrophes makes up nearly 40% of total first 
insured loss estimates during 1996 to 2010. Insured losses are in constant 2010-USD terms based on 
the Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers). An explanation of the state abbreviations can be 
found in the Appendix to this chapter on pg. 107. 
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To build the sample of publicly traded P&L insurers in the U.S., first a list 
of firms is downloaded which both the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and Datastream classify as P&L insurers (based on a SIC code of 6330 or 
6331). This yields an initial sample of 142 publicly traded P&L insurers. In cases 
where only one database identifies a firm as a P&L insurer, the firm’s website is 
checked to confirm its specialization. This way, an additional 26 P&L insurers are 
identified. 
The sample of P&L insurers is then matched with data on premium earnings 
compiled from the State Pages of insurers’ annual filings with the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The NAIC filings provide detailed 
state-level data on the composition of an insurer’s premium income. To ensure that 
sample firms are P&L insurers with at least some relevant risk exposure to mega-
catastrophes, insurers are only included in the sample if the NAIC filings show that 
insurers have homeowners’ loss exposure at the time of a mega-catastrophe. That is, 
insurers need to have positive premiums earned in the homeowners’ line in the year 
the catastrophe occurred.19 Finally, sample firms are required to have accounting and 
share price information on COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively. The final sample 
consists of 57 publicly traded P&L firms. A list of the sample insurers is provided in 
Table 4-2. 
                                                 
19 As insurance premiums are usually paid in advance, it is common to classify premiums into 
premiums written and premiums earned. While premiums written are equal to the revenues from 
insurance policies sold in a given period, earned premiums are equal to the portion of premiums 
written which is actually exposed to loss. For example, if an annual policy begins on July 1, the 
written premium is equal to the total revenue of that policy (usually the price of the policy), while 
premiums earned would only make up half the policy’s total revenue. Since this analysis is interested 
in the actual loss exposure of individual insurers, earned premiums are used as in Born and Viscusi 
(2006). 
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Table 4-2 
Sample Firms 
21st Century Insurance Group EMC Insurance Group National Security Group Inc. 
Ace Ltd. Erie Indemnity North Pointe Group 
Acceptance Insurance Corp. Everest Re Group Ohio Casualty Insurance Group 
Affirmative Insurance Holdings Farm Family Holdings Inc. Old Republic International Corp. 
Alfa Corp. First Acceptance Corp. Progressive Corp. (The) 
Allstate Corp. (The) Frontier Insurance Group Inc. Renaissance Re Holdings 
Alterra Capital Holdings Group Hallmark Financial Service Inc. Royal and Sun Alliance 
American Country Holdings Hanover Insurance Group (The) Safeco Corp. 
American Financial Group Harleysville Group Inc. Safety Insurance Group 
American International Group Hartford Financial Services Seibels Bruce Group Inc. 
Argonaut Group Inc. Homeowners Choice Inc. Selective Insurance Group 
Aspen Insurance Holdings Group Horace Mann Educators Corp. Tower Group Inc. 
AXIS Capital Group Kemper Corp. Travelers Corp. 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Markel Corp Group Trenwick Group Inc. 
Chubb Corp. Meadowbrook Insurance Group United Fire and Casualty Group 
Cincinnati Financial Corp. Mercer Insurance Group Inc. Universal Insurance Holdings 
CNA Insurance Group Merchants Group Inc. VESTA Insurance Group 
Commerce Group Inc. Mercury General Corp. White Mountains Insurance Group 
Donegal Group Inc. Meridian Insurance Group Inc. W.R. Berkley Corp. 
Notes: The sample consists of all publicly traded property-liability (P&L) insurers during the period 
1996 to 2010 with positive premiums earned in the homeowners’ line from the State Pages of 
insurers’ annual filings with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) as well 
historical accounting and stock price information on COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively. 
4.2.2 Methodology 
To estimate the impact of mega-catastrophes on the stock price performance of P&L 
insurers during the period 1996 to 2010, market-adjusted abnormal returns (AR) are 
used as employed by Fuller et al. (2002), Faccio et al. (2006) and others: 
= -it it mtAR r r ,      (4.1) 
where rit is the return for insurer   on day t and rmt is the CRSP-equally-weighted 
market index return for day t.20 Equity return data are from CRSP. Abnormal returns 
                                                 
20 The CRSP-equally-weighted market index is used for market returns. This return index is more 
dominated by returns on smaller firms (relative to a value-weighted index). This is appropriate for the 
present sample of small and medium sized P&L insurers (the median sample firm is smaller than the 
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are averaged across days and firms to yield cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). To 
test for the statistical significance of cumulative abnormal returns, a two tailed t-test 
as well as the non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (which is robust to the 
effects of outliers) are employed. With the exception of hurricanes, the event date is 
defined as the trading day on which the mega-catastrophe took place (if the event 
occurs on a non-trading day, the next trading day is used instead). For hurricanes, 
two calendar days before the event are used as the event date. This is because 
hurricanes can be tracked with a fair amount of accuracy and, consequently, some 
information leakage prior to the hurricane hitting land is expected. 
The analysis does not estimate market model-adjusted returns (which yield 
risk-adjusted returns) for two reasons. First, the market model approach assumes that 
the estimation period over which market model parameters are estimated is free of 
the type of event whose value effects are being investigated. If risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns were computed using contaminated estimation periods, the 
resulting estimates would be unreliable. Since the sample of insurers contains firms 
that are hit by more than a single mega-catastrophe in close succession, the clean 
time series of return data necessary to implement this approach is not available. 
Second, Brown and Warner (1980) show that over short-time periods risk-adjusted 
return values do not significantly improve estimation results as compared to the type 
of market-adjusted values employed in this study. 
                                                 
median firm included in the CRSP indices). Further, the vast majority of previous studies on the 
performance implications of catastrophe events for insurers have also employed the CRSP-equally-
weighted index (e.g., Cummins and Lewis, 2003, Lamb 1998, 1995 or Angbazo and Narayanan, 
1996). 
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4.3 Univariate Results 
4.3.1 The Shareholder Wealth Effects of 
Mega-Catastrophes 
In this section, changes in the market value of P&L insurers in response to mega-
catastrophes are examined. In doing so, this section provides new insights into the 
validity of the two opposing (yet not mutually exclusive) theories, i.e. the pessimistic 
and hardening theories, as regards the expected performance implications for insurers 
in response to mega-catastrophes. 
If the pessimistic theory dominates (as found in Lamb, 1995, 1998; Cagle, 
1996; Cummins and Lewis, 2003), a negative stock price response is expected. 
Under the pessimistic theory, investors price in the payments to reimburse 
policyholders for insured losses. Contrarily, if the hardening theory is an accurate 
portrayal of the expected performance implications of insurers following mega-
catastrophes, positive returns linked to mega-catastrophes are expected (as found in 
Shelor et al., 1992; Aiuppa et al., 1993; Lamb and Kennedy, 1997). Under the 
hardening theory, investors expect that a mega-catastrophe leads to additional 
premium earnings (e.g., from increased consumer and institutional demand for 
catastrophe insurance) and that this additional demand will more than offset the 
insured loss payments linked to a catastrophe event. 
Table 4-3 reports insurers’ market adjusted abnormal returns linked to the 
sample of mega-catastrophes for selected event windows. The results provide clear 
support for the pessimistic theory. Thus, for all event windows after the catastrophe 
event date, cumulative abnormal returns are negative and statistically significant at 
the 1%-level (for both t-tests and z-tests), ranging from -0.279% on day one to  
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-1.393% 20 days after the event date. For the five-day period immediately preceding 
the catastrophe event date [-5;-1], no statistically significant stock price reaction is 
found at all. Based on the results, it is concluded that the prospect of potentially 
substantial loss reimbursements to policyholders outweigh any expected benefits of 
potential premium increases in the aftermath of a catastrophe event. 
However, Table 4-3 also shows that the sample is nearly split in half as 
regards firm observations experiencing value gains and value losses from mega-
catastrophes. This points towards some heterogeneity in the market valuation effects 
linked to mega-catastrophes. The next sections, therefore, identify some of the 
factors which determine the market reaction to catastrophe events. 
Table 4-3 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Selected Event Windows 
Event window N mean (%) median (%) CAR<0% 
(days)  (t-stat) (z-stat) N % 
CAR[-5;-1] 716 -0.179 -0.422 398 55.6 
  (-1.154) (-1.112)   
      
CAR[0;+1] 716 -0.279*** -0.401*** 419 58.5 
  (-2.840) (-5.050)   
      
CAR[0;+5] 716 -0.671*** -0.686*** 413 57.7 
  (-3.723) (-4.411)   
      
CAR[0;+10] 716 -1.105*** -0.930*** 414 57.8 
  (-4.539) (-5.035)   
      
CAR[0;+15] 716 -1.161*** -0.698*** 394 55.0 
  (-3.532) (-3.604)   
      
CAR[0;+20] 716 -1.393*** -1.292*** 408 57.0 
  (-3.777) (-4.037)   
Notes: The table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event windows before and 
after the catastrophe event date for the period 1996 to 2010. Abnormal returns are estimated using an 
adjusted market model (ARit = rit – rmt), where rit is the observed arithmetic return for firm i at day t 
and rmt is the CRSP-equally-weighted market index return for day t. Also included are t-statistics (two 
tailed) and the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon Z-scores. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.3.2 Value Effects and Insurers’ Loss Exposure 
In this subsection, it is investigated how an insurer’s loss exposure impacts upon 
changes in the insurer market value in response to a mega-catastrophe. Loss exposure 
is captured using the homeowners’ premium income earned in the states affected by 
a mega-catastrophe. The rationale behind this test is to further probe the validity of 
the pessimistic versus the hardening theory. It is expected that if the pessimistic 
theory is a valid description of the expected performance effects linked to 
catastrophe events, insurers with higher loss exposure to an event should experience 
a stronger negative stock price reaction. 
By contrast, if mega-catastrophes lead to additional demand for insurance 
(as advocated by the hardening theory), it could be argued that such benefits will 
mainly be accrued by insurance firms with little or no loss exposure. This is because 
unexposed insurers would benefit from any additional insurance demand following a 
catastrophe event without having to indemnify existing policyholders for insured 
losses. Therefore, under the hardening theory, unexposed insurers are expected to 
experience revaluation gains around mega-catastrophes. For exposed insurers, 
however, no expectations are held as the overall valuation effect for this group of 
insurers depends on the relative magnitude of expected losses and additional 
insurance demand in the years following an event. 
Figure 4-1 presents a graphical comparison of CAR for both unexposed and 
exposed insurers up to 20 days following a mega-catastrophe. Firms are classified as 
either exposed or unexposed based on whether or not they have positive premiums 
earned in the homeowners’ line of business in any affected state(s). 
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Figure 4-1 
Value Effects by Existence of Loss Exposure 
 
Notes: The figure shows market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for both unexposed and 
exposed insurers for the 20 days following a mega-catastrophe. Exposed insurers are firms which have 
positive premiums earned in the homeowners’ line of business in the state(s) affected by the sample 
catastrophes. Unexposed insurers are firms which have also positive premiums earned in the 
homeowners’ line of business but only in the state(s) which are not affected by the sample 
catastrophes. Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from Figure 4-1. First, mega-
catastrophes have different performance implications for exposed and unexposed 
insurers. While exposed insurers experience negative CAR throughout the 20 days 
following a mega-catastrophe, CAR for unexposed insurers become positive 11 days 
after the catastrophe event. Second, Figure 4-1 provides graphical evidence for a 
delay in the market response to mega-catastrophes. The return difference between 
exposed and unexposed insurers widens around 10 days after the catastrophe event. 
Shelor et al. (1992) note that a delay in the market response may be attributable to a 
lack of data on expected loss estimates, the degree to which damaged property was 
insured or effects on the demand for insurance. 
-2.5 
-2 
-1.5 
-1 
-0.5 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
0 5 10 15 20 
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
A
b
n
o
rm
al
 R
et
u
rn
s 
 (
%
) 
Days Relative to Event Date 
Unexposed Insurers 
Exposed Insurers 
Chapter 4: The Performance Implications of Natural Catastrophes 86 
 
 
To more formally test these propositions, Table 4-4 reports CAR for 
different event windows following mega-catastrophes by whether or not insurers had 
loss exposure (Panel A). In addition, the level of loss exposure (defined as the ratio 
of direct earned homeowner premiums in the affected states to nationwide direct 
earned homeowner premiums in the year the catastrophe struck) is examined in Panel 
B. Also in Panel B, CAR are reported for insurers in the lowest (Q1) and highest 
quartile (Q4) of the distribution of loss exposure and the differences in CAR between 
the two groups are computed. 
Table 4-4 reports two important findings. First, and in line with Figure 4-1, 
Panel A shows that the expected performance of an insurer in response to a mega-
catastrophe is highly dependent on whether or not the insurer has earned premium in 
the affected states. Thus, for insurers with earned premium in the affected states 
(exposed insurers), CAR for all event windows are negative (and statistically 
significant at the 1%-level for both t-tests and z-tests), while insurers with no earned 
premium in the affected states (unexposed insurers) are not (statistically and 
significantly) affected by mega-catastrophes. Second, Panel B shows that the level of 
loss exposure also significantly impacts upon the stock price performance of 
insurers. For four out of the five event windows tested, the differences between firms 
in the highest and lowest quartile of the distribution of loss exposure 
(ΔCARHIGH-LOW) are negative and statistically significant at the 1%-level for both t-
tests and z-tests. Finally, Table 4-4 confirms that insurers’ wealth losses in response 
to mega-catastrophes are rather modest, indicating that mega-catastrophes do not 
have devastating performance effects on insurers. Thus, on average, even insurers 
located in the highest quartile (Q4) of the distribution of loss exposure experience 
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share price losses of less than 5% during the event period (Panel B), while the share 
price losses for the subsample of exposed insurers is less than 2% (Panel A). 
Table 4-4 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Loss Exposure 
  CAR[0;+1] CAR[0;+5] CAR[0;+10] CAR[0;+15] CAR[0;+20] 
Panel A: Existence of Loss Exposure (Yes/No) 
EXPOSED Insurers mean -0.324*** -0.724*** -1.357*** -1.710*** -1.961*** 
N=558 (t-stat) (-2.855) (-3.610) (-4.768) (-4.507) (-4.655) 
 median -0.414*** -0.707*** -1.021*** -0.993*** -1.629*** 
 (z-stat) (-4.770) (-4.321) (-5.217) (-4.575) (-4.991) 
       
UNEXPOSED Insurers mean -0.121 -0.484 -0.217 0.779 0.614 
N=158 (t-stat) (-0.623) (-1.186) (-0.481) (1.239) (0.828) 
 median -0.388* -0.517 -0.411 0.052 0.202 
 (z-stat) (-1.806) (-1.228) (-0.883) (0.997) (0.886) 
       
ΔCAREXPOSED-UNEXPOSED mean -0.203 -0.241 -1.140* -2.489*** -2.575*** 
 (t-stat) (-0.854) (-0.554) -(1.950) (-3.160) (-2.911) 
 median -0.026 -0.190 -0.610* -1.045*** -1.831*** 
 (z-stat) (-0.856) (-1.007) (-1.910) (-3.039) (-3.134) 
Panel B: Level of Loss Exposure (for Insurers with Some Loss Exposure) 
HIGH Exposure(Q4) mean -0.459* -2.073*** -3.307*** -4.192*** -4.969*** 
N=139 (t-stat) (-1.695) (-3.840) (-4.586) (-4.182) (-4.530) 
 median -0.895*** -1.755*** -2.703*** -2.994*** -3.443*** 
 (z-stat) (-2.807) (-4.638) (-4.945) (-4.661) (-4.998) 
       
LOW Exposure(Q1) mean -0.374** -0.247 -0.922** -0.376 -0.233 
N=140 (t-stat) (-2.234) (-0.880) (-2.063) (-0.614) (-0.330) 
 median -0.411*** -0.439 -0.913*** -0.493 -0.988 
 (z-stat) (-2.854) (-1.136) (-2.787) (-1.169) (-0.909) 
       
ΔCARHIGH-LOW Δmean -0.085 -1.826*** -2.385*** -3.817*** -4.736*** 
 (t-stat) (-0.267) (-3.014) (-2.816) (-3.7546) (-3.635) 
 Δmedian -0.484 -1.316*** -1.790*** -2.501*** -2.455*** 
 (z-stat) (-1.212) (-3.401) (-2.735) (-3.382) (-3.747) 
Notes: The table reports market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event 
windows following the sample of mega-catastrophes by an insurer’s loss exposure (defined as the 
ratio of homeowners’ premium earned in the affected states to total homeowners’ premium earned). 
Both the results for exposed and unexposed insurers (Panel A) as well as for exposed insurers in the 
highest (Q4) and lowest (Q1) quartile of the distribution of loss exposure are shown (Panel B). Also, 
the differences in CAR between exposed and unexposed firms (ΔCAREXPOSED- UNEXPOSED) as well as 
firms in the highest and lowest quartile of the distribution of loss exposure are reported 
(ΔCARHIGH-LOW). To test for the statistical significance of CAR, a two tailed t-test as well as the non-
parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test are employed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Chapter 4: The Performance Implications of Natural Catastrophes 88 
 
 
Overall, the finding that exposed insurers realize return losses, but 
unexposed insurers do not realize return gains around catastrophe events, further 
corroborates the pessimistic theory. It is also important to note that the delay in the 
market response to insurers’ loss exposure (which is also evident in Figure 4-1) is 
confirmed in Table 4-4. Thus, differences in CAR between exposed and unexposed 
insurers are not statistically significant until at least 10 (5) days after the catastrophe 
event in Panel A (B). 
4.3.3 Value Effects and Competition in the Homeowners’ 
Insurance Market 
An additional factor that may influence an insurer’s stock price reaction and help 
determine the applicability of the pessimistic versus the hardening theory is the level 
of competition at the state level in the homeowners’ insurance market. The hardening 
theory relies on the ability of insurers, when faced with additional demand for 
insurance coverage, to enforce premium increases for catastrophe coverage (e.g. 
Zanjani, 2002; Born and Viscusi, 2006). It is expected that insurers face more 
difficulty raising premiums when operating in highly competitive states as compared 
to insurers operating in states with little competition in the homeowners’ insurance 
market. 
For example, it could be argued that premium increases after a mega-
catastrophe will be smaller in highly competitive states (which will make it more 
difficult to offset initial reimbursements paid to policyholders and capital depletions) 
as compared to states with low levels of competition, because premium increases in 
more competitive states are likely to result in a permanent loss of market share. 
Under the hardening theory, it is expected that insurers without loss exposure will 
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experience valuation gains when they predominantly write business in states with 
low levels of competition. 
The measure of competition is calculated in two steps. In a first step, a 
yearly Herfindahl index is computed based on homeowners’ premiums in each state 
to measure the state-level degree of competition in the homeowners’ insurance 
market. Specifically, a state-level Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of the 
squared percentages of homeowners’ insurance premiums earned by each insurer to 
the total homeowners’ insurance premium earned by all insurers in a given state and 
year. In a second step, the Herfindahl index is weighted by the proportion of 
homeowners’ insurance premiums earned in a state relative to the nationwide total of 
direct homeowner premiums earned by an insurer. To ease the interpretation of the 
results, the 1-Herfindahl index is used. The resulting measure of competition ranges 
from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating increased competition for an insurer. 
Table 4-5 reports market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for different 
event windows after a mega-catastrophe for the highest (Q4) and lowest quartile (Q1) 
of the distribution of the 1-Herfindahl index and shows the differences in abnormal 
returns between the highest and lowest quartile (ΔCARHIGH-LOW). This analysis is 
performed for the full sample (Panel A), exposed insurers (Panel B) and unexposed 
insurers (Panel C) to test for any differences among these groups. 
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Table 4-5 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Competition 
  CAR[0;+1] CAR[0;+5] CAR[0;+10] CAR[0;+15] CAR[0;+20] 
Panel A: All Insurers 
HIGH Competition mean 0.017 -0.032 -0.854* -1.447** -1.756* 
Q4 (N=155) (t-stat) (0.085) (-0.091) (-1.786) (-1.975) (-1.935) 
 median -0.032 0.093 -0.302 -1.036** -1.299** 
 (z-stat) (-0.666) (0.372) (-1.363) (-2.010) (-2.158) 
       
LOW Competition mean -0.076 0.507 0.694 1.188** 0.941* 
Q1 (N=186) (t-stat) (-0.399) (1.385) (1.459) (2.206) (1.674) 
 median -0.366** -0.259 0.231 0.844* 0.364 
 (z-stat) (-2.075) (-0.082) (0.640) (1.861) (1.174) 
       
ΔCARHIGH-LOW mean 0.093 -0.539 -1.548** -2.635*** -2.697*** 
 (t-stat) (0.336) (-1.054) (-2.277) (-2.955) (-2.613) 
 median 0.334 0.352 -0.533 -1.880*** -1.663** 
 (z-stat) (0.895) (0.361) (-1.467) (-2.740) (-2.436) 
Panel B: Exposed Insurers 
HIGH Competition  mean -0.199** -0.139 -1.217*** -2.380*** -2.851*** 
Q4 N=117 (t-stat) (-2.075) (-1.338) (-2.910) (-3.542) (-3.557) 
 median -0.133** -0.091 -0.573** -1.186*** -1.425*** 
 (z-stat) (-2.396) (-0.414) (-2.231) (-3.231) (-3.682) 
       
LOW Competition mean -0.055 0.450 0.665 1.005 0.632 
Q1 (N=153) (t-stat) (-0.243) (1.056) (1.189) (1.609) (0.965) 
 median -0.397* -0.353 0.307 0.622 0.111 
 (z-stat) (-1.762) (-0.480) (0.396) (1.207) (0.236) 
       
ΔCARHIGH-LOW mean -0.144 -0.589 -1.882** -3.385*** -3.483*** 
 (t-stat) (-0.443) (-1.043) (-2.350) (-3.332) (-2.944) 
 median 0.264 0.262 -0.880* -1.808*** -1.536** 
 (z-stat) (0.180) (0.451) (-1.690) (-2.604) (-2.126) 
Panel C: Unexposed Insurers 
HIGH Competition mean 0.684 0.301 0.263 1.425 1.613 
Q4 (N=38) (t-stat) (1.646) (0.299) (0.276) (0.955) (0.936) 
 median 0.196 0.276 0.182 0.761 0.106 
 (z-stat) (1.066) (0.558) (0.123) (0.036) (-0.007) 
       
LOW Competition mean -0.174 0.773 0.829 2.035** 2.374** 
Q1 (N=33) (t-stat) (-0.784) (1.276) (1.185) (2.237) (2.662) 
 median -0.264 0.408 0.080 2.536** 2.852** 
 (z-stat) (-1.099) (1.027) (0.634) (1.974) (2.332) 
       
ΔCARHIGH-LOW mean 0.858* -0.472 -0.566 -0.610 -0.761 
 (t-stat) (1.744) (-0.387) (-0.466) (-0.336) (-0.375) 
 median 0.460 -0.132 0.102 -1.775 -2.746 
 (z-stat) (1.430) (-0.173) (-0.565) (-1.280) (-1.579) 
Notes: The table reports market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event 
windows following the sample of mega-catastrophes by state-level competition in the homeowners’ 
insurance market (as measured by 1-homeowners’ premium-based Herfindahl index at the state level 
which is value weighted by the individual insurer’s proportion of homeowners’ insurance premiums 
earned in the state to nationwide direct earned homeowner premiums in the year the catastrophe 
struck). CAR in the highest (Q4) and lowest (Q1) quartile of the distribution of competition are shown 
for all sample firms (Panel A), exposed insurers (Panel B) as well as unexposed insurers (Panel C). 
Also, the differences in CAR between firms in the highest (Q4) and lowest (Q1) quartile 
(ΔCARHIGH-LOW) are shown. To test for the statistical significance of CAR, a two tailed t-test as well 
as the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test are employed. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-5 confirms the initial proposition that competition in the 
homeowners’ insurance market affects the expected performance of insurers. For the 
sample as a whole (Panel A) as well as for the subsample of exposed insurers (Panel 
B), evidence is presented that CAR are lower (statistically significant at the 5% level 
for both t-tests and z-tests) when insurers predominantly operate in the most 
competitive states as compared to insurers operating in the least competitive states. 
Further, results show that unexposed insurers (Panel C) benefit from mega-
catastrophes if they write business in the least competitive states. For this group of 
insurers, CAR are positive and statistically significant over [0; +15] and [0; +20]. 
Overall, the findings provide some evidence consistent with the hardening 
theory as proposed by Shelor et al. (1992) and Aiuppa et al. (1993). While the 
previous section has demonstrated that having no loss exposure does not cause 
positive market revaluation effects for insurers, the results in this section show that 
insurers with no loss exposure experience positive returns, but only when they 
predominantly write insurance business in states which exhibit low levels of 
competition. Presumably, low levels of competition create additional opportunities 
for insurers to enforce premium increases in the aftermath of a mega-catastrophe. 
4.4 Multivariate Results 
4.4.1 The Model 
Next, multivariate regression analyses are used to assess the robustness of the 
findings in the univariate analysis and to jointly estimate the various factors which 
affect the market reaction of insurers to mega-catastrophes. Specifically, the 
following model is estimated via OLS with robust standard errors. 
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[0; 15]    CAR  = + IC+ CC+  ,     (4.2) 
where: 
 CAR[0;+15] is the market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return over 
[0;+15] days relative to the catastrophe event date, 
 IC is a vector of insurer characteristics in the fiscal quarter before the 
catastrophe event, and 
 CC is a vector of catastrophe event characteristics. 
In line with Cummins and Lewis (2003) and Chen et al. (2008), a multi-
week event window is used. A multi-week event window is required to ensure that 
the event window coincides with the disclosure of important information about a 
catastrophe event to market investors. For example, the PCS catastrophe database 
used shows that, on average, a catastrophe lasts for 3 to 4 days and that it takes 
another 9 to 10 days before the first estimate of insured losses are published. In line 
with this, both Figure 4-1 and Table 4-4 showed that it takes around ten days for a 
more substantial market response to a mega-catastrophe to materialize. Finally, to 
control for the effect of unobserved variables that are constant over years and 
insurers, firm and year fixed effects are also included into the model. 
Table 4-6 includes descriptions and summary statistics for the vector of 
variables described below. All accounting data (unless stated differently) refer to one 
fiscal quarter prior to the catastrophe event date and are from COMPUSTAT. 
Premium income data refer to the current fiscal year of the catastrophe event and are 
from NAIC insurer filings. Loss estimates are from the PCS database. 
 
  
Table 4-6 
Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Definition N Mean Median Std. Dev 1 Pctile 99 Pctile 
Value effect CAR[0;+15] Market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return over[0;+15] days relative to the 
mega-catastrophe event date (%) 
716 -1.161 -0.698 8.796 -25.905 25.049 
Insurer 
characteristics 
FIRMSIZE Log of total assets (millions of USD) 716 8.656 8.566 2.025 5.175 13.500 
TOBQ Tobin’s Q measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities 
divided by the book value of assets 
716 1.103 1.049 0.229 0.689 1.955 
ROA The ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets (%) 716 1.047 0.879 1.628 -2.721 4.407 
LOSSRATIO  Log of loss ratio which is defined as losses incurred to premiums earned in the 
homeowners‘ line of business 
716 4.161 4.107 0.932 3.377 7.158 
EXPOSURE The ratio of homeowners’ premium earned in the affected state(s) to total 
homeowners’ premium earned (%) 
716 29.707 14.749 34.165 0.000 100.000 
EXPOSED Dummy which equals 1 if the insurer has positive homeowners’ premium earned in the 
affected state (and 0 otherwise) 
716 0.779 1.000 0.415 0.000 1.000 
LOWCOMPETITION Dummy which equals 1 if the insurer is located in the lowest quartile of the 
competition measure defined as 1-Herfindahl index by state-level homeowners’ 
premium earned multiplied by the individual insurer’s proportion of homeowners’ 
insurance premiums earned in the state to nationwide direct earned homeowner 
premiums in the year the catastrophe struck 
716 0.259 0.000 0.438 0.000 1.000 
HIGHRATING Dummy which equals 1 if the insurer’s financial rating assigned by Standard & Poor’s 
is AA or better (and 0 otherwise) 
716 0.056 0.000 0.229 0.000 1.000 
LINEDIVERS A measure of line diversification defined as 1-Herfindahl index by line of business 
which is calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of insurance premium earned 
in each business line to the total premium earned in all property-liability lines (%) 
716 74.622 79.463 12.625 36.641 89.214 
Catastrophe 
characteristics 
POSTKATRINA Dummy which equals 1 if the catastrophe took place after hurricane Katrina (and 0 
otherwise) 
716 0.208 0.000 0.406 0.000 1.000 
relCATSIZE The ratio of first insured loss estimate to total liabilities (%) 716 14.901 0.545 193.696 0.003 93.310 
CATSIZE Log of first insured loss estimate (millions of USD) in constant 2010-USD terms based 
on the Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers) 
716 0.743 0.407 0.917 0.003 3.647 
HURRICANE Dummy which equals 1 if the catastrophe is a hurricane (and 0 otherwise) 716 0.474 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Notes: Accounting data (apart from premium income data) refer to one fiscal quarter prior to the catastrophe event date and are from COMPUSTAT. Premium income data refer to the 
fiscal year of the catastrophe event and are from the State Pages of insurers’ annual filings with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Loss estimates are compiled 
using data from Property Claim Services (PCS). 
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Insurer Characteristics: 
The vector of insurer characteristics contains the following variables. Firm size is 
included because larger firms are expected to be less susceptible to mega-
catastrophes. Firm size (FIRMSIZE) is measured as the logarithm of the total assets 
in the financial quarter preceding the mega-catastrophe and it is expected to find a 
positive relationship between FIRMSIZE and the market revaluation effect following 
a mega-catastrophe.21 
Further, the insurer’s Tobin’s Q is included (TOBQ, measured as the 
market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of 
assets), a commonly used proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities. Cummins et al. 
(2006) demonstrate that operational loss events that lead to internal capital depletion 
cause larger losses in market value for insurers with higher growth opportunities. The 
authors argue this is because having capital for new investments is more important 
for growth-orientated firms. Since mega-catastrophes typically lead to internal 
capital depletion, TOBQ is expected to enter the regressions with a negative 
coefficient. 
Next, the model also controls for the general insurer performance as well as 
the insurer performance in the homeowners’ market segment. For general 
performance, return on assets is used (ROA, defined as pre-tax profits over the book 
value of total assets), while the performance in the homeowners’ insurance business 
                                                 
21 As alternative measures to FIRMSIZE, the number of states where an insurer writes business as 
well as the annual total premium earned as a proxy for the firm’s size are employed. Regression 
results, however, do not change by using these measures instead of FIRMSIZE. 
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is measured using the log of the loss ratios (LOSSRATIO, defined as the log of the 
sum of claim and loss expenses scaled by premium income).22 Both performance 
measures are expected to enter the model with positive coefficients, as more 
profitable insurers should be in a better position to quickly recover from any capital 
depletions caused by a mega-catastrophe. 
In line with the univariate tests, the model also controls for both the 
existence as well as the level of an insurers’ loss exposure to a mega-catastrophe. To 
capture the existence of loss exposure, a dummy variable (EXPOSED) is included 
which is one when an insurer has earned homeowners’ premium in the state(s) 
affected by an event (and 0 otherwise). To capture the level of loss exposure, the 
ratio of homeowners’ premiums earned in the affected state(s) to total homeowners’ 
premium earned is included (EXPOSURE). Both measures of exposure are expected 
to be highly correlated with insured losses and, therefore, to enter the model with a 
negative coefficient. 
The model also includes a variable to control for the level of competition in 
the homeowners’ insurance market. For this purpose, LOWCOMPETITION is 
used, a dummy which equals one if the insurer is located in the lowest quartile of the 
competition measure (which is defined as the 1-Herfindahl index by state-level 
homeowners’ premium earned; see Section 4.3.3 for a more detailed description of 
how the competition measure is calculated). In line with the univariate results above, 
LOWCOMPETITION is expected to have a positive effect on insurers’ abnormal 
                                                 
22 The log of loss ratios is used as the loss ratios in the homeowners’ line of business are usually 
highly skewed. 
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returns. This is because firms can more readily increase insurance premiums in states 
with little competition, leading to more profitable insurance business in the future. 
Next, the insurer’s financial rating is included to compute HIGHRATING, 
a dummy variable which equals one if the insurer’s financial rating assigned by 
Standard&Poor’s is AA or better (and 0 otherwise) when a mega-catastrophe occurs. 
Mega-catastrophes are likely to give insurers with superior financial ratings a 
competitive advantage. These firms are in a better position to quickly replenish 
external capital at relatively lower costs as compared to insurers with lower financial 
ratings (which have to rely on slower capital recovery using internal capital as 
external capital is too costly for them). This is supported by Cummins and Lewis 
(2003) and Chen et al. (2008) who find evidence that insurers with superior financial 
ratings were better able to recover from the financial losses associated with the 
World Trade Center attacks in 2001. Consequently, HIGHRATING is expected to 
have a positive impact on insurers’ abnormal returns following mega-catastrophes as 
those firms can raise capital more cheaply. 
Finally, the model controls for the product (or line) diversification within 
the firm by including the 1-Herfindahl index of business diversity (LINEDIVERS). 
LINEDIVERS is calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of insurance 
premiums earned in each business line reported in NAIC filings to the total premium 
earned in all property and-liability lines. Higher values of this variable denote a more 
diversified firm. As more diversified firms are expected to be better able to handle 
losses from mega-catastrophes, LINEDIVERS is expected to enter the models with 
positive coefficients. 
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Catastrophe Characteristics: 
The vector of catastrophe characteristics includes a dummy variable which is one if 
the catastrophe event occurred after Hurricane Katrina (POSTKATRINA) and zero 
otherwise. It is hypothesized that Hurricane Katrina (the most expensive catastrophe 
in insurance history) has caused insurers to revise their probabilistic catastrophe 
models by increasing both the probability of loss occurrence and the magnitude of 
mega-catastrophe induced losses. For example, Cummins (2007, pg. 182) refers to 
Hurricane Katrina as a ‘truly paradigm shifting event’ for insurance markets as 
regards the revision of databases and predictive techniques in modelling natural 
catastrophes. Consequently, POSTKATRINA is expected to be positively related to 
insurer valuations as the losses caused by mega-catastrophes should be more 
anticipated by insurers after Hurricane Katrina. 
Further, the size of the first estimate of insured losses (CATSIZE) is 
included. For this purpose, preliminary estimates of insured losses are used instead of 
final estimates, because the final estimates were only available after the examination 
period. CATSIZE is expected to enter the model with a negative coefficient as larger 
losses are associated with larger reimbursements to policyholders. Since catastrophe 
losses which are small in absolute terms may still yield similar performance effects 
than large catastrophes for smaller insurers, a measure of relative loss size is also 
included as the ratio of the first insured loss estimate to the insurer’s total liabilities 
(relCATSIZE) in the regressions. First loss estimates are scaled by total liabilities, 
because the liabilities of P&L insurers typically comprise of insurance reserves for 
future loss payments. 
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Finally, the model includes a dummy variable which is equal to one if the 
mega-catastrophe is a hurricane and zero otherwise (HURRICANE). It is argued 
that since losses from hurricanes account for the lion’s share of total catastrophe 
losses in the sample (approximately 82% of total losses are caused by hurricanes), 
insurers should be able to more precisely anticipate losses from mega-catastrophes 
caused by hurricanes in premium pricing. Consequently, HURICANE is expected to 
be positively related to insurance firm values. 
4.4.2 Regression Results 
Table 4-7 presents the results of the regressions on market-adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR[0;+15]) in response to mega-catastrophes. The results 
confirm the main findings from the univariate tests above. First, capital markets 
distinguish among firms based on the existence as well as the magnitude of an 
insurer’s loss exposure. Thus, EXPOSED and EXPOSURE both enter with a 
negative and statistically significant coefficients at the 1%-level.23 This is consistent 
with arguments that investors devalue those insurers in the aftermath of catastrophe 
events which face potential reimbursements to policyholders and that higher loss 
exposures (which are associated with higher depletions of internal capital) lead to 
less favourable stock price performance around a mega-catastrophe. 
                                                 
23 EXPOSED and EXPOSURE are not simultaneously included in one model as they have a high 
correlation between them. 
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Table 4-7 
Regressions on Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns [0;+15], All Sample Insurers 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
FIRMSIZE -0.109 -0.102 -0.231 -0.110 -0.062 -0.178 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.23) (0.11) (0.06) (0.17) 
TOBQ -8.109** -8.185** -8.065** -7.547** -7.567** -7.611** 
 (2.35) (2.31) (2.39) (2.21) (2.15) (2.24) 
ROA 1.036 1.035 0.912 1.038 1.030 0.940 
 (1.42) (1.41) (1.23) (1.42) (1.39) (1.26) 
LOSSRATIO 0.073 0.099 0.096 0.143 0.158 0.141 
 (0.27) (0.33) (0.32) (0.52) (0.52) (0.46) 
EXPOSURE    -0.043*** -0.045*** -0.039*** 
    (3.52) (3.69) (3.13) 
EXPOSED -3.267*** -3.455*** -3.248***    
 (3.43) (3.65) (3.48)    
LOWCOMPETITION 4.999*** 5.826*** 7.157*** 4.862*** 5.793*** 6.799*** 
 (5.88) (5.64) (6.59) (5.69) (5.56) (6.20) 
HIGHRATING  0.034 0.032  0.014 0.014 
  (0.43) (0.40)  (0.18) (0.17) 
LINEDIVERS   4.051   4.377 
   (1.35)   (1.51) 
POSTKATRINA 9.222*** 9.886*** 10.755*** 9.335*** 10.088*** 10.769*** 
 (6.63) (6.86) (7.36) (6.75) (7.02) (7.39) 
relCATSIZE -0.253 -0.241 -0.198 -0.277 -0.253 -0.217 
 (0.45) (0.42) (0.35) (0.49) (0.44) (0.38) 
CATSIZE  -0.960** -1.427***  -1.089** -1.413*** 
  (2.11) (3.11)  (2.42) (3.11) 
HURRICANE   3.226***   2.512** 
   (3.07)   (2.34) 
       
Intercept 12.490 10.736 10.013 11.894 11.242 10.485 
 (1.53) (1.16) (1.09) (1.45) (1.20) (1.12) 
Observations 716 716 716 716 716 716 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Insurer fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.196 0.198 0.210 0.201 0.203 0.210 
Notes: The table reports the results of OLS regression with robust standard errors for CAR [0;+15] 
relative to the mega-catastrophe event. The independent variables are the log of total assets 
(FIRMSIZE), the insurers’ Tobin’s Q (TOBQ) measured as the market value of equity plus the book 
value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets, the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets 
(ROA), the log of the loss ratio which is defined as losses incurred to premiums earned in the 
homeowners‘ line of business (LOSSRATIO), the ratio of homeowners’ premium earned in affected 
state(s) to total homeowners’ premium earned (EXPOSURE), a dummy which equals 1 if the insurer 
has positive homeowners’ premium earned in the affected states (EXPOSED), a dummy which equals 
1 if the insurer is located in the lowest quartile of the competition measure defined by 1-Herfindahl 
index by state-level homeowners’ premium (LOWCOMPETITION), 1-Herfindahl index by line of 
business (LINEDIVERS) which is calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of insurance 
premium earned in each business line to the total premium earned in all property and-liability lines, a 
dummy which equals 1 if the insurer’s financial rating assigned by Standard &Poor’s is AA or better 
(HIGHRATING), a dummy which equals 1 if the catastrophe took place after hurricane Katrina 
(POSTKATRINA), the ratio of total insured loss to total liabilities (relCATSIZE), the total insured 
loss (billions USD) in constant 2010-USD terms based on the Consumer Price Index (CATSIZE) and 
a dummy which is equal to one if the mega-catastrophe is a hurricane (HURRICANE). Accounting 
data (apart from premium income data) refer to one fiscal quarter prior to the catastrophe event and 
are from COMPUSTAT. Premium income data refer to the current fiscal year of the catastrophe event 
and are from the State Pages of insurers’ annual filings with the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC). Loss estimates are compiled using data from Property Claim Services. The t-
statistics (two tailed) of the coefficients are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Second, LOWCOMPETITION enters the regression models with a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient (at the 1%-level) which shows that firms are 
more likely to benefit from mega-catastrophes when they write homeowners’ 
insurance in the least competitive states. This is consistent with the argument that 
firms can more easily increase premiums in response to mega-catastrophes in states 
with lower competition as compared to states with higher competition where 
premium increases are likely to result in a permanent loss of market share. 
In addition to the results at the univariate level, further variables are 
identified which significantly impact on the stock price response of insurers. TOBQ, 
for example, is negatively related with abnormal returns at the 5% level. In line with 
Cummins et al. (2006), it is argued that loss events, such as mega-catastrophes, 
which lead to internal capital depletion are more severe for firms with strong growth 
prospects than for firms whose market value is more dependent on assets in place, as 
capital for new investments is more important for growth-orientated firms. 
Also, a negative relationship (at the 5% level) is reported between the 
amount of first insured loss estimates (CATSIZE) and insurers’ stock price reaction. 
This result was anticipated, as more expensive catastrophes (in terms of insured 
losses) lead to higher loss payments. Finally, results report that mega-catastrophes 
which are caused by hurricanes as well as catastrophes which occurred after 
Hurricane Katrina have positive value implications for insurers. Thus, both 
HURRICANE and POSTKATRINA are positive and statistically significant (at the 
5%-level and 1%-level, respectively). This is in line with the arguments that the risk 
models for hurricanes are amongst the most advanced and most accurate ones (as 
regards the estimation of the probability of potential losses of future hurricanes) and 
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that Hurricane Katrina caused the insurance industry to upwardly revise its 
expectations regarding the potential magnitude of all natural disaster losses (and not 
only windstorm events) which resulted in a smaller ‘shock effect’ for mega-
catastrophes following Katrina as large-scaled losses by natural catastrophes were 
better anticipated by capital markets (Cummins and Lewis, 2003). 
In a next step, it is tested whether the results observed for the sample as a 
whole (Table 4-7) also apply for the two subgroups of exposed and unexposed firm 
level observations. The rationale behind this test is that some of the variables are 
expected to turn (in)significant when applied to the sample of (un)exposed firm level 
observations only. For example, it could be argued that variables such as the absolute 
and relative size of first insured loss estimates (CATSIZE and relCATSIZE) which 
relate to the level of capital depletions (following reimbursements to policyholders) 
should only impact upon the stock price performances of exposed insurers. 
Table 4-8  presents the results of regressions on market-adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR[0;+15]) in response to mega-catastrophes for exposed and 
unexposed firm level observations, respectively. For the sample of exposed firm 
level observations it is reported, in addition to the results for the sample as a whole 
(Table 4-7), that the relative size of first loss estimates (relCATSIZE) enters the 
model with a negative and statistically significant coefficient. This provides further 
evidence that more expensive catastrophes (this time in relative terms) lead to higher 
loss payments. For the sample of unexposed insurers, only LOWCOMPETITION 
and POSTKATRINA remain significant while all variables which are related to the 
effect of underwriting losses (TOBQ, CATSIZE and relCATSIZE, HURRICANE) 
turn out to be insignificant. 
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Table 4-8 
Regressions on Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns [0;+15], Exposed and Unexposed 
Insurers 
 Exposed Insurers  Unexposed Insurers 
 (A) (B) (C)  (D) (E) (F) 
FIRMSIZE -0.782 -0.660 -0.782  -4.144 -3.739 -3.967 
 (0.84) (0.70) (0.82)  (1.06) (1.00) (1.05) 
TOBQ -7.848** -7.842** -7.592**  -2.217 -2.199 -1.590 
 (2.17) (2.12) (2.15)  (0.31) (0.31) (0.22) 
ROA -0.123 -0.104 -0.236  0.880 0.801 0.746 
 (0.16) (0.13) (0.30)  (0.79) (0.72) (0.67) 
LOSSRATIO 0.050 0.047 0.002  -0.695 -0.722 -0.736 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.01)  (1.34) (1.39) (1.45) 
EXPOSURE -0.032** -0.035** -0.026*     
 (2.25) (2.41) (1.70)     
LOWCOMPETITION 5.289*** 6.267*** 7.422***  5.276** 6.730** 7.450** 
 (5.51) (5.41) (5.94)  (2.46) (2.17) (2.41) 
HIGHRATING  -0.013 -0.009   0.004 0.004 
  (0.18) (0.12)   (0.02) (0.02) 
LINEDIVERS   3.913    2.648 
   (1.30)    (1.15) 
POSTKATRINA 8.227*** 9.061*** 9.803***  10.350*** 11.354*** 11.810*** 
 (5.39) (5.57) (5.91)  (3.76) (3.62) (3.75) 
relCATSIZE -1.458*** -1.378*** -1.393***  -0.614 -0.532 -0.532 
 (3.23) (2.92) (3.03)  (0.77) (0.67) (0.67) 
CATSIZE  -1.217** -1.630***   -1.101 -1.175 
  (2.40) (3.05)   (1.09) (1.15) 
HURRICANE   2.722**    2.789 
   (2.15)    (1.05) 
 
       
Intercept 17.983** 18.694* 17.320*  35.895 33.966 32.332 
 (2.06) (1.90) (1.74)  (1.16) (1.09) (1.02) 
Observations 558 558 558  158 158 158 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Insurer fixed effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.237 0.240 0.248  0.118 0.109 0.108 
Notes: The table reports the results of OLS regression with robust standard errors for CAR [0;+15] 
relative to the mega-catastrophe event. The independent variables are the log of total assets 
(FIRMSIZE), the insurers’ Tobin’s Q (TOBQ) measured as the market value of equity plus the book 
value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets, the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets 
(ROA), the log of the loss ratio which is defined as losses incurred to premiums earned in the 
homeowners‘ line of business (LOSSRATIO), the ratio of homeowners’ premium earned in affected 
state(s) to total homeowners’ premium earned (EXPOSURE), a dummy which equals 1 if the insurer 
is located in the lowest quartile of the competition measure defined by 1-Herfindahl index by state-
level homeowners’ premium (LOWCOMPETITION), 1-Herfindahl index by line of business 
(LINEDIVERS) which is calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of insurance premium 
earned in each business line to the total premium earned in all property and-liability lines, a dummy 
which equals 1 if the insurer’s financial rating assigned by Standard &Poor’s is AA or better 
(HIGHRATING), a dummy which equals 1 if the catastrophe took place after hurricane Katrina 
(POSTKATRINA), the ratio of total insured loss to total liabilities (relCATSIZE), the total insured 
loss (billions USD) in constant 2010-USD terms based on the Consumer Price Index (CATSIZE) and 
a dummy which is equal to one if the mega-catastrophe is a hurricane (HURRICANE). Accounting 
data (apart from premium income data) refer to one fiscal quarter prior to the catastrophe event and 
are from COMPUSTAT. Premium income data refer to the current fiscal year of the catastrophe event 
and are from the State Pages of insurers’ annual filings with the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC). Loss estimates are compiled using data from Property Claim Services. The t-
statistics (two tailed) of the coefficients are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.5 Robustness 
Several tests are conducted to evaluate the robustness of the results. First, it is 
assessed whether the results are sensitive to the event window used. For this purpose, 
the analysis of market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return is re-run using 
[0;+1], [0;+5] [0;+10] and [0;+20] days relative to the catastrophe event date as event 
windows. The results of this test are provided in Table 4-9 (models A-H). It becomes 
apparent that, with the exception of CAR(0;+1), all event windows confirm the main 
conclusions as the regression results remain qualitatively unaffected. However, the 
insignificance of nearly all variables during [0;+1] confirms the rationale for using 
multi-week event windows. After all, key information relating to expected losses 
which are crucial for market investors to assess potential performance implications of 
mega-catastrophes are usually not available one day after the event date. 
Next, the stability of the results are examined after excluding Hurricane 
Katrina from the sample of mega-catastrophes. This is done, because Hurricane 
Katrina is still the most expensive natural catastrophe in insurance history (in terms 
of insured losses) and, as such, might have influenced the results reported. 
Consequently, all firm level observations are excluded that relate to Hurricane 
Katrina and the analysis of market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal returns over 
[0;+15] days relative to the catastrophe event date is re-run. The results are shown in 
Table 4-9 (models I-J). Apart from the absolute size of first insured loss estimates 
(CATSIZE), which turns out to be insignificant, all other conclusions remain 
unaffected. 
  
Table 4-9 
Regressions on Insurers’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns for different Event Windows and Without Hurricane Katrina 
 CAR(0;+1)  CAR(0;+5)  CAR(0;+10)  CAR(0;+20)  
Excluding Katrina 
CAR (0;+15) 
 (A) (B)  (C) (D)  (E) (F)  (G) (H)  (I) (J) 
FIRMSIZE 0.003 0.005  0.330 0.345  0.044 0.079  -0.819 -0.759  -0.256 -0.191 
 (0.01) (0.02)  (0.74) (0.77)  (0.06) (0.11)  (0.83) (0.75)  (0.25) (0.19) 
TOBQ -0.069 -0.068  0.327 0.334  -3.892** -3.553**  -6.937** -6.407*  -7.802** -7.353** 
 (0.46) (0.45)  (1.16) (1.18)  (2.32) (2.14)  (2.03) (1.81)  (2.38) (2.22) 
ROA 0.039 0.068  -0.154 0.015  0.705* 0.723*  0.646 0.677  0.954 0.987 
 (0.04) (0.08)  (0.12) (0.01)  (1.90) (1.94)  (1.08) (1.13)  (1.28) (1.31) 
LOSSRATIO -0.108 -0.105  -0.220 -0.200  -0.020 0.017  0.021 0.075  0.045 0.084 
 (1.22) (1.19)  (1.24) (1.12)  (0.08) (0.07)  (0.05) (0.18)  (0.15) (0.27) 
EXPOSURE  -0.003   -0.015**   -0.029***   -0.045***   -0.038*** 
  (0.70)   (2.57)   (3.44)   (2.82)   (3.00) 
EXPOSED -0.145   -0.972*   -2.161***   -3.677***   -3.345***  
 (0.47)   (1.79)   (3.16)   (3.19)   (3.46)  
LOWCOMPETITION 1.081*** 1.062***  4.233*** 4.116***  5.855*** 5.606***  7.098*** 6.688***  6.517*** 6.222*** 
 (2.65) (2.62)  (6.36) (6.15)  (7.45) (7.06)  (5.53) (5.19)  (5.50) (5.22) 
HIGHRATING -0.008 -0.009  -0.002 -0.008  0.007 -0.005  0.010 -0.010  0.029 0.012 
 (0.40) (0.44)  (0.06) (0.22)  (0.13) (0.10)  (0.08) (0.09)  (0.37) (0.14) 
LINEDIVERS 0.744 0.756  2.612 2.700  3.151 3.357  2.044 2.408  4.108 4.444 
 (0.75) (0.77)  (1.21) (1.26)  (1.06) (1.14)  (0.65) (0.79)  (1.36) (1.51) 
POSTKATRINA 0.801 0.794  5.290*** 5.266***  8.499*** 8.477***  9.279*** 9.283***  8.217*** 8.529*** 
 (1.49) (1.46)  (4.96) (4.93)  (7.56) (7.52)  (5.70) (5.62)  (4.23) (4.34) 
relCATSIZE 0.024 0.023  -0.221 -0.228  -0.367 -0.382  -0.219 -0.241  -0.264 -0.287 
 (0.16) (0.15)  (1.21) (1.24)  (1.41) (1.47)  (0.44) (0.48)  (0.45) (0.49) 
CATSIZE -0.089 -0.091  -0.659*** -0.667***  -1.248*** -1.252***  -1.126** -1.116**  0.189 0.033 
 (0.53) (0.55)  (2.63) (2.67)  (3.85) (3.90)  (2.02) (2.01)  (0.20) (0.03) 
HURRICANE 0.579* 0.528  2.363*** 2.075***  2.441*** 1.884**  3.603*** 2.762**  2.743** 2.094* 
 (1.73) (1.54)  (4.71) (4.11)  (3.35) (2.47)  (3.08) (2.30)  (2.56) (1.93) 
               
Intercept 1.635 1.719  -2.871 -2.496  4.698 5.272  12.322 12.962  9.867 10.245 
 (0.61) (0.63)  (0.68) (0.59)  (0.76) (0.84)  (1.04) (1.06)  (1.06) (1.07) 
Observations 716 716  716 716  716 716  716 716  680 680 
Year fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Insurer fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.023  0.178 0.181  0.203 0.207  0.179 0.180  0.222 0.221 
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Notes: The table reports the results of OLS regression with robust standard errors for cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event windows following the sample of mega-
catastrophes (models A-H) as well as for CAR[0;+15] without any observations that relate to the effects of Hurricane Katrina. The independent variables are the log of total assets 
(FIRMSIZE), the insurers’ Tobin’s Q (TOBQ) measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets, the ratio of pre-tax profits to 
total assets (ROA), the log of the loss ratio which is defined as losses incurred to premiums earned in the homeowners‘ line of business (LOSSRATIO), the ratio of homeowners’ 
premium earned in affected state(s) to total homeowners’ premium earned (EXPOSURE), a dummy which equals 1 if the insurer has positive homeowners’ premium earned in the 
affected states (EXPOSED), a dummy which equals 1 if the insurer is located in the lowest quartile of the competition measure defined by 1-Herfindahl index by state-level homeowners’ 
premium (LOWCOMPETITION), 1-Herfindahl index by line of business (LINEDIVERS) which is calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of insurance premium earned in each 
business line to the total premium earned in all property and-liability lines, a dummy which equals 1 if the insurer’s financial rating assigned by Standard &Poor’s is AA or better 
(HIGHRATING), a dummy which equals 1 if the catastrophe took place after hurricane Katrina (POSTKATRINA), the ratio of total insured loss to total liabilities (relCATSIZE), the 
total insured loss (billions USD) in constant 2010-USD terms based on the Consumer Price Index (CATSIZE) and a dummy which is equal to one if the mega-catastrophe is a hurricane 
(HURRICANE). Accounting data (apart from premium income data) refer to one fiscal quarter prior to the catastrophe event and are from COMPUSTAT. Premium income data refer to 
the current fiscal year of the catastrophe event and are from the State Pages of insurers’ annual filings with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Loss estimates 
are compiled using data from Property Claim Services. The t-statistics (two tailed) of the coefficients are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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4.6 Summary and Conclusions 
Mega-catastrophes are low-frequency but high-severity events which pose great 
financial risks to insurance firms. Underwriting losses from mega-catastrophes are 
often large relative to capital reserves. Further, mega-catastrophes are extremely 
difficult to predict which means they cannot be fully anticipated in premium pricing. 
However, mega-catastrophes may also lead to an increase in consumer and 
institutional demand for catastrophe risk insurance and lead to premium increases in 
the catastrophe risk market. Previous empirical work tends to focus on a single 
catastrophe event and reports results that are consistent with either of these 
explanations. In this chapter, a cross-section of nineteen mega-catastrophes between 
1996 and 2010 is examined to shed light on a simple question: what are the expected 
performance effects of mega-catastrophes on insurance firms? 
The rationale behind this question is to assess whether the rather limited use 
of insurance securitization can (to some extent) be explained by the fact that the 
expected losses from natural catastrophes (as reflected in equity losses) despite the 
capacity constraints in the market for catastrophe risk do not pose as much of a risk 
to insurance and reinsurance firms as proposed by several authors (e.g., Froot, 2001 
or Cummins et al., 2002). For example, if the expected losses associated with natural 
catastrophes are only little, insurance and reinsurance firms may not have much to 
gain from additional underwriting capacity provided by insurance securitization. 
The results show that P&L insurers with homeowners’ exposure realize 
value losses around the time that a mega-catastrophe occurs. Since this value effect is 
primarily driven by insurers with loss exposure to the type of event which occurs, 
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this indicates that market investors are concerned about underwriting losses 
associated with a mega-catastrophe. Further, no evidence is found that insurers 
without loss exposure experience valuation gains, unless they operate in the least 
competitive geographic markets. However, and most importantly, the magnitude of 
share price losses during the examination period is only moderate on average. This is 
interpreted as evidence that the expected performance implications of mega-
catastrophes are by no means devastating for insurers. Consequently, the results 
challenge the view that firms exposed to catastrophe risks have much to gain from 
additional underwriting capacity and, therefore, put a ceiling on the potential benefits 
of insurance securitization to firms. Arguably, this finding provides a possible 
explanation for the underwhelming use of insurance securitization as a tool for 
increasing the underwriting capacity for catastrophe risks. 
4.7 Appendix 
Table 4-10 
Explanation of State Abbreviations 
AK Alaska LA Louisiana OH Ohio 
AL Alabama MA Massachusetts OK Oklahoma 
AR Arkansas MD Maryland OR Oregon 
AZ Arizona ME Maine PA Pennsylvania 
CA California MI Michigan RI Rhode Island 
CO Colorado MN Minnesota SC South Carolina 
CT Connecticut MO Missouri SD South Dakota 
DE Delaware MS Mississippi TN Tennessee 
FL Florida MT Montana TX Texas 
GA Georgia NC North Carolina UT Utah 
HI Hawaii ND North Dakota VA Virginia 
IA Iowa NE Nebraska VT Vermont 
ID Idaho NH New Hampshire WA Washington 
IL Illinois NJ New Jersey WI Wisconsin 
IN Indiana NM New Mexico WV West Virginia 
KS Kansas NV Nevada WY Wyoming 
KY Kentucky NY New York   
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5  
The Performance Implications of Insurance 
Securitization: The Case of Catastrophe 
Bonds and Issuing Firms
24
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter demonstrates that, despite the recent increase in underwriting 
losses from natural catastrophes and capacity constraints in the market for 
catastrophe risk, insurance and reinsurance firms are (on average) able to cope rather 
well with the losses associated with natural catastrophes. This raises questions about 
the usefulness and value of insurance securitization as a risk management tool for 
insurance and reinsurance firms to provide additional underwriting capacity. 
This chapter empirically analyzes the performance implications of insurance 
securitization for insurance and reinsurance firms in order to find out about the 
perceptions of capital markets about the use of insurance securitization and to 
provide new empirical evidence which can help to explain the limited use of 
                                                 
24 A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication as Hagendorff, B., J. Hagendorff, K. 
Keasey, The Shareholder Wealth Effects of Insurance Securitization: Preliminary Evidence from the 
Catastrophe Bond Market, Journal of Financial Services Research (forthcoming in 2013). 
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insurance securitization by insurance and reinsurance firms. Specifically, for a 
unique sample which consists of the near population of Cat bond issues by listed 
companies up to May 2010, changes in the market value realized by firms which 
announce their intention to issue a Cat bond are computed. As illustrated in 
Chapter 3, Cat bonds have been the most successful insurance securitization vehicles 
to date (in terms of total risk capital issued). Basically, Cat bonds are insurance 
derivatives whose payoffs depend on the occurrence of a catastrophe loss event. As 
such, the issuing firm may forfeit on principal and/or coupon payments when a 
specified catastrophe loss event occurs. 
This chapter makes two important contributions. First, it presents the first 
empirical investigation into the wealth benefits of Cat bonds. Given the relatively 
low number of Cat bond issues to date, previous work on Cat bonds has been mostly 
theoretical (e.g. Bantwal and Kunreuther, 2000; Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2006) with 
empirical work lagging behind. This has led to considerable uncertainty as to the 
actual effects of Cat bonds on the issuing firm. While the low number of Cat bond 
issues to date also means that the results of the following analysis have to be 
interpreted with suitable care, the analysis is the first to show that, even though Cat 
bonds do not lead to strong wealth gains for shareholders in the issuing firm, there 
are large variations in the market revaluation effects linked to Cat bonds. 
Second, this chapter helps to understand the motivations as to why firms 
issue Cat bonds. While the motivations for banks to engage in asset securitization 
have previously been analyzed (e.g. Ambrose et al., 2005; Lockwood et al., 1996, 
Martin-Oliver and Saurina, 2007), much less is empirically known about the reasons 
why firms engage in insurance securitization. Jointly, the results of this chapter 
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support the notion that firms issue Cat bonds less as a means to hedge catastrophe 
risks and more as a means to realize cost efficiencies relative to other forms of 
catastrophe risk management. For instance, the analysis reveals that the value effects 
linked to Cat bond issues are particularly pronounced for firms with less volatile 
losses from their insurance business. It is argued that this group of firms is likely to 
benefit from lower information acquisition costs in financial markets when they 
substitute reinsurance coverage using Cat bonds (see Gibson et al. 2011). In the same 
vein, since Cat bond prices are fixed over a multi-year period and remain unaffected 
by future price increases in the market for catastrophe coverage, issuer abnormal 
returns are particularly high during periods of low catastrophe reinsurance prices 
when the costs of raising capital via Cat bonds are relatively low. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 surveys 
the previous literature on why firms may benefit from issuing Cat bonds and 
develops the propositions to be tested in this chapter. Section 5.3 discusses the data 
and empirical strategy. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 then present the results of the univariate 
and multivariate analysis, respectively. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes and discusses 
the implications of the findings. 
5.2 Theory and Literature: Do Firms Benefit from 
Issuing Catastrophe Bonds? 
Most of the reasons as to why firms may benefit from issuing Cat bonds can be 
summarized into two main arguments. First, Cat bonds allow firms to hedge against 
catastrophe-related underwriting losses. Second, Cat bonds can help firms with 
catastrophe exposure to realize costs savings on catastrophe-related risk 
management. 
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The first argument is that Cat bonds allow the issuer to hedge against 
catastrophe-related underwriting losses by transferring catastrophe risks to capital 
markets (e.g. Niehaus, 2002; Harrington and Niehaus, 2003; Cummins et al., 2004). 
The argument is based on the rationale that Cat bonds typically let the issuing firm 
forfeit on principal and/or coupon payments subject to a catastrophe event occurring. 
Cat bonds can, therefore, be viewed as a form of subordinated debt which, once 
forgiven, free up funds to absorb underwriting losses caused by a specified 
catastrophe. 
In practice, however, the payoff structure of Cat bonds rarely makes them a 
perfect hedge against underwriting losses. This is because the triggers, which permit 
forfeiture, do not necessarily match the specific loss experience of the issuer. Instead, 
triggers tend to be defined in terms of industry losses (e.g. via loss indices). While 
index-based triggers are meant to keep issuers from transferring their highest 
portfolio risks to unsuspecting investors (Doherty, 1997), any mismatch between the 
payoffs from issuing Cat bonds and the losses experienced by the issuer in a 
catastrophe event gives rise to so-called basis risk. Simulation analyses conducted by 
Harrington and Niehaus (1999) and Cummins et al. (2004) show that the basis risk 
linked to index-based triggers is manageable for U.S. homeowner insurers and large 
Hurricane insurers in Florida, respectively. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in 
mind that these results are based on simulations. The risk that the payoffs from 
index-based Cat bonds do not cover the issuer’s catastrophe losses remains a valid 
concern for issuing firms. However, regarding basis risk and Cat bonds, it is also 
important to bear in mind that the payoffs in a classical insurance setup may also be 
inefficient. Some insurance and reinsurance contracts include a cap on the losses 
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which may be indemnified, which means that insurance coverage may not fully 
indemnify an insurer’s losses either in the event of a natural catastrophe. 
While the presence of basis risk diminishes the effectiveness of Cat bonds 
as a perfect hedge, there are also questions over the extent to which Cat bonds help 
diversify catastrophe exposures more generally. Commonly, insurers economize on 
capital and realize diversification gains by protecting insured value in excess of the 
capital held against it. However, in contrast to insurance agreements, Cat bonds 
frequently offer full collateralization of risk exposures. This is because the funds 
reserved for principal payment are placed in special trusts and cannot be used to 
offset losses caused by events other than the trigger event (Niehaus, 2002; 
Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2006). In that respect, it could be argued that capital 
provision via Cat bonds is inefficient, because it precludes the type of capital 
diversification benefits linked to traditional insurance and reinsurance. 
The second argument as to why firms could benefit from issuing Cat bonds 
is based on issuing firms realizing costs savings on catastrophe-related risk 
management (e.g. Jaffee and Russell, 1997; Niehaus, 2002; Kunreuther and Heal, 
2012). Traditionally, catastrophe risk management for underwriting firms involves 
either raising capital (to absorb losses) or purchasing reinsurance (to seek indemnity 
from all or part of the losses caused by a catastrophe event). The cost of purchasing 
reinsurance coverage for catastrophe risks is expensive since reinsurance premiums 
are high relative to actuarial loss estimates (see Lane and Mahul, 2008). This is why 
especially higher layers of protection (i.e. protection against events with a very low 
probability of occurrence) often go unreinsured by insurers (Froot, 2001). Therefore, 
insurers that seek to increase their catastrophe underwriting capacity will typically 
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have to rely on raising capital. However, raising capital to absorb catastrophe losses 
is costly for both insurance and reinsurance companies (e.g. Jaffee and Russell, 1997; 
Froot, 2001; Niehaus, 2002). For insurance companies, raising equity capital is costly 
because it is tax-inefficient, while raising debt capital to finance catastrophe risks 
increases the probability of financial distress of the insurer (Niehaus, 2002). For 
reinsurance companies, raising capital to increase their capacity to underwrite 
catastrophe risks is costly, as it is likely to lead to higher costs of capital. This is 
because catastrophes are large correlated loss events which reinsurers cannot fully 
diversify (Froot and Stein, 1998; Froot and O'Connell, 2008). 
Against this background, Cat bonds could provide a cost-efficient substitute 
for risk management via reinsurance. Froot and O’Connell (2008) argue that because 
catastrophe risks are both quantifiable and diversifiable for investors, the required 
rate of return from holding Cat bonds should equal the risk-free rate. This argument 
stands in contrast to the findings of applied work which shows that, while spreads on 
Cat bonds have fallen in recent years, they remain well above risk-free levels (Lane 
and Mahul, 2008) and are comparable to reinsurance premiums for catastrophe 
coverage (Cummins et al., 2004).25 However, comparing the pricing of Cat bonds 
with reinsurance premiums is unlikely to convey an accurate picture of the net costs 
and benefits linked to insurance securitization as compared with reinsurance 
coverage. Among other things, such comparisons do not take into account that Cat 
bonds (vis-à-vis reinsurance contracts) carry lower counterparty risk (Cat bond 
                                                 
25 One frequently advanced explanation for the high spreads on Cat bonds is that investors are still 
unfamiliar with the concept of insurance securitization and, therefore, demand a return premium (see 
Bantwal and Kunreuther, 2000; Habib and Ziegler, 2007; Barrieu and Louberge, 2009). 
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principals are fully collateralized), provide liquidity benefits for the issuer (Cat bond 
premiums are paid at the end of each quarter rather than upfront as in the case of 
reinsurance) and result in more predictable cost management for the issuer (Cat 
bonds fix the costs of coverage at the time of issue for a multiyear period). 
Nonetheless, there remain good reasons to argue that some issuers should 
realize cost savings from issuing Cat bonds compared with obtaining reinsurance. 
Gibson et al. (2011) compare the information-gathering incentives of traders in 
financial markets (Cat bonds) with the incentives of reinsurers and develop a model 
where it is relatively more cost efficient for insurers which face low levels of loss 
uncertainty to securitize catastrophe risks. They argue that lower levels of loss 
uncertainty reduce the information acquisition costs in financial markets (which are 
ultimately borne by the issuer via a discount on the price of the securities issued26). 
Therefore, insurance securitization may be a less costly alternative to either 
reinsurance or to raising equity for insurers facing low levels of loss uncertainty. 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
5.3.1 Data 
The data on insurance securitizations before May 2010 are obtained from Hannover 
Re. All Cat bonds are selected which are defined as bonds where coupons and/or 
principal payments are contingent on the occurrence of catastrophe-related property 
                                                 
26 In Gibson et al. (2011), the discount which insurers with high loss uncertainty offer serves as 
compensation to uninformed traders for the losses they are likely to experience when dealing with 
informed market traders. The discount also equals the information production costs of informed 
market traders. 
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and casualty risks or catastrophe-related mortality risks.27 Both types of risks are 
pooled, because the bonds’ structures are (apart from the trigger event) identical 
(Cowley and Cummins, 2005) and because the issuing firms in the sample do not 
operate in distinct markets (i.e. all sample firms issuing mortality-related bonds have 
at some point also issued property and casualty-related bonds). Further, the findings 
presented in this chapter remain unaffected when mortality-related Cat bonds are 
excluded from the sample (the results of the analysis without mortality-related Cat 
bonds can be found in the Appendix to this chapter on pgs. 142 to 145). Finally, it is 
stipulated that Cat bond issuers need to be listed firms which have equity and 
accounting data available on the Datastream-Worldscope database and that issuers 
are the ultimate beneficiary of the Cat bond coverage.28 
For an initial sample of 143 Cat bond issues, the Cat bond data from 
Hannover Re is verified by matching them with public information on insurance 
securitizations in AON Capital Markets (2010) and Guy Carpenter (2008). Where 
discrepancies between proprietary and public data are identified (e.g., as regards the 
issue date, value and risks underlying an issue), further searches on various news 
sources available on LexisNexis and Factiva are conducted. Where the discrepancies 
remain unresolved, the issue is omitted from the sample (this affects a total of eight 
issues). 
                                                 
27 Catastrophe mortality risks result from events which lead to sharp increases in mortality rates such 
as natural catastrophes or pandemics. Bonds which securitize such risks are referred to as ‘mortality 
(Cat) bonds’. By contrast, longevity bonds are not included in the sample, because these securitize 
longevity risk (due to increased life expectancy) and are not linked to catastrophe events (for more 
details, see Cowley and Cummins, 2005). 
28 Transactions where the Cat bond coverage was sold by the issuer to a third party (i.e. Calabash Re 
Ltd. I-III by Swiss Re) are not included to avoid convoluted interpretations of the results. 
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In a next step, issues are omitted for any of the following reasons. First, so-
called follow-up transactions from shelf offering programs are dropped. Shelf 
offering programs allow firms to issue further Cat bonds at any time. Follow-up 
transactions tend to be very small and have only a limited amount of information 
available. This affects 29 issues. Second, when a firm issues more than one Cat bond 
on the same trading day, the transactions are consolidated into a single issue. This 
leads to 15 individual transactions being consolidated into three deals.29 Third, a 
further 14 transactions were excluded because the news coverage indicates that 
confounding events such as earnings announcements, dividend payments or equity 
and debt issues occurred around the event date. 
The final sample used in this chapter consists of 80 Cat bond issues 
undertaken by 25 issuing firms. The data from Hannover Re indicate that the sample 
corresponds to 80% of the total Cat bond risk capital (i.e. the total of bond principal 
and coupon payments at risk) issued by listed companies up to May 2010. 
Table 5-1 provides sample descriptives by year (Panel A), trigger type 
(Panel B), country (Panel C), and issuing firm (Panel D). It is evident from Panel A 
that the majority of Cat bond transactions (by both number and total risk capital) 
took place in 2006 and 2007. Panel B reveals that the vast majority of Cat bonds 
exhibits an index-based trigger (meaning that Cat bond payoffs are independent of 
the underwriting losses of the issuing firm). Finally, Panel C and D illustrate that 
most Cat bonds were issued in Switzerland by Swiss Reinsurance Company. 
                                                 
29 When Cat bond transactions are consolidated, the risk capital of the individual transactions is 
summed up. For all cases where Cat bonds are consolidated, the trigger types of the individual 
transactions are identical across constituent issues. 
  
Table 5-1 
Sample Characteristics 
 
Panel A: Cat Bond Issues by Year 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Number 1 1 3 4 6 3 2 1 5 12 17 10 9 6 80 
Risk capital $ (millions) 112 45 322 604 797 356 605 248 1,007 3,344 4,043 1,638 1,290 850 15,261 
% Value 0.73 0.29 2.11 3.95 5.21 2.33 3.95 1.62 6.58 21.86 26.42 10.71 8.43 5.56 100.00 
Panel B: Cat Bond Issues by Trigger Type 
Indemnity 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 3 1 0 11 
Index 1 0 2 4 6 3 2 1 3 9 12 5 6 5 59 
Hybrid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 2 1 10 
Panel C: Cat Bond Issues by Country 
 France Germany Japan Switzerland UK U.S. Total 
Number 9 18 3 24 3 23 80 
Risk capital $ (millions) 2,164 2,944 748 5,215 408 3,782 15,261 
% Value 14.15 19.24 4.89 34.08 2.67 24.72 100.00 
Panel D: Cat Bond Issues by Issuing Firm 
Firm  No. Firm  No. Firm No. 
Allianz SE 5  Flagstone Reinsurance Holdings Ltd. 2  PXRE Group Ltd. 2 
Allstate Corp. 2  Hannover Re 3  Scor SE 4 
Aspen Insurance Holdings 1  Hartford Financial Service Group Inc. 3  Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd. 18 
Assurances Generales De France (AGF) 1  Hiscox Ltd. 1  Tokio Marine Holdings Inc. 1 
Assurant Inc. 2  Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Group Holdings Inc. 1  Travelers Companies Inc. 4 
AXA S.A. 4  Montpelier Re Holdings Ltd. 1  Vesta Insurance Group Inc. 1 
Catlin Group Ltd. 2  Munich Re Group 10  Zurich Financial Services AG 6 
Chubb Corp. 3  Nissay Dowa General Insurance Company Ltd. 1    
Endurance Specialty Holdings Ltd. 1  Platinum Underwriters Holdings Ltd. 1   
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5.3.2 Methodology 
In this chapter, the stock market valuation effects linked to a firm’s announcement to 
issue a Cat bond are analyzed. In an efficient capital market, changes in the market 
valuation of the issuing firm provide an assessment of the net benefits which issuers 
will realize from a Cat bond issue. Market-adjusted abnormal returns (AR) are 
estimated as employed by Fuller et al. (2002), Faccio et al. (2006) and others: 
= -it it mtAR r r ,       (5.1) 
where rit is the return for issuer i on day t and rmt is the return on a Datastream 
insurance index (which also includes reinsurers) for the country of the issuing firm.30 
The Datastream insurance index is computed as the value-weighted AR of all 
insurance and reinsurance companies listed on Datastream in the issuer’s country 
which have not issued Cat bonds.31 AR are summed across days and firms to yield 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). To test for the statistical significance of 
cumulative abnormal returns, a two tailed t-test as well as the non-parametric Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon test (which is robust to the effects of outliers) is employed. 
The analysis does not estimate market model-adjusted returns (which 
effectively yield risk-adjusted returns) for two reasons. First, the market model 
approach assumes that the estimation period over which market model parameters 
are estimated is free of the type of event whose value effects are being investigated. 
                                                 
30 This market return index is appropriate given the composition of the sample which consists of 
insurance and reinsurance firms. 
31 The results are qualitatively identical if an European insurance index (by aggregating all insurance 
and reinsurance companies in France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK) is used instead of the 
individual return index at country level. 
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If the analysis was to compute risk-adjusted abnormal returns using contaminated 
estimation periods, the resulting estimates would be unreliable. Since the sample 
contains a number of repeat issues by the same firm, the clean time series of return 
data necessary to implement this approach cannot be provided.32 Second, Brown and 
Warner (1980) show that over short-time periods risk-adjusted return values do not 
significantly improve estimation results as compared to the type of market-adjusted 
values employed in this study. 
The lack of an official announcement date presents a difficulty when 
determining the market reaction to Cat bond issues. The issue date of a Cat bond is 
unsuitable as an announcement date, because Cat bonds are sold on a book-building 
basis where investment banks contact potential investors in advance of an issue to 
gauge their interest as regards the size and structure of a new issue. It is, therefore, 
highly likely that market investors are informed about a firm’s intention to issue a 
Cat bond before the issue date. Following Thomas (1999), the event date is defined 
as the announcement date, unless the issue date precedes the announcement date, in 
which case the issue date is used as the event date. For each Cat bond, the day that an 
issue was first announced is identified by conducting news searches on LexisNexis 
and Factiva, as well the issuing firm’s website and ARTEMIS (www.artemis.bm) an 
online practitioner portal for insurance securitization. For 80% of sample 
observations, press announcements of Cat bond issues precede the issue date (on 
                                                 
32 When overlaps in the estimation period are allowed and the regression models are re-run using a 
single index market model (ARit=rit-αi-βirmt) and an estimation period of 200 trading days (t-226 to t-
26 trading days relative to the announcement date t of a Cat bond issue), the main conclusions are not 
affected. The results of these regressions are displayed in the Appendix to this chapter on pg. 146. 
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average by 13 days). This highlights the importance of employing hand collected 
announcement dates (rather than the issue dates) as event dates. 
5.4 Univariate Results 
5.4.1 The Shareholder Wealth Effects of Issuing 
Catastrophe Bonds 
In this section, the changes in the market value of firms which announce their 
engagement in insurance securitization by issuing Cat bonds are examined. Given the 
rather underwhelming contribution of Cat bonds to global catastrophe coverage to 
date, it is not expected to find strong performance gains for shareholders in the 
issuing firms. 
Table 5-2 reports abnormal returns linked to new Cat bond issues for 
selected event windows. Panel A shows that CAR[-15;+15] and CAR[-20;+20] are 
positive and statistically significant above the 10%-level (yet only according to the t-
test).33 While Cowan and Sergeant (1996) argue that non-parametric tests may 
struggle to detect small levels of abnormal share price performance, the insignificant 
z-statistic means that explanations according to which the finding of value gains is 
driven by outliers cannot be excluded. 
Panel B reports abnormal returns around the issue date of Cat bonds. Since 
any press coverage has preceded the issue date for the vast majority of Cat bond 
issues, it is not expected to find any statistically significant valuation effects around 
                                                 
33 The use of multi-week event periods is consistent with studies examining the shareholder wealth 
effects of asset securitization in the banking sector. For instance, Thomas (1999, 2001) uses a 50-day 
event window. 
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the issue. The results in Panel B are consistent with this expectation and confirm the 
rationale for centering the event study around announcement dates rather than issue 
dates. 
Table 5-2 
Abnormal Returns for Selected Event Windows 
 N mean (%) median (%) CAR>0% 
  (t-stat) (z-stat) N % 
Panel A: Distribution by Announcement Date 
CAR[-5;+5] 80 0.38 -0.20 37 46.3 
  (0.77) (-0.11)   
CAR[-10;+10] 80 1.01 0.20 42 52.5 
  (1.50) (0.56)   
CAR[-15;+15] 80 1.55 0.85 43 53.8 
  (2.00)** (1.25)   
CAR[-20;+20] 80 1.45 0.11 43 53.8 
  (1.67)* (0.93)   
CAR[-25;+25] 80 0.78 0.41 44 55.0 
  (0.94) (0.47)   
Panel B: Distribution by Issue Date 
CAR[-5; +5] 80 0.08 -0.20 39 48.8 
  (0.14) (-0.10)   
CAR[-10;+10] 80 0.97 0.52 44 55.0 
  (1.39) (1.26)   
CAR[-15;+15] 80 0.93 -0.33 39 48.8 
  (1.10) (-0.47)   
CAR[-20;+20] 80 0.88 -0.02 40 50.0 
  (0.96) (-0.08)   
CAR[-25;+25] 80 0.41 0.05 41 51.3 
  (0.47) (0.33)   
Notes: The table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for both the announcement date (Panel 
A) and the issue date (Panel B) of Cat bond issues during the period 1997 to May 2010 for different 
event windows. In both cases, abnormal returns are estimated using a market model (ARit = rit – rmt), 
where rit is the observed arithmetic return for issuing firm i at day t and rmt is the value-weighted 
market index return for day t. Also included are t-statistics (two tailed) and the non-parametric Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon Z-scores. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
In sum, no evidence is found that Cat bond issues, on average, lead to strong 
performance gains for shareholders in the issuing firm. However, Table 5-2 also 
reports that the sample is nearly split in half as regards sample firms experiencing 
value gains and value losses from Cat bond issues. This points towards large 
Chapter 5: The Performance Implications of Insurance Securitization 122 
 
 
variations in the distribution of Cat bond effects. The next sections, therefore, 
identify some of the factors which determine the market reaction to Cat bonds. This 
will lead to a better understanding of the motivations as to why firms engage in 
insurance securitization. Based on the two main sources for firm gains from issuing 
Cat bonds identified in Section 5.2, these factors are grouped into hedging benefits 
and cost benefits. 
5.4.2 Value Effects and Hedging Benefits 
As previously noted, one reason why firms could benefit from Cat bond issues is that 
Cat bonds allow firms to hedge against catastrophe-related underwriting losses by 
transferring catastrophe risks to capital markets. Since very few Cat bonds have been 
triggered by a natural catastrophe to date, it is not possible to measure the hedge 
efficiency of Cat bonds by matching Cat bond payoffs with insurer losses. Instead, 
two proxies are used to gauge the hedging benefits likely to be realized by the issuer: 
the trigger types underlying Cat bonds and the initial bond rating. 
The first proxy which is used to measure any hedging benefits realized by 
the issuers is the trigger type. The sample contains three types of triggers. (i) 
Indemnity based triggers, where the conditions for principal and/or coupon forfeiture 
are defined in terms of the underwriting losses of the issuer, (ii) index based triggers, 
where payouts are based on a loss index, and (iii) hybrid triggers, which combine 
more than one trigger in a single Cat bond. Indemnity-based triggers provide a 
perfect hedge against catastrophe-related losses of the issuing firm and should, 
therefore, provide the greatest hedging benefits to firms issuing Cat bonds. 
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However, indemnity-based Cat bonds suffer from a well-defined moral 
hazard problem. Since issuers are better informed about the loss functions linked to 
particular risks than market investors, they may issue high-risk bonds to 
unsuspecting investors (Doherty, 1997). Furthermore, indemnity-based Cat bonds 
display higher transaction costs resulting from higher disclosure requirements on the 
part of the issuer over the securitized risks. While index-linked and hybrid triggers 
are subject to a lower degree of moral hazard (and, thus, carry lower transaction costs 
for issuers), they both involve substantial basis risk when Cat bond payoffs are 
independent of the losses realized by the issuer. A priori it is, therefore, not obvious 
which trigger type will bring larger benefits to the issuer. It is proposed, however, 
that if the main benefit of Cat bonds lies in hedging catastrophe-related risks, 
indemnity-based Cat bonds should lead to higher abnormal returns. 
Table 5-3 examines the market valuation effects linked to Cat bond issues 
by trigger type for different event windows. The sample is split into indemnity-based 
triggers as well as non-indemnity triggers. Overall, the results show that abnormal 
returns surrounding the announcement to issue Cat bonds do not differ by the type of 
trigger. Differences in the abnormal returns for indemnity-based Cat bonds as 
compared with non indemnity-based Cat bonds are not statistically significant at 
customary levels (based on either a t-test or the non-parametric Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test). While statistically significant abnormal returns according to a t-test 
for non indemnity-based Cat bonds over [-15,+15] (at 10%-level of significance) are 
presented, Table 5-3 provides no further evidence that the value effects linked to Cat 
bond issues differ by the type of trigger event underlying an issue. 
  
Table 5-3 
Value Effects by Trigger Event 
  CAR[-5;+5] CAR[-10;+10] CAR[-15;+15] CAR[-20;+20] CAR[-25;+25] 
Indemnity mean -0.42% -0.04% 1.03% 1.27% -0.58% 
N=11 (t-stat) (-0.37) (-0.02) (0.43) (0.37) (-0.14) 
 median -0.47% -0.14% -0.37% -0.44% -0.31% 
 (z-stat) (-0.46) (-0.05) (-0.15) (-0.26) (-0.25) 
       
Other mean 0.50% 1.16% 1.62% 1.47% 0.97% 
N=69 (t-stat) (0.91) (1.58) (1.91)* (1.64) (1.26) 
 median -0.13% 0.20% 1.13% 0.27% 0.41% 
 (z-stat) (-0.06) (0.64) (1.36) (0.85) (0.64) 
       
ΔCARINDEM-OTHER mean -0.92% -1.20% -0.59% -0.20% -1.55% 
 (t-stat) (-0.61) (-0.59) (-0.24) (-0.08) (-0.62) 
 median -0.34% -0.06% -1.50% -0.77% -0.72% 
 (z-stat) (-0.46) (-0.21) (-0.62) (0.10) (-0.53) 
Notes: The table reports market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event windows surrounding the announcement to issue Cat 
bonds for indemnity based and non-indemnity based Cat bonds, respectively. Also, the differences in CAR between indemnity based and non-
indemnity based Cat bonds are displayed (ΔCARINDEM-OTHER). The sample consists of 80 Cat bonds issued in the period 1997 to May 2010. All firms 
are publicly traded. To test for the statistical significance of CAR, a two tailed t-test as well as the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test are 
employed. * indicates significance at the 10 % level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The second proxy which is used to measure any hedging benefits realized 
by the issuers is the initial Cat bond rating by Standard & Poor’s (or, if unavailable, 
by Moody’s).34 Since Cat bonds involve no credit risk (as their principals are fully 
collateralized), lower ratings indicate that the catastrophe loss event underlying the 
bond is more likely to occur. Given capacity constraints in reinsurance markets due 
to the inability of reinsurers to fully diversify underwriting losses caused by 
catastrophe events (see Froot and Stein, 1998; Froot and O'Connell, 2008), issuers 
will find it particularly difficult to obtain coverage in reinsurance markets for the 
type of loss events underlying Cat bonds with low ratings. Therefore, if the main 
benefit of Cat bonds lies in hedging catastrophe-related risks, it is expected that for 
high-risk catastrophes (i.e. for Cat bonds with low ratings), Cat bonds should result 
in higher revaluation gains for the issuing firm. 
Table 5-4 examines the market valuation effects linked to Cat bond issues 
by bond rating. Specifically, it reports abnormal returns for different event windows 
surrounding the announcement to issue Cat bonds for both the ten highest and lowest 
rated bonds. Bond ratings are converted into a numerical scale where higher numbers 
indicate a lower rating.35 The results in Table 4 show that Cat bond ratings do not 
impact on abnormal returns surrounding the issue announcement. Thus, differences 
between the ten highest and lowest rated Cat bonds are all statistically insignificant at 
customary levels (based on either a t-test or the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). 
                                                 
34 Since Cat bonds often consist of several tranches with separate ratings, the rating assigned in this 
chapter to an issue is an average weighted rating by the risk capital underlying each tranche. 
35 The numerical conversion applied to Cat bond ratings is as follows. The value of one is assigned to 
an issue which is rated AAA (or Aaa rated by Moodys), two to an AA+ (or Aa1) bond issue, and so on 
down to 17 for a CCC+ (or Caa) and 18 for ’Not Rated’. In ther sample, nearly 60% of observations 
attract a rating between BB+ (or Ba1) and BB (or Ba2), i.e. between the values 11 and 12. 
  
Table 5-4 
Value Effects by Credit Rating 
  CAR[-5;+5] CAR[-10;+10] CAR[-15;+15] CAR[-20;+20] CAR[-25;+25] 
High Rating mean 0.17% 2.13% 0.44% -0.59% -0.38% 
N=10 (t-stat) (0.37) (0.93) (0.31) (-0.35) (-0.31) 
 median 0.40% -0.78% -0.50% -2.94% -1.26% 
 (z-stat) (0.36) (0.25) (-0.25) (-1.27) (-0.66) 
       
Low Rating mean 0.67% 0.79% 0.15% 0.47% 0.08% 
N=10 (t-stat) (0.72) (0.76) (0.13) (0.37) (0.11) 
 median -0.13% 0.46% 0.35% -0.56% 0.22% 
 (z-stat) (0.56) 0.76 (0.25) (0.05) (0.25) 
       
ΔCARHIGH-LOW Δmean -0.50% 1.33% 0.29% -1.07% -0.45% 
 (t-stat) (-0.49) (0.53) (0.16) (-0.49) (-0.33) 
 Δmedian 0.53% -1.24% -0.85% -2.38% -1.48% 
 (z-stat) (-0.23) (-0.61) (-0.23) (-1.05) (-0.75) 
Notes: The table reports market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event windows surrounding the announcement to issue Cat 
bonds for both the ten highest and lowest rated bonds. The bond rating is applied by Standard &Poor’s or Moody’s with 1 being the highest rated bond 
and 18 being not rated Also, the differences in CAR between the ten highest and lowest rated bonds are displayed (ΔCARHIGH-LOW). The sample 
consists of 80 Cat bonds issued in the period 1997 to May 2010. All firms are publicly traded. To test for the statistical significance of CAR, a two 
tailed t-test as well as the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test are employed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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5.4.3 Value Effects and Cost Benefits 
Next to hedging benefits, firms may also benefit from Cat bonds by realizing cost 
savings on catastrophe-related risk management. To analyze whether firms issue Cat 
bonds to realize cost savings on catastrophe-related risk management, this section 
examines how loss uncertainty and the prices of catastrophe coverage via reinsurance 
markets affect the market reaction to a Cat bond issue. 
First, loss uncertainty facing the issuer may prove costly to the issuer of Cat 
bonds. Gibson et al. (2011) develop a theoretical model where loss uncertainty gives 
rise to increased information acquisition costs which are borne by insurers that seek 
catastrophe coverage via financial markets. These additional costs arise because 
insurers which face greater loss uncertainty need to offer a discount on the price of 
any securities issued to uninformed market participants. This discount is designed to 
compensate uninformed market participants for the likely losses they will experience 
when dealing with more informed traders under high loss uncertainty. 
Table 5-5 tests this proposition. To capture loss uncertainty, the volatility of 
the issuer’s loss ratio in the four fiscal years before the announcement date is used as 
in De Haan and Kakes (2010).36 Table 5-5 reports abnormal returns for different 
event windows surrounding the announcement to issue Cat bonds in the lowest (Q1) 
and highest (Q5) quintile of the distribution of issuers’ loss uncertainty. 
                                                 
36 Loss ratios are defined as the sum of claim and loss expenses and long-term insurance reserves 
scaled by premium income as in Browne and Hoyt (1995) and Cummins and Xie (2008). To address 
concerns that loss ratios are not comparable across property/casualty and life insurers, both univariate 
as well as multivariate tests are re-run after excluding life insurers. The main conclusions remain 
unaffected. 
  
Table 5-5 
Value Effects by the Issuer’s Loss Uncertainty 
  CAR[-5;+5] CAR[-10;+10] CAR[-15;+15] CAR[-20;+20] CAR[-25;+25] 
Low (Q1) mean 4.43% 7.02% 7.98% 6.77% 2.84% 
N=16 (t-stat) (1.09) (1.75)* (1.38) (1.24) (0.55) 
 median 1.26% 3.19% 4.37% 2.92% 2.61% 
 (z-stat) (1.15) (2.31)** (1.36) (1.36) (0.52) 
       
High (Q5) mean 0.35% 1.04% 1.30% 1.29% 1.00% 
N=16 (t-stat) (0.68) (1.45) (1.50) (1.26) (1.04) 
 median 0.14% 0.45% 0.97% -0.10% 0.30% 
 (z-stat) (0.58) (0.26) (1.27) (0.60) (0.51) 
       
ΔCARQ1-Q5 Δmean 4.08% 5.97% 6.68% 5.49% 1.84% 
 (t-stat) (2.07)** (2.38)** (2.11)** (1.56) (0.56) 
 Δmedian 1.12% 2.74% 3.40% 3.02% 2.31% 
 (z-stat) (0.98) (1.80)* (1.16) (1.13) (0.27) 
Notes: The table reports market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event windows surrounding the announcement to issue Cat 
bonds for the lowest (Q1) and highest quintiles (Q5) for the standard deviation of the loss ratio in the four fiscal years before the announcement date. 
The loss ratio is defined as claim and loss expenses plus long-term insurance reserves scaled by premium income (all in t-1). Also, the differences in 
CAR between the lowest and highest quintile are reported (ΔCARQ1-Q5). The sample consists of 80 Cat bonds issued in the period 1997 to May 2010. 
All firms are publicly traded. To test for the statistical significance of CAR, a two tailed t-test as well as the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon 
test are employed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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In line with the proposition and Gibson et al.’s (2011) arguments, Table 5-5 
documents that issuers with lower loss uncertainty benefit more from issuing Cat 
bonds than issuers with more volatile loss ratios. Over most event windows, issuers 
with low loss uncertainty realize higher abnormal returns than issuers with high loss 
uncertainty (significant at 10% for both t-test and z-test). 
Second, the pricing of catastrophe coverage is examined. Since the pricing 
of catastrophe coverage varies across the reinsurance underwriting cycle, the extent 
to which the gains from issuing Cat bonds vary across the reinsurance underwriting 
cycle provides an additional indicator of whether firms issue Cat bonds to realize 
costs savings on catastrophe-related risk management. 
The reinsurance underwriting cycle is characterized by periods when 
reinsurance prices are relatively low and coverage is readily available (soft markets) 
and periods when reinsurance prices are high and coverage supply is restricted (hard 
markets). Hard markets tend to follow time periods in the aftermath of natural 
catastrophes (Froot and O'Connell, 2008). Lane and Mahul (2008) show that Cat 
bond spreads are positively related to the reinsurance underwriting cycle. 
Consequently, when the costs of reinsurance are high, the costs of catastrophe 
coverage via Cat bonds are high as well. The critical cost advantage of Cat bonds lies 
in the fact that the costs of catastrophe coverage are fixed over a multiyear period (of 
usually three to four years) at the time of the issue. Therefore, Cat bonds issued 
during soft markets effectively lock in low catastrophe pricing and may result in 
substantial cost savings should reinsurance markets harden in the following years. By 
the same token, issues during hard markets mean that the issuer is likely to pay a 
high price for catastrophe coverage when reinsurance markets soften again. If the 
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costs of obtaining catastrophe coverage are an important driver of the benefits linked 
to Cat bond issues, it is proposed that the value effects linked to issuing Cat bonds 
during hard reinsurance markets will be lower than the value effects generated by 
issuing Cat bonds during soft reinsurance markets. 
In order to distinguish between soft markets and hard reinsurance markets, 
the Guy Carpenter (2010) World Catastrophe Rate On Line Index is used. The index 
values essentially equate to the average premium per dollar of reinsurance coverage 
(defined as global catastrophe reinsurance premiums divided by the global policy 
limits of catastrophe reinsurance). Table 5-6 reports abnormal returns for different 
event windows surrounding the announcement to issue Cat bonds for the lowest (Q1) 
and highest quintile (Q5) of the distribution of the Rate On Line index. 
Table 5-6 confirms the propositions. Over all event windows examined, Cat 
bond issues during soft markets lead to higher abnormal returns for issuing firms 
compared with issues during hard markets. These results are statistically significant 
according to the t-test for all event windows and also according to a z-test (for [-20; 
+20] and [-25; +25]). This suggests that lowering the costs of catastrophe coverage is 
an important source of gains for the issuers of Cat bonds. 
  
Table 5-6 
Value Effects by Reinsurance Prices 
  CAR[-5;+5] CAR[-10;+10] CAR[-15;+15] CAR[-20;+20] CAR[-25;+25] 
Guy Carpenter Rate On Line Index 
Low (Q1) mean 3.78% 4.04% 6.34% 6.91% 3.11% 
N=20 (t-stat) (0.98) (0.99) (1.29) (1.23) (0.67) 
 median 0.55% 3.42% 4.15% 7.85% 6.25% 
 (z-stat) (0.28) (0.70) (1.12) (1.26) (0.70) 
       
High (Q5) mean -0.46% -1.08% -0.93% -1.58% -2.17% 
N=13 (t-stat) (-0.97) (-1.70)* (-1.17) (-2.17)** (-2.77)*** 
 median -1.04% -0.95% -0.61% -1.12% -1.70% 
 (z-stat) (-1.07) (-1.48) (-0.92) (-1.85)* (-2.41)** 
       
ΔCARQ1-Q5 Δmean 4.25% 5.11% 7.27% 8.48% 5.28% 
 (t-stat) (1.96)* (2.14)** (2.50)** (2.69)** (1.91)* 
 Δmedian 1.59% 4.37% 4.76% 8.97% 7.95% 
 (z-stat) (0.55) (0.92) (0.85) (1.77)* (2.04)** 
Notes: The table reports market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event windows surrounding the announcement to issue Cat 
bonds for the lowest (Q1) and highest quintiles (Q5) for the Guy Carpenter Rate On Line Index (Source: Guy Carpenter, 2010). This index is used as a 
measure of the reinsurance price level. Also, the differences in CAR between the lowest and highest quintile are reported (ΔCARQ1-Q5). The sample 
consists of 80 Cat bonds issued in the period 1997 to May 2010. All firms are publicly traded. To test for the statistical significance of CAR, a two 
tailed t-test as well as the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test are employed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Overall, the wealth effects in response to the issue announcement of Cat 
bonds appear to be driven by explanations according to which Cat bonds offer cost 
savings versus other forms of catastrophe risk management (and less by their 
potential to hedge exposure to catastrophe risk). To test whether additional factors 
impact upon the shareholder wealth effects of insurance securitization, multivariate 
regression analyses are employed in the next section. 
5.5 The Determinants of the Wealth Effects of Issuing 
Catastrophe Bonds 
5.5.1 The Model 
Multivariate regression analyses is used to assess the robustness of the findings in the 
univariate analysis and to jointly estimate the various factors which affect the market 
reaction to firms issuing Cat bonds. Specifically, the following model is estimated 
via OLS with robust standard errors. 
 CAR[-20;  20] = +  IC+  BC+  MC+ ,    (5.2) 
where: 
 CAR[-20;+20] is the market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return 
over [-20;+20] days relative to the announcement date; 
 IC is a vector of issuer characteristics in the fiscal year before the issue; 
 BC is a vector of Cat bond characteristics, and 
 MC is a vector of market specific characteristics. 
To control for the effect of unobserved variables that are constant over time, 
year fixed effects are included into the model. Also, because observations for 
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specific issuers are unlikely to be independent (possibly leading to within correlation 
issues), cluster-robust standard errors are computed and each issuing firm is treated 
as a cluster. 
Table 5-7 presents descriptions and summary statistics for the vector of 
variables described below. All accounting data (unless stated differently) refer to one 
fiscal year prior to the announcement of the Cat bond issue (t-1) and are from 
Worldscope. 
Issuer Characteristics: 
The vector of issuer characteristics contains firm size (SIZE) which is measured by 
the logarithm of issuer total assets. Firm size is expected to enter the model with a 
positive coefficient for three reasons. First, large companies should possess the 
financial sophistication and adequate mass to produce transactions of sufficient scale 
to amortize the high structuring costs of Cat bonds (Cummins and Trainar, 2009). 
Second, it is conceivable that larger firms are more likely to boast sizable asset 
management divisions which facilitate access to potential Cat bond investors. Third, 
basis risk involved in the transaction is likely to decrease with the size of the issuing 
firm (Harrington and Niehaus, 1999). 
Another issuer characteristic is the issuer’s leverage (LEV; defined as total 
liabilities over total assets) which measures a firm’s exposure to financial distress. 
Firms with higher leverage are expected to generate positive announcement returns, 
because securitization is a means to free up capital that can then be used to absorb 
losses and avoid financial distress following a catastrophe event (Cummins and 
Trainar, 2009). 
  
Table 5-7 
Summary Statistics 
 Variable Definition N Mean Median Std. Dev 5 Pctile 95 Pctile 
Value effect CAR[-20;+20] Market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return over 
[-20; +20] days relative to the announcement date (%) 
80 1.45 0.11 7.90 -8.92 17.48 
Issuer 
characteristics 
SIZE Log of total assets 80 18.36 18.87 1.62 14.94 20.84 
LEV Total liabilities to total assets (%) 80 85.47 89.43 13.03 61.86 95.93 
ROE The ratio of pre-tax profits to equity (%) 80 16.18 17.59 10.61 -3.19 31.70 
PREPERF Buy and hold abnormal return from -252 to -20 days relative 
to the announcement date (%) 
80 0.25 -2.52 22.25 -27.40 34.72 
LOSSVOL Standard deviation of loss ratios (defined as claim and loss 
expenses plus long-term insurance reserves scaled by premium 
income) over a four-year period prior to the announcement date 
80 6.45 4.62 6.08 1.24 18.02 
FREQUENT Dummy which equals 1 if the issuer has issued five or more 
Cat bonds during the observation period (and 0 otherwise) 
80 0.49 0.00 0.51 0.00 1.00 
Cat bond 
characteristics 
ISSUESIZE Value of Cat bond issue scaled by the book value of equity 
(%) 
80 2.61 1.45 3.25 0.31 10.60 
INDEM Dummy which equals 1 if the Cat bond has an indemnity 
trigger (and 0 otherwise) 
80 0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
BONDRATING The bond rating applied by Standard &Poor’s or Moody’s 
with 1 being the highest rated bond and 18 being not rated 
80 11.39 11.43 2.55 5.39 14.91 
MORTALITY Dummy which equals 1 if the Cat bond securitizes 
mortality-related risks (and 0 otherwise) 
80 0.07 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Market 
characteristics 
SOFTMARKET Dummy which equals 1 if the announcement to issue a Cat 
bond took place during the lowest quintile for the Guy 
Carpenter Rate On Line Index (and 0 otherwise). Source: 
Guy Carpenter (2010). 
80 0.25 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Notes: Accounting data (unless stated differently) refer to one fiscal year prior to the announcement of the Cat bond issue and are from Worldscope. 
 
C
h
ap
ter 4
: P
erfo
rm
an
ce Im
p
licatio
n
s o
f In
su
ran
ce S
ecu
ritizatio
n
 
C
h
ap
ter 5
: T
h
e P
erfo
rm
an
ce Im
p
licatio
n
s o
f In
su
ran
ce S
ecu
ritizatio
n
                                1
3
4
 
Chapter 5: The Performance Implications of Insurance Securitization 135 
 
 
Also, the model controls for accounting and market performance before the 
time period of an issue. For accounting performance, the return on equity is used 
(ROE; defined as pre-tax profits over book value of equity). For pre-issue market 
performance, the issuers’ buy and hold abnormal returns (PREPERF) over [-252; -
20] days relative to the announcement date net of the return for the Datastream 
insurance index at country-level over the same time period is used. Against the 
background that shareholders may be unfamiliar with the concept of Cat bonds, it is 
expected to find a positive association between both performance measures and 
announcement returns. This would indicate that shareholders place more confidence 
in the performance effects of Cat bonds issued by highly performing firms. 
The vector of issuer characteristics also includes the issuers’ loss volatility 
(LOSSVOL). In line with the univariate tests above, loss volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the loss ratio (which is the sum of claim and loss expenses as 
well as long-term insurance reserves scaled by premium income) in the four fiscal 
years before the announcement date. LOSSVOL is expected to have a negative effect 
on abnormal returns, meaning that issuers with more stable loss ratios will benefit 
more from issuing Cat bonds, as insurance securitization offers them relatively 
greater cost savings as compared to reinsurance coverage (see Gibson et al. 2011).37 
FREQUENT is a proxy for the experience of the issuing firm in the Cat 
bond market. This variable is defined as a dummy variable which equals one if the 
                                                 
37 The model also controls for the type of issuer, by including a dummy variable which is equal to one 
when the issuer is a reinsurance firm and 0 otherwise (REINSURER). REINSURER enters the model 
with a statistically insignificant coefficient while the results remain the same. Nevertheless, as 
REINSURER is highly correlated with the size of the issuer (SIZE), the variable is excluded from the 
model. 
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issuer has issued five or more Cat bonds during the observation period (and zero 
otherwise).38 Evidence from the banking sector shows that frequent securitizations 
are rewarded with higher excess shareholders returns (Thomas, 2001). These 
findings are explained by potential knowledge and reputation gains as well as greater 
bargaining power vis-à-vis investors when structuring follow-up issues. As a result, 
the announcement by a firm which has already issued five or more Cat bonds is 
expected to be associated with positive abnormal returns. 
Catastrophe Bond Characteristics: 
The vector of Cat bond controls contains the following variables. The size of the 
issue (ISSUESIZE) is computed as the ratio of total risk capital issued to the book 
value of equity. Since Cat bond issues display a high proportion of fixed transaction 
costs, larger issues should be more cost efficient (Cummins and Trainar, 2009) and 
should, therefore, generate higher abnormal returns. 
In line with the univariate tests, the model further controls for the type of 
trigger event underlying Cat bonds. INDEM is a dummy variable which is equal to 
one when an indemnity trigger is used (and zero otherwise). As explained in Section 
4.2, if the main benefit of Cat bonds lies in hedging catastrophe-related risks, 
INDEM to enter the model with a positive coefficient. Also in line with the 
univariate tests, the model controls for the initial Cat bond rating (BONDRATING) 
by Standard & Poor’s (or, if unavailable, by Moody’s) with 1 being the highest rated 
                                                 
38 As an alternative measure to FREQUENT, the number of previous Cat bond issues as a proxy for 
the issuer’s experience is employed, as suggested by Thomas (2001). However, regression results did 
not change by using this measure instead of FREQUENT. 
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bond and 18 being not rated. If the main benefit of Cat bonds lies in hedging 
catastrophe-related risks, it is expected that the coefficient on BONDRATING enters 
the model with a positive sign, indicating that Cat bonds with a lower rating 
(meaning the catastrophe loss event underlying the bond is more likely to occur) lead 
to higher abnormal returns. 
Since Cat bonds can be used to securitize either catastrophe-related property 
and casualty risks or catastrophe-related mortality risks, the model also controls for 
the securitized type of risk by adding MORTALITY to the model. MORTALITY 
takes a value of one if the bond securitizes catastrophe-related mortality risks (and 
zero otherwise). Against the background that mortality bonds are much less 
frequently used, shareholders are expected to be more uncertain about mortality 
bonds’ potential performance effects. Consequently, MORTALITY should have 
negative value implications for the issuing firms. 
Market Characteristics: 
Finally, moving on to the vector of market characteristics, the Guy Carpenter Rate 
On Line Index is used to compute SOFTMARKET, a dummy variable which equals 
one if the issue announcement takes place during particular soft reinsurance markets 
(defined as the lowest quintile of the sample distribution of the Guy Carpenter Rate 
On Line Index). In line with the univariate tests, a positive association between 
SOFTMARKET and announcement returns is expected, as Cat bond spreads are 
positively related to the reinsurance underwriting cycle (Lane and Mahul, 2008). 
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5.5.2 Regression Results 
Table 5-8 presents the results of regressions on the announcement period returns 
(CAR[-20;+20]) around the announcement of a Cat bond issue. The results confirm 
the main findings from the univariate tests above. First, INDEM and BONDRATING 
do not enter with a statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that the hedging 
potential of Cat bonds do not impact on the value effects linked to insurance 
securitization. Second, LOSSVOL enters the model with negative coefficients 
(significant at the 1% level). This is consistent with issuers with more stable loss 
ratios realizing larger cost savings from Cat bonds vis-à-vis reinsurance coverage. 
This is in line with Gibson et al. (2011) who argue that insurance securitization 
involves lower information acquisition costs as compared to traditional reinsurance 
when expected losses can be predicted involving little uncertainty. 
Third, reinsurance prices affect the benefits that issuers expect to extract 
from the issue of a Cat bond. SOFTMARKET enters with a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient (significant at the 5% level), indicating that Cat bond issues 
during periods of particularly low reinsurance prices lead to higher abnormal returns 
for issuing firms. As argued earlier, this can be ascribed to the fact that Cat bond 
prices are locked in for a multi-year period and, consequently, Cat bond prices 
remain unaffected by future price increases in the market for catastrophe coverage. 
By and large, these results confirm that market investors take the view that the source 
of performance gains for firms engaging in insurance securitization lies in these 
firms realizing cost efficiencies compared with reinsurance coverage. 
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Table 5-8 
Regressions on Abnormal Issuer Announcement Returns 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
SIZE 0.813 0.385 0.391 0.854 0.836  
 (0.45) (0.26) (0.27) (0.58) (0.57)  
LEV -0.217** -0.180** -0.180** -0.189** -0.189** -0.172*** 
 (2.65) (2.23) (2.20) (2.23) (2.22) (5.27) 
ROE 0.021 0.003 0.001 -0.014 -0.012  
 (0.28) (0.04) (0.02) (0.18) (0.16)  
PREPERF 0.083** 0.074** 0.074** 0.077** 0.077** 0.073** 
 (2.24) (2.25) (2.24) (2.31) (2.36) (2.36) 
LOSSVOL -0.391*** -0.351*** -0.351*** -0.364*** -0.368*** -0.323*** 
 (3.04) (3.08) (2.97) (3.13) (3.06) (3.51) 
FREQUENT  -1.720 -0.808 -0.744 -1.674 -1.793  
 (0.71) (0.70) (0.52) (1.17) (1.02)  
ISSUESIZE 0.093 0.172 0.174 0.258 0.247  
 (0.13) (0.31) (0.32) (0.46) (0.46)  
INDEM -1.595  -0.148  -0.484  
 (0.53)  (0.06)  (0.18)  
BONDRATING 0.360   0.363 0.375  
 (1.48)   (1.67) (1.68)  
MORTALITY 1.179  -0.791 1.122 1.168  
 (0.56)  (0.70) (0.60) (0.61)  
SOFTMARKET 1.555** 1.491** 1.494** 1.424** 1.419** 1.611*** 
 (2.25) (2.42) (2.36) (2.25) (2.20) (3.00) 
       
Intercept 0.803 9.187 9.025 -1.630 -1.307 14.802*** 
 (0.03) (0.44) (0.45) (0.08) (0.06) (5.31) 
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Adjusted R
2 
0.321 0.381 0.360 0.367 0.356 0.416 
Notes: The table reports the results of ordinary least squares regression for CAR[-20;+20] relative to 
the announcement date (t=0). The model is estimated with Huber-White corrected standard errors 
clustered by the issuing firm. The independent variables are: SIZE = logarithm of total assets; LEV = 
ratio of total assets to total liabilities; ROE = return on equity; PREPERF = one year buy and hold 
abnormal return before the issue announcement net of the same return computed for the market index; 
LOSSVOL = standard deviation of loss ratios (defined as claim and loss expenses plus long-term 
insurance reserves scaled by premium income) over a four-year period prior to the announcement 
date; FREQUENT  = dummy variable which equals 1 if the issuer has issued 5 or more Cat bonds 
during the observation period (and 0 otherwise); ISSUESIZE = ratio of total risk capital issued to total 
shareholders’ equity; INDEM = dummy variable which equals 1 if the Cat bond has an indemnity 
trigger (and 0 otherwise); BONDRATING = the bond rating applied by Standard &Poor’s or Moody’s 
with 1 being the highest rated bond and 18 being not rated; MORTALITY = dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the securitized risk is linked to mortality risk (and 0 otherwise); SOFTMARKET = dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the bond is issued during the lowest quintile for the Guy Carpenter Rate On 
Line Index (Source: Guy Carpenter, 2010). All accounting data (unless stated differently) refer to one 
fiscal year prior to the announcement of the Cat bond issue (t-1) and are from Worldscope. The t-
statistics (two tailed) of the coefficients are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Further, the control variables show that firms which are less exposed to 
financial distress (LEV), as well as firms with higher pre-issue market performances 
(PREPERF) realize higher abnormal returns (significant at the 5% level). These 
findings are jointly interpreted as consistent with explanations according to which 
investors are uncertain about the performance implications of Cat bonds. It could be 
argued that investors focus on measures of the issuer’s recent performance and 
financial stability to gauge the expected performance effects of a Cat bond on the 
issuing firm. 
Also, and consistent with the last point, it is interesting to note a general 
absence of control variables linked to the Cat bond design which enter the 
regressions with a statistically significant sign. Consequently, it could be argued that 
shareholders are either indifferent about the Cat bond design or, alternatively, they 
are uncertain over the performance effects of Cat bond design on the issuing firm. 
5.6 Summary and Conclusions 
The recent earthquake and tsunami in Japan is estimated to be the second most costly 
insurance loss after Hurricane Katrina in 2005. These and similar catastrophe loss 
events bear testimony to a remarkable increase in catastrophe-related underwriting 
losses over the past decade. Against the background of capacity constraints in the 
market for catastrophe risk, firms exposed to catastrophe-related underwriting losses 
can use alternative risk transfer solutions, most prominently in the form of Cat bonds, 
which are designed to transfer catastrophe-related risks to capital markets. However, 
the total outstanding risk capital of Cat bonds has been lagging behind expectations 
to date. This raises questions about the usefulness of Cat bonds for insurers. 
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For firms with catastrophe-related underwriting exposures, issuing Cat 
bonds should offer a number of potential benefits. However, many of the arguments 
made in favor of Cat bonds do not take into account supply-side or demand-side 
frictions in the market for catastrophe risks. Over the years, this has led to 
considerable uncertainty over whether Cat bonds actually benefit the firms which 
issue them. This chapter empirically examines the shareholder wealth effects for a 
unique data set consisting of the near population of Cat bond issues by listed 
companies up to May 2010. 
Consistent with the underwhelming contribution which Cat bonds make to 
global catastrophe coverage to date, evidence of strong performance gains for the 
shareholders of firms which issue Cat bonds cannot be provided. However, further 
examination reveals that the value effects linked to insurance securitization appear to 
be driven by explanations according to which Cat bonds offer cost savings versus 
other forms of catastrophe risk management and less by their potential to hedge 
exposure to catastrophe risk. Thus, issues by firms facing low levels of loss 
uncertainty (which reduces the information acquisition costs in financial markets) as 
well as issues during time periods in which the premiums for catastrophe coverage 
are particularly low (and coverage via Cat bonds is inexpensive) experience large 
value gains linked to Cat bond issues. 
As a result, this chapter offers another possible explanation for the 
underwhelming use of insurance securitization by firms exposed to catastrophe risks. 
This is because the analysis casts doubt on the effectiveness of insurance 
securitization in general (and Cat bonds in particular) in hedging underwriting risks. 
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5.7 Appendix 
Table 5-9 
Abnormal Returns for Selected Event Windows, Excluding Catastrophe Mortality Bonds 
 N mean (%) median (%) CAR>0% 
  (t-stat) (z-stat) N % 
Panel A: Distribution by Announcement Date 
CAR[-5;+5] 74 0.40 -0.20 34 45.9 
  (0.74) (-0.10)   
CAR[-10;+10] 74 1.11 0.33 40 53.3 
  (1.53) (0.70)   
CAR[-15;+15] 74 1.62** 1.13 41 54.7 
  (2.01) (1.46)   
CAR[-20;+20] 74 1.55* 0.27 41 54.7 
  (1.68) (1.09)   
CAR[-25;+25] 74 0.81 0.46 42 56.0 
  (0.93) (0.62)   
Panel B: Distribution by Issue Date 
CAR[-5; +5] 74 0.09 (-0.21) 36 48.7 
  (0.15) (0.12)   
CAR[-10;+10] 74 1.04 (0.63) 42 56.76 
  (1.38) (1.29)   
CAR[-15;+15] 74 0.94 (0.19) 37 50.0 
  (1.09) (0.57)   
CAR[-20;+20] 74 0.88 (0.05) 38 51.4 
  (0.90) (0.11)   
CAR[-25;+25] 74 0.41 (0.09) 38 51.4 
  (0.45) (-0.22)   
Notes: The table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for both the announcement date (Panel 
A) and the issue date (Panel B) of Cat bond issues during the period 1997 to May 2010 for different 
event windows. In both cases, abnormal returns are estimated using a market model (ARit = rit – rmt), 
where rit is the observed arithmetic return for issuing firm i at day t and Rmt is the value-weighted 
market index return for day t. Also included are t-statistics (two tailed) and the non-parametric 
Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon Z-scores. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 5-10 
Value Effects by Trigger Event, Excluding Catastrophe Mortality Bonds 
  CAR[-5;+5] CAR[-10;+10] CAR[-15;+15] CAR[-20;+20] CAR[-25;+25] 
ΔCARINDEM-OTHER mean -0.94% -1.33% -0.68% -0.32% -1.61% 
 (t-stat) (0.60) (0.62) (0.28) (0.12) (0.63) 
 median -0.34% -0.19% -1.74% 1.03% -0.77% 
 (z-stat) (-0.47) (-0.28) (-0.74) (0.03) (-0.55) 
Notes: The table reports market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event 
windows surrounding the announcement to issue Cat bonds for indemnity based and non-indemnity 
based Cat bonds, respectively. Also, the differences in CAR between indemnity based and non-
indemnity based Cat bonds are displayed (ΔCARINDEM-OTHER). The sample consists of 80 Cat bonds 
issued in the period 1997 to May 2010. All firms are publicly traded. To test for the statistical 
significance of CAR, a two tailed t-test as well as the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test 
are employed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5-11 
Value Effects by Catastrophe Bond Rating, Excluding Catastrophe Mortality Bonds 
  CAR[-5;+5] CAR[-10;+10] CAR[-15;+15] CAR[-20;+20] CAR[-25;+25] 
ΔCARHIGH-LOW Δmean -0.45% 2.68% 1.92% 1.00% 1.10% 
 (t-stat) (-0.36) (0.87) (0.94) (0.33) (0.51) 
 Δmedian 0.25% 0.32% 0.23% -0.27% 1.63% 
 (z-stat) (0.00) (0.35) (0.81) (0.12) (0.69) 
Notes: The table reports market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event 
windows surrounding the announcement to issue Cat bonds for both the ten highest and lowest rated 
bonds. The bond rating is applied by Standard &Poor’s or Moody’s with 1 being the highest rated 
bond and 18 being not rated Also, the differences in CAR between the ten highest and lowest rated 
bonds are displayed (ΔCARHIGH-LOW). The sample consists of 80 Cat bonds issued in the period 1997 
to May 2010. All firms are publicly traded. To test for the statistical significance of CAR, a two tailed 
t-test as well as the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test are employed. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5-12 
Value Effects by the Issuer’s Loss Uncertainty, Excluding Catastrophe Mortality Bonds 
  CAR[-5;+5] CAR[-10;+10] CAR[-15;+15] CAR[-20;+20] CAR[-25;+25] 
ΔCARQ1-Q5 Δmean 4.12% 5.91% 6.72% 5.45% 1.87% 
 (t-stat) (2.01)** (2.27)** (2.10)** (1.52) (0.55) 
 Δmedian 1.07% 2.68% 3.11% 2.92% 2.28% 
 (z-stat) (1.00) (1.73)* (1.16) (1.08) (0.27) 
Notes: The table reports market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event 
windows surrounding the announcement to issue Cat bonds for the lowest (Q1) and highest quintiles 
(Q5) for the standard deviation of the loss ratio in the four fiscal years before the announcement date. 
The loss ratio is defined as claim and loss expenses plus long-term insurance reserves scaled by 
premium income (all in t-1). Also, the differences in CAR between the lowest and highest quintile are 
reported (ΔCARQ1-Q5). The sample consists of 80 Cat bonds issued in the period 1997 to May 2010. 
All firms are publicly traded. To test for the statistical significance of CAR, a two tailed t-test as well 
as the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test are employed. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5-13 
Value Effects by Reinsurance Prices, Excluding Catastrophe Mortality Bonds 
  CAR[-5;+5] CAR[-10;+10] CAR[-15;+15] CAR[-20;+20] CAR[-25;+25] 
Guy Carpenter Rate On Line Index 
ΔCARQ1-Q5 Δmean 4.17% 5.01% 7.06% 8.36% 5.20% 
 (t-stat) (1.86)* (2.03)* (2.35)** (2.55)** (1.81)* 
 Δmedian 1.53% 3.34% 4.37% 8.70% 7.64% 
 (z-stat) (0.51) (0.86) (0.82) (1.73)* (2.00)** 
Notes: The table reports market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for different event 
windows surrounding the announcement to issue Cat bonds for the lowest (Q1) and highest quintiles 
(Q5) for the Guy Carpenter Rate On Line Index (Source: Guy Carpenter, 2010). This index is used as a 
measure of the reinsurance price level. Also, the differences in CAR between the lowest and highest 
quintile are reported (ΔCARQ1-Q5). The sample consists of 80 Cat bonds issued in the period 1997 to 
May 2010. All firms are publicly traded. To test for the statistical significance of CAR, a two tailed t-
test as well as the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test are employed. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5-14 
Regressions on Abnormal Issuer Announcement Returns, Excluding Catastrophe Mortality 
Bonds 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
SIZE 0.567 0.398 0.362 0.699 0.676  
 (0.29) (0.25) (0.23) (0.43) (0.41)  
LEV  -0.216** -0.178* -0.178* -0.184* -0.184* -0.170*** 
 (2.50) (1.98) (1.97) (2.01) (1.99) (4.76) 
ROE  0.076 0.048 0.051 0.039 0.043  
 (1.04) (0.66) (0.72) (0.51) (0.57)  
PREPERF 0.092** 0.080** 0.081** 0.082** 0.083** 0.079** 
 (2.21) (2.19) (2.24) (2.25) (2.33) (2.31) 
LOSSVOL -0.395** -0.360** -0.363** -0.368** -0.374** -0.338*** 
 (2.73) (2.72) (2.71) (2.76) (2.77) (3.12) 
FREQUENT -1.129 -0.930 -1.018 -1.586 -1.789  
 (0.76) (0.79) (0.69) (0.99) (0.87)  
ISSUESIZE 0.062 0.232 0.219 0.281 0.266  
 (0.08) (0.38) (0.37) (0.47) (0.45)  
INDEM -1.958  -0.480  -0.733  
 (0.66)  (0.19)  (0.28)  
BONDRATING 0.244   0.234 0.258  
 (0.68)   (0.86) (0.87)  
SOFTMARKET 1.584*** 1.712*** 1.676*** 1.785*** 1.738*** 1.633*** 
 (4.82) (7.43) (5.79) (6.93) (5.91) (14.72) 
       
Intercept 5.918 7.945 8.630 1.077 1.404 14.659*** 
 (0.20) (0.35) (0.39) (0.05) (0.06) (4.80) 
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Adjusted R
2 
0.322 0.380 0.368 0.370 0.359 0.415 
Notes: The table reports the results of ordinary least squares regression for CAR[-20;+20] relative to 
the announcement date (t=0). The model is estimated with Huber-White corrected standard errors 
clustered by the issuing firm. The independent variables are: SIZE = logarithm of total assets; LEV = 
ratio of total assets to total liabilities; ROE = return on equity; PREPERF = one year buy and hold 
abnormal return before the issue announcement net of the same return computed for the market index; 
LOSSVOL = standard deviation of loss ratios (defined as claim and loss expenses plus long-term 
insurance reserves scaled by premium income) over a four-year period prior to the announcement 
date; FREQUENT  = dummy variable which equals 1 if the issuer has issued 5 or more Cat bonds 
during the observation period (and 0 otherwise); ISSUESIZE = ratio of total risk capital issued to total 
shareholders’ equity; INDEM = dummy variable which equals 1 if the Cat bond has an indemnity 
trigger (and 0 otherwise); BONDRATING = the bond rating applied by Standard &Poor’s or Moody’s 
with 1 being the highest rated bond and 18 being not rated; SOFTMARKET = dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the bond is issued during the lowest quintile for the Guy Carpenter Rate On Line Index 
(Source: Guy Carpenter, 2010). All accounting data (unless stated differently) refer to one fiscal year 
prior to the announcement of the Cat bond issue (t-1) and are from Worldscope. The t-statistics (two 
tailed) of the coefficients are reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Chapter 5: The Performance Implications of Insurance Securitization 146 
 
 
Table 5-15 
Regressions on Abnormal Issuer Announcement Returns Using Risk Adjusted Abnormal 
Returns 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
SIZE 0.749 0.644 0.607 1.118 1.087  
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.39) (0.67) (0.65)  
LEV  -0.274** -0.219** -0.220** -0.229** -0.230** -0.175*** 
 (2.65) (2.24) (2.23) (2.19) (2.22) (3.69) 
ROE  0.034 -0.006 -0.003 -0.020 -0.017  
 (0.30) (0.06) (0.03) (0.18) (0.15)  
PREPERF -0.004 -0.019 -0.019 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 
 (0.09) (0.40) (0.40) (0.36) (0.34) (0.32) 
LOSSVOL -0.439** -0.423* -0.427* -0.440* -0.446* -0.500** 
 (2.06) (1.88) (1.87) (1.91) (1.94) (2.59) 
FREQUENT -1.021 1.204 1.090 0.156 -0.041  
 (1.39) (0.81) (0.65) (0.08) (0.02)  
ISSUESIZE 0.094 0.260 0.245 0.341 0.324  
 (0.12) (0.41) (0.40) (0.53) (0.52)  
INDEM -2.419  -0.437  -0.800  
 (0.75)  (0.17)  (0.30)  
MORTALITY 0.335   0.384 0.404  
 (0.78)   (0.97) (1.03)  
BONDRATING 2.422  0.299 2.334 2.410  
 (0.64)  (0.18) (0.70) (0.72)  
SOFTMARKET 1.782** 1.641** 1.637** 1.565** 1.557** 1.622*** 
 (2.26) (2.47) (2.43) (2.26) (2.21) (2.90) 
       
Intercept 4.173 5.103 5.863 -5.810 -5.276 14.278*** 
 (0.13) (0.23) (0.28) (0.24) (0.22) (3.50) 
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Adjusted R
2 
0.223 0.262 0.237 0.245 0.232 0.299 
Notes: The table reports the results of ordinary least squares regression for CAR[-20;+20] relative to 
the announcement date (t=0) using a standard market model (ARit=rit-αi-βirmt) with risk adjusted 
abnormal returns. The model is estimated with Huber-White corrected standard errors clustered by the 
issuing firm. The independent variables are: SIZE = logarithm of total assets; LEV = ratio of total 
assets to total liabilities; ROE = return on equity; PREPERF = one year buy and hold abnormal return; 
LOSSVOL = standard deviation of loss ratios (defined as claim and loss expenses plus long-term 
insurance reserves scaled by premium income) over a four-year period prior to the announcement 
date; FREQUENT = dummy variable which equals 1 if the issuer issued more than 5 Cat bonds 
during the observation period (and 0 otherwise); ISSUESIZE = ratio of total risk capital issued to total 
shareholders’ equity; INDEM = dummy variable which equals 1 if the Cat bond has an indemnity 
trigger (and 0 otherwise); MORTALITY = dummy variable which equals 1 if the securitized risk is 
linked to mortality risk (and 0 otherwise); BONDRATING = the bond rating applied by Standard 
&Poor’s or Moody’s with 1 being the highest rated bond and 18 being not rated; SOFTMARKET = 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the announcement to issue a Cat bond took place during the highest 
quintile for the Guy Carpenter Rate On Line Index (Source: Guy Carpenter, 2010). All accounting 
data (unless stated differently) refer to one fiscal year prior to the announcement of the Cat bond issue 
(t-1) and are from Worldscope. The t-statistics (two tailed) of the coefficients are reported in the 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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6  
The Risk Implications of Insurance 
Securitization: Do Catastrophe Bonds 
Lower the Default Risk of Issuers? 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter casts doubt on the effectiveness of insurance securitization in 
general (and Cat bonds in particular) in hedging underwriting risks. Potentially, this 
could provide another explanation for the hitherto underwhelming use of insurance 
securitization, as one of the key characteristics of insurance securitization is the 
transfer of catastrophe risks from insurers to capital markets. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the effectiveness of 
insurance securitization in hedging underwriting risks by assessing how effective Cat 
bonds are in reducing the default risk of the firms which issue them. The 
investigation focuses on default risk, because the underwriting losses linked to 
catastrophe events may prove large enough to cause distress and, consequently, have 
an effect on the default-likelihood of an insurer (Cummins et al., 2002; Harrington 
and Niehaus, 2003). If Cat bonds are effective in transferring catastrophe 
underwriting risk from issuers to market investors, they should lead to a 
commensurate reduction in the issuers’ default risk. 
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Default risk is calculated by using a default likelihood indicator derived 
from the Merton (1974) option pricing model. This default risk measure has recently 
been applied to both insurance firms (Bernoth and Pick, 2011) and to financials more 
generally (e.g. Akhigbe et al., 2007; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2011). The Merton 
default risk measure has several critical advantages over other risk measures. First, 
because it draws on both accounting and market data, the Merton default risk 
measure picks up the expected risk benefits at the time of the issue even though these 
benefits will only materialize at a future point in time. Consistent with this, evidence 
from the banking sector shows that the Merton default risk measure outperforms pure 
market measures of default risk over most time horizons (Gropp et al., 2006). 
Second, the Merton default risk measure can be computed for all listed insurers. By 
contrast, data on credit default swap spreads and other market measures of default 
risk are not widely available.39 
The main intuition behind this analysis is that if Cat bonds transfer 
catastrophe-related underwriting risk, their issue should cause a reduction in the 
default risk of the issuer. Next to this argument, there are additional explanations as 
to why Cat bonds may exhibit risk reducing benefits. First, unlike reinsurance, Cat 
bonds involve no counterparty risk. Reinsurance claims may not be indemnified if 
large losses force reinsurers into default. By contrast, the pay-offs from Cat bonds for 
insurers are independent of the counterparty remaining solvent, because Cat bond 
principals are fully collateralized (Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2006). Second, Cat bonds 
                                                 
39 Less than half of the issuers of Cat bonds have credit default swap (CDS) contracts outstanding 
which are traded on an exchange and for which spreads can be calculated at a high frequency. Also, 
the data on CDS contracts are rarely available before 2004. 
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have a maturity of typically three to four years. This makes the costs of risk 
management via Cat bonds more predictable as compared with reinsurance contracts 
which have a typical risk period of only one year. Consequently, the costs of 
coverage via Cat bonds are fixed for the issuer until the bond’s maturity and remain 
fixed irrespective of underwriting losses realized by either the issuer or the industry. 
Since large loss events typically cause reinsurance markets to ‘harden’, leading to 
higher prices and restrictions in the supply of catastrophe coverage (Froot and 
O'Connell, 2008; Cummins and Weiss, 2009), the multi-year maturity of Cat bonds 
may insulate insurers from unexpected hikes in the pricing of catastrophe risk 
management (or a loss of coverage if reinsurance pricing becomes too unattractive). 
However, there remain doubts over whether Cat bonds entail a transfer of 
catastrophe-related underwriting risk which is sufficiently large to lead to observable 
changes in the default risk of the issuing firm. These doubts are founded on two 
reasons. First, the triggers which permit issuers of Cat bonds to forfeit do not 
necessarily match the specific loss experience of the issuer. Instead, triggers are 
frequently defined in terms of industry-wide losses (e.g. via loss indices). Few Cat 
bonds use so-called indemnity triggers where payoffs are defined in terms of the 
issuer’s realized losses. As a result, non-indemnity triggers give rise to basis risk 
which may leave insurers which have issued Cat bonds facing default in the event of 
high individual losses but low index losses (see Harrington and Niehaus, 1999; 
Cummins et al., 2004).40 
                                                 
40 Both Harrington and Niehaus (1999) and Cummins et al. (2004) use simulation analyses to show 
that the basis risk linked to index-based triggers is manageable for U.S. homeowner insurers and large 
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Second, it is unknown whether the risks which insurers securitize via Cat 
bonds actually pose substantial underwriting risks to them (in the sense that the 
underlying catastrophe event is likely to occur). Evidence from the banking sector 
shows that banks tend to securitize assets with low ex-post default rates and retain 
assets with high ex-post default rates on their balance sheets (see Ambrose et al., 
2005; Keys et al., 2010). The fact that only four Cat bonds have been triggered by a 
catastrophe event to date raises the point whether, similar to banks, the issuers of Cat 
bonds are mindful of any reputational damage which could result from allegations 
that they had issued high-risk bonds to unsuspecting investors. 
This chapter makes three important contributions. First, and most 
importantly, it presents the first empirical investigation into the realized risk 
implications of insurance securitization and shows that Cat bonds are effective in 
reducing the default risk of the firms which issue them as insurers experience a 
statistically and economically significant reduction in default risk around the issue of 
a Cat bond. Consequently, this chapter can diminish the concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of insurance securitization in hedging catastrophe risk which originated 
from results in Chapter 5. 
Second, this chapter presents new insights into the nexus between basis risk 
and the effectiveness of risk transfers via Cat bonds (see Harrington and Niehaus, 
1999; Cummins et al., 2004). Results show that even Cat bond issues with index 
triggers (which involve basis risk because payouts are largely independent of the 
                                                 
Hurricane insurers in Florida, respectively. However, it is important to bear in mind that these results 
are based on simulations. The risk that the payoffs from index-based Cat bonds do not cover the 
issuer’s catastrophe losses remains a concern for issuing firms. 
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catastrophe losses experienced by the issuer) lead to a reduction in default risk. This 
shows that the basis risk underlying Cat bonds is not sufficiently large as to thwart 
the hedging benefits linked to Cat bonds from materializing. 
Third, the results also identify some of the drivers of the risk reduction 
benefits of Cat bond issues. Thus, Cat bonds are particularly risk reducing for issuers 
that are more exposed to either catastrophe or default risk. Further, the risk reduction 
benefits associated with insurance securitization are more pronounced during time 
periods when the supply of reinsurance as a substitute to catastrophe risk 
management is restricted. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section 
describes the Cat bond sample and explains the methodology used to gauge changes 
in the issuer’s default risk in response to the issue of a Cat bond. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 
present the results of the univariate and multivariate analysis, respectively. Finally, 
Section 6.5 concludes. 
6.2 Data and Methodology 
6.2.1 Sample 
The data on insurance securitization are obtained from Hannover Re and include all 
Cat bond issues before May 2010. Cat bonds are defined as bonds where coupons 
and/or principal payments are contingent on the occurrence of catastrophe-related 
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property and casualty risks or catastrophe-related mortality risks.41 In all cases, the 
issuer is the ultimate beneficiary of the Cat bond coverage.42 Issuing firms are 
insurance and reinsurance firms—most of them large and well-known firms such as 
Travelers Companies, Axa and Swiss Reinsurance. All issuing firms included in the 
sample are publicly listed firms with equity returns available on Datastream and 
accounting data on Worldscope. 
For an initial sample of 143 Cat bond issues, the Cat bond data from 
Hannover Re is verified by matching them with publicly available information on 
insurance securitizations in AON Capital Markets (2010) and Guy Carpenter (2008). 
Where discrepancies between proprietary and public data (as regards the issue date, 
value and risks underlying an issue) are identified, further searches on various news 
sources available on LexisNexis and Factiva were conducted. Where the 
discrepancies remain unresolved, the affected issue was omitted from the sample 
(this affects a total of seven issues). 
In a next step, issues were omitted for any one of the following reasons. 
First, to avoid confounding events, there need to be more than 122 trading days 
between separate issue announcements by the same issuer to Cat bonds.43 As a result 
                                                 
41 Catastrophe mortality risks result from catastrophe events which generate spikes in mortality rates 
(e.g. natural catastrophes or pandemics). While these so-called mortality (Cat) bonds are included in 
the sample, longevity bonds are excluded. This is because longevity bonds securitize longevity risk 
(due to increased life expectancy) and are not linked to catastrophe events (for more details, see 
Cowley and Cummins, 2005). 
42 Transactions where the Cat bond coverage is sold by the issuer to a third party (i.e. Calabash Re 
Ltd. I-III by Swiss Re) are not included in the sample to avoid convoluted interpretations of the 
results. 
43 There needs to be at least 122 trading days between separate events since this chapter analyses the 
issuers’ default risk for a period ranging from -61 days to +61 days relative to the announcement date. 
For more details regarding the methodology in this chapter, see Section 6.2.2. 
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of this criterion, 14 Cat bond issues were omitted. Second, all so-called follow-up 
transactions from shelf offering programs were dropped. Shelf offering programs 
allow firms to issue further Cat bonds at any time. Follow-up transactions tend to be 
very small and have only a limited amount of information available. This affects 29 
issues. Finally, when a firm issues more than one Cat bond on the same trading day, 
the transactions are consolidated into a single issue. This leads to 15 individual 
transactions being consolidated into three deals.44 
The final sample used in this study consists of 81 Cat bond issues. When 
comparing the sample with the data from Hannover Re, it becomes evident that the 
sample corresponds to 75% of the total Cat bond risk capital issued by listed firms up 
to May 2010. Table 6-1 provides sample descriptives by year (Panel A), trigger type 
(Panel B) and country (Panel C). It shows that the majority of Cat bond transactions 
(by both number and total risk capital) took place in 2006 and 2007 (Panel A). Also, 
the vast majority of Cat bonds exhibits an index-linked trigger where Cat bond 
payoffs are largely independent of the losses realized by the issuer (Panel B). Finally, 
most Cat bonds were issued by firms listed in Switzerland, the U.S. and Germany 
(Panel C). 
                                                 
44 When Cat bond transactions are consolidated, the risk capital of the individual transactions was 
summed up. For all cases where Cat bonds are consolidated, the trigger types of the individual 
transactions are identical. 
  
Table 6-1 
Sample Characteristics 
Panel A: Distribution of Cat bond Issues by Year 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Number 1 4 3 5 4 4 1 1 5 13 16 8 12 4 81 
Risk capital ($ millions) 112 251 322 804 564 506 205 248 1,007 3,064 3,663 1,220 1,710 630 14,306 
% Value 0.78 1.76 2.25 5.62 3.94 3.54 1.44 1.73 7.04 21.42 25.60 8.53 11.95 4.40 100.00 
Panel B: Distribution of Cat bond Issues by Trigger Type 
Indemnity 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 1 0 12 
Non-indemnity 1 0 2 4 4 4 1 1 4 13 14 6 11 4 69 
Panel C: Distribution of Cat bond Issues by Country 
 France Germany Japan Switzerland UK U.S. Total 
Number 11 18 4 23 2 23 81 
Risk Capital ($ millions) 2,565 2,705 468 4,424 258 3,886 14,306 
% Value 17.92 18.91 3.27 30.93 1.81 27.16 100.00 
Notes: The sample consists of 81 Cat bond issues in the period 1997 to May 2010. This is approximately 75% of total Cat bond risk capital (defined as the total 
of bond principal and coupon payments at risk) issued by listed firms during that time period. 
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6.2.2 Methodology 
To estimate the effect of Cat bonds on the issuers’ default risk, this chapter applies 
the Merton (1974) option pricing method as in Akhigbe et al. (2007) and Vassalou 
and Xing (2004). The daily default risk of issuing firms is estimated using the 
following default likelihood indicator (DLI): 
 2, ,
,
ln( / ) 0.5
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A t t f A t
t
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V L r T
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
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,   (6.1) 
where VA,t is the market value of assets on day t, Lt is the book value of total 
liabilities and, rf is the risk-free rate (proxied by the annualized yield on two-year 
government bonds in the issuer’s country), σA,t is the annualized asset volatility on 
day t, T is the time to maturity (conventionally set to one year), and N is the 
cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. 
The computation of DLI requires estimates of VA,t and σA,t, neither of which 
are directly observable. Following Akhigbe et al. (2007) and Hillegeist et al. (2004), 
the values of VA,t and σA,t are simultaneously estimated through an iterative process 
based on the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing method. Specifically, the market 
value of a firm’s equity (VE,t) is viewed as a call option on the value of the firm’s 
assets by solving the following system of nonlinear equations: 
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Equation (6.3) is the optimal hedge equation that relates the standard 
deviation of a firm’s equity value to the standard deviation of a firm’s total asset 
value (both on an annualized basis). 
To solve the system of nonlinear equations, this chapter first employs as 
starting values for A,t the historical volatility of equity (computed daily on the basis 
of a 90-trading day rolling window) multiplied by the square root of the number of 
trading days in the year. The chapter then uses the daily values of σE,t and VE,t to 
compute the initial value of A,t as , , , ,/ ( )A t E t E t E t tV V L   . Finally, a Newton 
search algorithm identifies the daily values of VA,t and σA,t which are then employed 
to compute the default likelihood for each issuer per day as in (6.1). 
To measure the risk effects linked to the issue of a Cat bond, the differences 
in DLI during a 60-day trading period ending 2 days before the issue announcement 
(the pre-issue period [α-61, α-2]) and DLI during a 60-day trading period starting 
two days after the issue announcement (the post-issue period [α+2, α+61]) are 
computed.45 The analysis measures changes in risk around the announcement date of 
a Cat bond, because press announcements of Cat bond issues precede the issue date 
for 64 issues in the sample (by 13 days on average).46 In cases where the issue date 
precedes the announcement date, the issue date is employed as the announcement 
date. Since the default risk measure used in this chapter captures expected changes in 
                                                 
45 Akhigbe et al. (2007) use an identical examination period when analyzing the effects of Fed policy 
actions on the default likelihood of commercial banks. 
46 To assess whether the results are sensitive to the event period used, the analysis is re-run using a 
time window of identical length but around the issue date rather than the date the issue was first 
announced. The main implications of both the univariate and regression results remain unaffected. 
The tables to this test can be found in the Appendix to this chapter on pgs. 179 and 180. 
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risk (via the inclusion of market valuations), changes in risk due to securitization will 
be most reliably measured around the announcement date. The dates on which Cat 
bond issues were first announced in the press are hand-collected by searching various 
news sources on LexisNexis and Factiva, as well as the issuing firms’ websites and 
ARTEMIS (www.artemis.bm), an online practitioner portal for insurance 
securitization. 
The analysis follows Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) and eliminates 
general industry and time trends in risk by computing a daily default likelihood index 
at country level. For every issue, the market risk index is calculated as the value-
weighted DLI of all insurance and reinsurance companies listed on Datastream in the 
issuer’s country which have not issued Cat bonds.47 The industry-adjusted change in 
default likelihood (ΔIADL) which can be attributed to Cat bonds can, therefore, be 
expressed as: 
 ( 2; 61) ( 61; 2) ( 61; 2)( 2; 61)ΔIADL=DLI DLI DLI DLI
ΔDLI ΔDLI
              
 
indexindex
issuer index
 (6.5) 
Some researchers argue that the Merton default risk measure as applied in 
this chapter underestimates the true probability of default as it assumes that corporate 
assets follow a diffusion process. They propose, given that the diffusion process 
makes a sudden drop in the firm value impossible, to add a jump component to the 
firm value process as a potential remedy to the underestimation of default risk (e.g. 
Zhou, 1997). However, Chapter 4 of this thesis as well as previous work has 
                                                 
47 The results are qualitatively identical if an European default likelihood index (by aggregating all 
insurance and reinsurance companies in France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK) is used instead of 
the individual default likelihood index at country level. 
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demonstrated that even extreme catastrophe events (such as Hurricane Andew in 
1992, the World Trade Centre Attacks in 2001 or Hurricane Katrina in 2005) do not 
cause extreme plunges in the market value of insurers (Lamb, 1995; Cummins and 
Lewis, 2003). Therefore, and in line with published work in the insurance area (e.g. 
Bernoth and Pick, 2011), this study applies the Merton default risk measure in its 
original form.48 
6.3 Univariate Results 
6.3.1 Catastrophe Bonds and Issuers’ Default Risk 
In this section, the risk effects that Cat bond issues exert on the issuers’ default risk 
are examined. Table 6-2 reports the industry-adjusted default likelihood (IADL) 
during the pre-issue period [α-61; α-2] and post-issue [α+2; α+61] period relative to 
the issue announcement date (α). To analyze whether insurance securitization exerts 
a statistically significant impact on the issuers’ default likelihood, Table 6-2 reports 
t-statistics (z-statistics) which evaluate the hypothesis that mean (median) changes in 
the issuers’ default likelihood (ΔIADL) are equal to zero. If Cat bonds are effective 
in transferring catastrophe risks from insurers to capital markets (as suggested by 
Niehaus, 2002; Harrington and Niehaus, 2003; Cummins et al., 2004), the issuing 
                                                 
48 To test whether the results are influenced by any large-scale catastrophe events which occurred 
during the examination period (t-61; t+61), issues which coincide with the ten most costly catastrophe 
events in terms of insured losses (identified in the annual Swiss Re Sigma Reports from 1996 to 2010) 
during the examination period are excluded and both univariate and multivariate tests are re-run. This 
affects 23 observations and reduces the total sample size to 58. The univariate results as well as the 
regression results remain unaffected. The tables to this test can be found in the Appendix to this 
chapter on pgs. 181 and 182. 
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firm’s default likelihood is expected to decrease in response to the issue of a Cat 
bond. 
Table 6-2 shows that the mean (median) IADL declines in response to Cat 
bond issues. The reduction in the default likelihood (ΔIADL) is statistically 
significant at the 1% level according to the t-test (and 5% level according to the z-
test). Further, the risk reduction benefits of Cat are widespread in the sample. More 
than 60% of issuers in the sample exhibit a reduction in default likelihood after the 
Cat bond issue. 
The results reported in Table 6-2 indicate that insurance securitization is an 
effective vehicle to reduce the issuers’ default risk. However, the risk profile of the 
issuing firm may play an important factor in determining the risk effects of an issue. 
Equally, because only indemnity-based triggers do not involve any basis risk and, 
hence, serve as a perfect hedge against catastrophe-related underwriting losses, it is 
conceivable that the risk reductions reported above are driven by this type of trigger. 
Consequently, the next subsections analyze if the risk benefits of Cat bonds are 
moderated by the risk profile of the issuing firm or the trigger type underlying the 
Cat bond. 
  
Table 6-2 
Effect of Catastrophe Bonds on the Issuers’ Industry-Adjusted Default Likelihood (IADL) 
 N mean (%) median (%) ΔIADL<0% 
  (t-stat) (z-stat) N % 
IADL: Pre-Issue Period (α-61;α-2) 81 1.305 -0.040   
  (1.906)* (-0.963)   
      
IADL: Post-Issue Period (α+2;α+61) 81 -0.047 -0.066**   
  (-0.120) (-2.305)   
      
ΔIADL 81 -1.352*** -0.019** 50 61.7 
  (-2.727) (-2.135)   
Notes: The table reports the mean (median) industry-adjusted default likelihood for a sample of Cat bond issuing firms. Both the default 
likelihood in the pre-issue period (computed as the default likelihood over the period from -61 days to -2 days relative to the announcement 
date α) as well as the default likelihood in the post-issue period (computed as the average of the default likelihood over the period from +2 
days to +61 days relative to the announcement date α) are displayed. The effect of Cat bonds on the issuers’ industry-adjusted default 
likelihood (ΔIADL) is the difference between the post-issue and pre-issue period. Also included are t-statistics (two tailed) and the non-
parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon Z-scores to evaluate if the mean and median IADL and ΔIADL are equal to zero. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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6.3.2 Risk Effect and Issuers’ Exposure to Catastrophe 
Risk 
In this subsection, it is investigated how the exposure to catastrophe risk impacts 
upon changes in the default risk of the issuing firm around insurance securitizations. 
If Cat bonds are effective in transferring catastrophe underwriting risks from the 
issuer, it would be expected that issuers which are more exposed to catastrophe risk 
experience a more pronounced reduction in default risk. Table 6-3 tests this 
proposition. 
To measure an insurer’s exposure to catastrophe risk, the correlation 
between the issuing firms’ mean quarterly IADL and quarterly global insured 
catastrophe losses (as published in Swiss Re Sigma Reports dating from 1994 to 
2010) over a three-year period prior to the issue is used. Insurers are ranked into 
quartile portfolios according to their exposure to catastrophe risk and the changes in 
ΔIADL for the lowest (Q1) and highest (Q4) catastrophe risk portfolio are reported.49 
Also, the changes in default risk in response to the Cat bond issue are assessed for 
insurers among the two quartiles (ΔIADLQ4- ΔIADLQ1). 
 
                                                 
49 There is little overlap between the quartile portfolio of issuing firms which are most exposed to Cat 
risk (Q4 in Table 6-3) and the quartile portfolio of firms which are most exposed to default (Q4 in 
Table 6-4). Out of the 20 issues contained in both portfolios, six issues are present in both portfolios. 
  
Table 6-3 
Risk Effects of Catastrophe Bonds, by the Issuers’ Exposure to Catastrophe (Cat) Risk 
  N mean (%) median (%) ΔIADL<0% 
   (t-stat) (z-stat) N % 
Low IADL: Pre-Issue Period (α-61;α-2) 21 0.242 -0.050   
Cat Exposure (Q1)   (0.365) (-0.299)   
 IADL: Post-Issue Period (α+2;α+61) 21 -0.040 -0.037   
   (-0.084) (-0.299)   
 ΔIADLQ1 21 -0.282 -0.123 12 57.1 
   (-0.453) (-0.672)   
       
High  IADL: Pre-Issue Period (α-61;α-2) 20 6.129** 0.628**   
Cat Exposure (Q4)   (2.679) (2.133)   
 IADL: Post-Issue Period (α+2;α+61) 20 1.918 -0.023   
   (1.660) (0.765)   
 ΔIADLQ4 20 -4.211** -0.364*** 17 85.0 
   (-2.471) (-2.777)   
       
 ΔIADLQ4- ΔIADLQ1  -3.930** -0.241*   
   (2.211) (1.69)   
Notes: The table reports the mean (median) industry-adjusted default likelihood for a sample of Cat bond issuing firms for the lowest (Q1) and highest 
(Q4) quartile of pre-issue exposure to catastrophe risk based on the correlation between quarterly IADL values and quarterly insured catastrophe losses 
(as published in Swiss Re Sigma Reports dating from 1994 to 2010) over a three-year period prior to the issue of a Cat bond. Both the default likelihood 
in the pre-issue period (computed as the average of the default likelihood over the period from -61 days to -2 days relative to the announcement date α) 
as well as the default likelihood in the post-issue period (computed as the average of the default likelihood over the period from +2 days to +61 days 
relative to the announcement date α) are displayed. Also, the differences in IADL between the highest and lowest quartile are reported (ΔIADLQ4-Q1). 
The effect of Cat bonds on the issuers’ industry-adjusted default likelihood (ΔIADL) is the difference between the post-issue and pre-issue period. Also 
included are t-statistics (two tailed) and the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon Z-scores to evaluate if the mean and median IADL and ΔIADL are 
equal to zero. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
C
h
ap
ter 6
: T
h
e R
isk
 Im
p
licatio
n
s o
f In
su
ran
ce S
ecu
ritizatio
n
                                             1
6
2
 
Chapter 6: The Risk Implications of Insurance Securitization 163 
 
 
Table 6-3 confirms the expectations that issuers which are more exposed to 
catastrophe risk exhibit a larger reduction in default risk. Thus, issuers with the 
highest exposure to catastrophe risk (Q4) experience a larger reduction in default 
likelihood around the issue of a Cat bond as compared to issuers with the lowest 
exposure to catastrophe risk (Q1). This finding is statistically significant at the 5% 
level according to the t-test (and 10% level according to the z-test). 
6.3.3 Risk Effect and Issuers’ Exposure to Default Risk 
It is expected that the risk reduction benefits linked to Cat bond issues will be larger 
for insurers which are more exposed to default risk. This expectation is based on two 
arguments. First, insurers which are more exposed to default risk should see a larger 
reduction in default risk when issuing Cat bonds, because Cat bonds collateralize 
coverage of specific loss events. While insurers may also hedge catastrophe risks 
using reinsurance contracts, coverage via reinsurance is not collateralized and, 
therefore, involves counterparty risk. This means that insurer losses will not be 
indemnified in the event the reinsurance counterparty defaults. Since the default 
likelihood of insurers which are more exposed to default risk will be more sensitive 
to the counterparty risk inherent in reinsurance contracts (Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 
2006), it is expected that this type of insurer should realize higher risk reduction 
benefits from issuing Cat bonds. 
Second, the pricing of the risk transfer underlying Cat bonds is fixed over 
the multi-year maturity of the bond. This is in contrast to reinsurance contracts with a 
typical risk period of only one year. Therefore, reinsurance premiums may increase 
sharply following large loss experiences either by the industry or individual insurers 
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(see Froot and O'Connell, 2008; Cummins and Weiss, 2009). To the extent that 
insurers which are more exposed to default risk will be more vulnerable to the 
liquidity shocks caused by volatile reinsurance premiums, this type of insurer should 
see a larger reduction in their default risk when issuing Cat bonds. Cat bonds 
effectively insulate insurers which are more exposed to default risk from potential 
liquidity shocks caused by volatile reinsurance premiums. 
Table 6-4 tests if the risk reduction benefits in response to the issue of Cat 
bonds are more pronounced for insurers which are more exposed to default risk. 
Issuers are ranked into quartile portfolios according to their default risk values in the 
pre-issue period and the changes in the industry-adjusted default risk for the lowest 
(ΔIADLQ1) and highest (ΔIADLQ4) default risk portfolio are reported. It can then be 
examined whether the changes in default risk in response to the Cat bond issue are 
different among the two quartiles (ΔIADLQ4- ΔIADLQ1). In line with expectations, 
Table 6-4 documents that when issuers are located in the highest-default risk 
portfolio (Q4), they realize a larger reduction in default risk in response to the Cat 
bond issue (significant at 1% according to both t-test and z-test) as compared to 
issuers which are located in the lowest-default risk portfolio (Q1). 
  
Table 6-4 
Risk Effects of Catastrophe Bonds, by the Issuers’ Exposure to Default Risk 
  N mean (%) median (%) ΔIADL<0% 
   (t-stat) (z-stat) N % 
Low  IADL: Pre-Issue Period (α-61;α-2) 21 -2.752 -1.331   
Default Risk (Q1)   (-4.737)*** (-4.015)***   
 IADL: Post-Issue Period (α+2;α+61) 21 -2.612 -1.080   
   (-3.066)*** (-3.841)***   
 ΔIADLQ1 21 0.136 0.213 10 47.6 
   (0.233) (0.574)   
       
High IADL: Pre-Issue Period (α-61;α-2) 20 8.320 6.035   
Default Risk (Q4)   (4.201)*** (3.920)***   
 IADL: Post-Issue Period (α+2;α+61) 20 2.744 1.046   
   (2.712)** (2.576)**   
 ΔIADLQ4 20 -5.576 -3.22 17 85.0 
   (-3.484)*** (-3.248)***   
       
 ΔIADLQ4- ΔIADLQ1  -5.712*** 3.433***   
   (3.146) (3.391)   
Notes: The table reports the mean (median) industry-adjusted default likelihood for a sample of Cat bond issuing firms for the lowest (Q1) and highest 
(Q4) quartile of pre-issue exposure to catastrophe risk based on the correlation between quarterly IADL values and quarterly insured catastrophe losses 
(as published in Swiss Re Sigma Reports dating from 1994 to 2010) over a three-year period prior to the issue of a Cat bond. Both the default likelihood 
in the pre-issue period (computed as the average of the default likelihood over the period from -61 days to -2 days relative to the announcement date α) 
as well as the default likelihood in the post-issue period (computed as the average of the default likelihood over the period from +2 days to +61 days 
relative to the announcement date α) are displayed. Also, the differences in IADL between the highest and lowest quartile are reported (ΔIADLQ4-Q1). 
The effect of Cat bonds on the issuers’ industry-adjusted default likelihood (ΔIADL) is the difference between the post-issue and pre-issue period. Also 
included are t-statistics (two tailed) and the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon Z-scores to evaluate if the mean and median IADL and ΔIADL are 
equal to zero. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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6.3.4 Risk Effect and Trigger Type 
As previously noted, Cat bonds can be designed using either indemnity-based or non-
indemnity based triggers. For indemnity-based triggers, Cat bond payoffs depend on 
the actual loss experience of the issuer’s own book of business. By contrast, the 
payoffs from Cat bonds linked to non-indemnity-based triggers are defined in terms 
of industry-wide losses (via loss indices) which may vary substantially from the 
underwriting losses realized by the issuer. As a result, non-indemnity-based triggers 
give rise to basis risk which rises the more the insured losses of the issuer and the 
index losses diverge. It is, therefore, expected that the risk reduction benefits linked 
to Cat bonds are higher for the group of indemnity-based triggers which involve no 
basis risk for the issuing firm. 
Table 6-5 examines the risk effects that Cat bond issues exert on the issuers’ 
default risk by type of trigger. Both the changes in the issuers’ default likelihood for 
indemnity-based triggers (ΔIADLINDEM) and non-indemnity triggers 
(ΔIADLNONINDEM) are displayed, as well as the difference in changes in the issuers’ 
default risk among these two groups (ΔIADLINDEM -ΔIADLNONINDEM). 
 
  
Table 6-5 
Risk Effects of Catastrophe Bonds, by Trigger Type 
  N mean (%) median (%) ΔIADL<0% 
   (t-stat) (z-stat) N % 
Indemnity IADL: Pre-Issue Period (α-61;α-2) 12 -1.007 -0.011   
   (-0.907) (-943)   
 IADL: Post-Issue Period (α+2;α+61) 12 -1.850 -0.037   
   (-1.319) (-1.013)   
 ΔIADLINDEM 12 -0.843* -0.195* 10 83.3 
   (-1.676) (-1.782)   
       
Non-Indemnity IADL: Pre-Issue Period (α-61;α-2) 69 1.747** -0.044   
   (2.244) (-0.703)   
 IADL: Post-Issue Period (α+2;α+61) 69 0.298 -0.085**   
   (0.796) (-2.096)   
 ΔIADLNONINDEM 69 -1.449** -0.016* 40 58.0 
   (-2.488) (-1.674)   
       
 ΔIADLNONINDEM- ΔIADLINDEM  0.606 -0.179   
   (0.447) -(0.495)   
Notes: The table reports the mean (median) industry-adjusted default likelihood for a sample of Cat bond issuing firms for the lowest (Q1) and highest 
(Q4) quartile of pre-issue exposure to catastrophe risk based on the correlation between quarterly IADL values and quarterly insured catastrophe losses 
(as published in Swiss Re Sigma Reports dating from 1994 to 2010) over a three-year period prior to the issue of a Cat bond. Both the default likelihood 
in the pre-issue period (computed as the average of the default likelihood over the period from -61 days to -2 days relative to the announcement date α) 
as well as the default likelihood in the post-issue period (computed as the average of the default likelihood over the period from +2 days to +61 days 
relative to the announcement date α) are displayed. Also, the differences in IADL between the highest and lowest quartile are reported (ΔIADLQ4-Q1). 
The effect of Cat bonds on the issuers’ industry-adjusted default likelihood (ΔIADL) is the difference between the post-issue and pre-issue period. Also 
included are t-statistics (two tailed) and the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon Z-scores to evaluate if the mean and median IADL and ΔIADL are 
equal to zero. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The results presented in Table 6-5 do not confirm the expectation that 
indemnity-based Cat bonds generate larger risk effects than non-indemnity based Cat 
bonds. However, the results show that the risk reduction benefits in response to the 
issue of a Cat bond are not limited to issues with indemnity-based triggers. Both the 
changes in the issuers’ default likelihood for indemnity-based triggers (ΔIADLINDEM) 
and non-indemnity triggers (ΔIADLNONINDEM) are negative and statistically 
significant (at the 10% level according to the t-test and z-test, respectively). The 
presence of risk reduction benefits linked to Cat bonds without an indemnity-based 
trigger is interpreted as an indication that the potential basis risk underlying these 
issues is not sufficiently large as to prevent the risk-reducing effects of Cat bonds 
from materializing. 
In summary, the univariate tests in this section show that Cat bonds lower 
the default risk of issuing firms. This risk reduction is higher for insurers which are 
riskier in the sense that they are more exposed to either catastrophe risk or default 
risk more generally. Finally, a risk reduction is observable irrespective of the type of 
trigger underlying the Cat bond. The last results are interpreted as indicting that the 
basis risk underlying Cat bonds which do not have an indemnity trigger does not 
prevent insurers from realizing some hedging benefits via the issue of Cat bonds. 
In the next section, multivariate regression analyses are used to examine 
whether these findings hold and whether additional factors (e.g. issuer 
characteristics, Cat bond characteristics or market characteristics) shape the default 
risk benefits of Cat bonds. 
Chapter 6: The Risk Implications of Insurance Securitization 169 
 
 
6.4 The Determinants of Changes in Default Risk 
6.4.1 The Model 
The multivariate model, estimated via GLS with robust standard errors, assumes the 
following specification: 
0i i i i i          ΔIADL IC BC MC    (6.6) 
where: 
 ΔIADLi is the Cat bond-related change in industry-adjusted default 
likelihood (see Section 6.2.2); 
 ICi is a vector of issuer characteristics at the end of the fiscal year before the 
issue announcement; 
 BCi is a vector of Cat bond characteristics, and 
 MCi is a vector of market specific characteristics. 
To control for the effect of unobserved variables that are constant over 
countries and years, country and year fixed effects are included into the model.50 
Also, because the observations for one specific issuer are unlikely to be independent 
(possibly leading to within–correlation issues), cluster-robust standard errors are 
computed and each issuing firm is treated as a cluster. 
Table 6-6 provides descriptions and summary statistics for the variables 
described below. All accounting data (unless stated differently) are from Worldscope 
and refer to the last accounting year prior to the announcement of the Cat bond issue.
                                                 
50 When the models are re-estimated without fixed effects, the results are qualitatively identical. The 
tables to this test can be found in the Appendix to this chapter on pg. 183. 
  
Table 6-6 
Summary Statistics 
 Variable Definition N Mean Median Std. Dev 5 Pctile 95 Pctile 
Default likelihood 
measures 
IADL: Pre-Issue Period 
(α-61;α-2) 
Industry-adjusted default likelihood during the pre-issue period (%) 81 1.305 -0.040 6.163 -4.101 10.820 
IADL: Post-Announcement 
(α+2;α+61) 
Industry-adjusted default likelihood during the post-issue period (%) 81 -0.047 -0.066 3.525 -3.972 5.603 
ΔIADL Cat bond-related change in industry-adjusted default likelihood (%) 81 -1.352 -0.019 4.464 -8.007 2.184 
Issuer 
characteristics 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE Dummy which equals 1 if the issuer is in the highest pre-
announcement Cat exposure quartile (and 0 otherwise) 
81 0.247 0.000 0.434 0.000 1.000 
HIGHDEFAULT Dummy which equals 1 if the issuer is in the highest pre-
announcement default probability quartile (and 0 otherwise) 
81 0.247 0.000 0.434 0.000 1.000 
ROA The ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets (%) 81 1.241 1.036 2.493 -0.379 5.599 
CAR Cumulative abnormal return between -20 days to +1 day relative 
the issue announcement (%) 
81 1.573 0.492 7.538 -6.953 16.312 
SIZE Log of total assets (thousands of USD) 81 18.205 18.623 1.70 14.833 20.690 
LEVERAGE Total liabilities to total assets (%) 81 84.408 89.439 14.841 60.313 95.799 
LOSSRATIO  Loss ratio (%). Defined as (claims and loss expenses + long-term 
insurance reserves) / premiums earned 
81 78.919 80.000 18.813 51.000 117.000 
UWRISK Standard deviation of loss ratios over a four-year period prior to 
the issue announcement 
81 8.821 5.551 9.641 1.299 35.514 
PREV Number of previous Cat bond transactions undertaken by the 
issuer 
81 3.753 2.000 4.157 1.000 14.000 
Cat bond 
characteristics 
INDEM Dummy which equals 1 if the Cat bond has an indemnity trigger 
(and 0 otherwise) 
81 14.814 0.000 0.357 0.000 1.000 
ISSUESIZE Value of Cat bond issue scaled by the book value of equity (%) 81 3.128 1.620 3.964 0.308 12.170 
BONDRATING The bond rating applied by Standard &Poor’s or Moody’s with 1 
being the highest rated bond and 18 being not rated 
81 11.395 11.447 2.453 6.833 14.400 
Market 
characteristics 
REPRICES Reinsurance cycle. Guy Carpenter World Catastrophe Rate On 
Line Index. Source: Guy Carpenter (2010) 
81 241.667 260.000 42.278 155.000 295.000 
GDP Real GDP growth rate (%) 81 1.483 2.140 2.207 -2.440 4.070 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the measure of default likelihood, issuer characteristics, Cat bond characteristics and market characteristics. The sample consists of 
81 Cat bond issues announced over the period from 1997 to May 2010. Accounting data (unless stated differently) refer to the last accounting year prior to the announcement of the 
Cat bond issue and are from Worldscope. Cat bond data (PREV, INDEM, ISSUESIZE, BONDRATING, USRISK) are provided by private records by Hannover Re and public 
records by AON Capital Markets (2010). GDP data are from IMF – International Financial Statistics database. 
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Issuer Characteristics: 
Amongst other variables, the vector of issuer characteristics contains two dummy 
variables which control for the pre-issue riskiness of the issuers. These variables are 
used to assess the robustness of the univariate tests above. Specifically, 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE equals one if the issuer is located in the highest pre-issue 
catastrophe exposure quartile (and zero otherwise), while HIGHDEFAULT equals 
one if the issuer is located in the highest pre-issue default probability quartile (and 
zero otherwise). In line with the results of the univariate analysis, both variables are 
expected to enter the models with a negative coefficient (i.e. to reduce the default 
likelihood). Also, the models control for issuers’ profitability using return on assets 
(ROA; defined as pre-tax profits scaled by total assets). De Haan and Kakes (2010) 
suggest that more profitable insurers are less exposed to default risk as they tend to 
have more internal funds that can be used to absorb losses. As a result, ROA is 
expected to be inversely related to changes in issuers’ default risk. 
To evaluate whether the performance gains which issuers are expected to 
realize from Cat bond issues explain the risk implications of insurance securitization, 
the market adjusted announcement returns are modeled (CAR) and averaged from 
day -20 to +1 relative to the issue announcement date. CAR is expected to exert a 
negative impact on the issue-related changes in default risk. This is because 
reductions in the default risk of the issuer (suggesting Cat bonds are effective in 
hedging catastrophe-related underwriting risk) should be associated with higher 
expected performance gains. 
Further, the models control for issuer size (SIZE) which is measured by the 
logarithmic transformation of the U.S. dollar value of the issuers’ total assets. 
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Harrington and Niehaus (1999) argue that basis risk (which arises when Cat bond 
payoffs depend on industry rather than on insurer losses) is likely to decrease with 
the size of the issuing firm. Since larger insurers pool a wider range of catastrophe 
risks, their losses will be more aligned with industry-wide losses which means that 
basis risk will become more manageable. 
The issuing firm’s leverage (LEVERAGE) is also included in the models. 
LEVERAGE is defined as total liabilities over total assets. Given the liquidity 
benefits of Cat bonds to issuing firms (which are largely due to the predictability of 
the costs of Cat risk management), the risk reduction benefits of insurance 
securitization should increase with issuer leverage. Highly leveraged firms will have 
low excess cash flows which could raise default risk when the costs of reinsurance 
coverage rise unexpectedly. Therefore, a negative relationship between insurer 
leverage and industry-adjusted changes in the default likelihood around the issue of 
Cat bonds is expected. 
Further, the models include two variables which capture the risk of the 
issuer’s insurance portfolio. First, LOSSRATIO is the sum of claim expenses, loss 
expenses and long-term insurance reserves scaled by premium income. Cummins and 
Weiss (2011) demonstrate that loss ratios are an appropriate risk measure in the 
insurance industry. The authors show that loss ratios correlate highly with ex post 
default rates in the U.S. insurance sector. Second, underwriting risk (UWRISK) is 
the standard deviation of LOSSRATIO over a four-year period before the issue 
announcement (as employed in de Haan and Kakes, 2010). Both LOSSRATIO and 
UWRISK are expected to enter the models with negative coefficients based on the 
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rationale that issuers with riskier insurance portfolios will benefit more from 
catastrophe risk transfers than insurers with less risky insurance portfolios. 
PREV counts the number of previous Cat bond transactions undertaken by 
an issuer.51 Against the background of how novel insurance securitization is and how 
unfamiliar many investors are with Cat bonds, it could be argued that issuers are only 
able to engineer effective risk transfers with growing expertise and reputation in the 
Cat bond market. Thus, the number of previous Cat bond transactions is expected to 
be associated with a negative change in industry-adjusted default likelihood 
(ΔIADL), meaning that issuers realize higher reductions in default risk with a higher 
number of completed issues. 
Catastrophe Bond Characteristics: 
The vector of Cat bond controls contains the following variables. INDEM is a 
dummy variable which is equal to one if the Cat bond exhibits an indemnity trigger 
(and 0 otherwise). Indemnity triggers define the conditions for principal and/or 
coupon forfeiture in terms of the underwriting losses of the issuer rather than 
catastrophe index losses. Since Cat bonds with indemnity-based triggers allow 
issuers to fully (rather than partially) hedge against catastrophe underwriting losses, 
INDEM is expected to enter with a negative sign. 
ISSUESIZE measures the ratio of risk capital issued to the market value of 
the issuers’ equity at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement. Larger 
                                                 
51 As an alternative measure to PREV the model also used a dummy variable which is equal to one in 
the case of the issuer’s first Cat bond and 0 for follow-up issues. No qualitative changes to the 
regression results are found when this definition of PREV is used instead of the count variable. 
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issues are expected to provide the issuers with more diversification benefits and, as a 
result, to reduce the issuers’ default risk. Also, the models control for the initial Cat 
bond rating (BONDRATING) by Standard & Poor’s (or, if unavailable, by 
Moody’s).52 BONDRATING is based on a numerical conversion of bond ratings 
where higher numbers indicate a lower rating.53 Since Cat bonds involve no credit 
risk (as their principals are fully collateralized), higher Cat bond ratings indicate that 
the catastrophe loss event underlying the bond is more likely to occur. As a result, 
lower Cat bond ratings are expected to lead to larger reductions in the industry-
adjusted changes in the default likelihood. 
Market Characteristics: 
Finally, moving on to the vector of market characteristics, the Guy Carpenter (2010) 
Rate On Line Index (REPRICES) is used as a measure of reinsurance prices. This 
yearly index is calculated by dividing global catastrophe reinsurance premiums by 
global catastrophe reinsurance limits. REPRICES, therefore, measures average 
reinsurance prices per unit of catastrophe risk underwritten. 
Reinsurance markets tend to follow cycles which are characterized by 
periods when reinsurance prices are relatively low and coverage is readily available 
(soft markets), and periods when reinsurance prices are high and coverage supply is 
restricted (hard markets) (see Jaffee and Russell, 1997; Niehaus, 2002). During hard 
                                                 
52 Cat bonds usually consist of several tranches with different ratings. The rating assigned to an issue 
is an average weighted by the risk capital of each tranche. 
53 The numerical conversion applied to Cat bond ratings is as follows. The value of one is assigned to 
issues rated AAA (or Aaa by Moodys), two to AA+ (Aa1) bond issues, and so on up to 17 for CCC+ 
(Caa) and 18 for bonds which are not rated. In the sample, nearly 60% of issues are rated between 
BB+ (or Ba1) and BB (Ba2), i.e. BONDRATING lies between 11 and 12. 
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reinsurance markets, insurers will only be able to make limited use of catastrophe 
reinsurance and are more reliant on Cat bonds. For some types of catastrophe events, 
no reinsurance capacity may be available during hard reinsurance markets which 
means that Cat bonds will be the only vehicle for insurers to hedge their catastrophe-
related underwriting risk. Owing to the lack of reinsurance capacity during hard 
reinsurance markets, Cat bond issues during hard reinsurance markets (when 
REPRICES is high) are expected to be designed with a view to maximize the 
potential risk transfer. Consequently, REPRICES is expected to enter the models 
with a negative sign. 
Finally, the models control for the influence of economic growth on the risk 
implications of insurance securitization by including the inflation-adjusted national 
GDP growth rates (GDP). 
6.4.2 Regression Results 
Table 6-7 reports the results of the regressions on Cat bond-related changes in 
industry-adjusted default likelihood (ΔIADL). The results confirm the main findings 
from the univariate tests. Issuers which are most exposed to catastrophe risk 
(HIGHCATEXPOSURE) as well as issuers which are most exposed to default risk 
(HIGHDEFAULT) reduce their default likelihood after the issue (significant at the 
5% levels). Further, INDEM enters the model with a statistically significant 
coefficient (significant for most models at the 10% level). Accordingly, reductions in 
default likelihood in response to a Cat bond issue are more pronounced for issuers 
when indemnity-based Cat bonds are used. This is consistent with expectations as 
indemnity triggers do not involve basis risk and, thus, serve as a perfect hedge 
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against catastrophe-related underwriting risk (Harrington and Niehaus, 1999; 
Cummins et al., 2004). 
In addition, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) exert a negative impact on 
issue-related changes in default risk. This implies that reductions in the default risk 
of the issuer (suggesting a transfer of catastrophe-related underwriting risks away 
from the issuer) are associated with higher expected shareholder returns. The 
remaining issuer characteristics do not enter the regressions with statistically 
significant coefficients. 
Finally, and also in line with expectations, reinsurance prices affect changes 
in default likelihood in response to Cat bond issues. REPRICES enters with a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient (significant at the 5% levels). This 
indicates that Cat bond issues during periods of high reinsurance prices lead to larger 
reductions in the default likelihood of issuing firms. It is argued that hard reinsurance 
markets (when the supply of catastrophe coverage via traditional reinsurance is 
restricted) make insurers more reliant on Cat bonds as vehicle to hedge catastrophe 
risk and that this is likely to incentivize insurers to design Cat bonds such that they 
maximize the potential hedging benefits to them. 
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Table 6-7 
Regressions on the Effect of Catastrophe Bonds on the Issuers’ Industry-Adjusted Default 
Likelihood (IADL) 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE -3.623** -3.538** -3.468** -3.582** -3.643** -3.480** 
 (2.51) (2.30) (2.29) (2.41) (2.36) (2.21) 
HIGHDEFAULT -2.880** -2.827** -2.900** -3.255** -3.143** -2.881** 
 (2.12) (2.09) (2.08) (2.10) (2.07) (2.10) 
ROA 0.612 0.583 0.570 0.594 0.595 0.566 
 (1.49) (1.51) (1.55) (1.51) (1.66) (1.59) 
CAR -0.202** -0.204** -0.207** -0.194** -0.186** -0.204** 
 (2.39) (2.45) (2.39) (2.33) (2.32) (2.47) 
SIZE 0.413 0.231 0.086 0.237 0.292 0.079 
 (0.58) (0.31) (0.12) (0.32) (0.36) (0.10) 
LEVERAGE   0.019  0.008 0.017 
   (0.31)  (0.12) (0.29) 
LOSSRATIO  0.004  0.004 0.008 0.002 
  (0.16)  (0.17) (0.36) (0.10) 
UWRISK  0.045 0.048 0.068  0.047 
  (1.20) (1.33) (1.64)  (1.29) 
PREV    0.215 0.134  
    (1.33) (0.84)  
INDEM -2.421* -2.221* -2.248* -1.945 -2.196* -2.227* 
 (1.98) (1.78) (1.87) (1.48) (1.70) (1.78) 
ISSUESIZE 0.272 0.172 0.157 0.177 0.247 0.151 
 (0.85) (0.56) (0.51) (0.56) (0.75) (0.48) 
BONDRATING  0.014    0.009 
  (0.09)    (0.06) 
REPRICES -0.032** -0.048** -0.028** -0.049** -0.032** -0.028** 
 (2.68) (2.54) (2.54) (2.64) (2.52) (2.43) 
GDP -0.042 -0.065 -0.103 -0.072 -0.094 -0.109 
 (0.12) (0.19) (0.32) (0.19) (0.28) (0.35) 
       
Constant 0.669 8.482 4.231 8.307 1.578 4.180 
 (0.05) (0.55) (0.35) (0.54) (0.12) (0.34) 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.506 0.488 0.499 0.503 0.487 0.479 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the issuers’ industry-adjusted default likelihood 
calculated as the difference between the post-issue (α-61, α-2) and pre-issue period (α+2, α+61) 
relative to the issue announcement date α. The model is estimated with country- and year-fixed effects 
and Huber-White corrected standard errors clustered by the issuing firm. t-Statistics are in 
parentheses. Issuer characteristics include a dummy indicating if the issuer is listed in the highest 
quartile of the distribution of pre-announcement exposure to catastrophe risk 
(HIGHCATEXPOSURE), a dummy indicating if the issuer is listed in the highest quartile of the 
distribution of pre-announcement industry-adjusted default likelihood (HIGHDEFAULT), the ratio 
between pre-tax profit and total assets (ROA), the market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return 
over -20 to +1 days relative to the announcement date (CAR), the log of the issuer total assets (SIZE), 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (LEVERAGE), the loss ratio of the issuer (LOSSRATIO) 
defined as claim and loss expenses plus long-term insurance reserves scaled by premium income, the 
standard deviation of loss ratios over a four-year period prior to the issue announcement (UWRISK), 
and the number of previous Cat bond transactions undertaken by the issuer (PREV). Cat bond 
characteristics include a dummy which equals 1 if the Cat bond has an indemnity trigger (INDEM), 
the value of the Cat bond issue scaled by the book value of equity (ISSUESIZE), and the bond rating 
applied by Standard &Poor’s or Moody’s with 1 being the highest rated bond and 18 being not rated 
(BONDRATING). Market characteristics include reinsurance prices (REPRICES), estimated by the 
Guy Carpenter world catastrophe rate on line index (Guy Carpenter, 2010), as well as the real GDP 
growth rate (GDP). Accounting data (unless stated differently) refer to the last accounting year prior 
to the issue announcement of the Cat bond. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
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6.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter assesses how effective Cat bonds are in transferring catastrophe-related 
underwriting risk away from issuers by analyzing the impact of Cat bonds on the 
issuers’ default risk. The chapter was partly motivated by findings in Chapter 5 
which cast doubt on the effectiveness of insurance securitization in general (and Cat 
bonds in particular) to hedge catastrophe risks. 
Using the Merton distance to default model, this chapter provides the first 
empirical evidence that Cat bonds are effective tools for hedging catastrophe-related 
underwriting risk by showing that the issuers’ default risk decreases in response to 
the Cat bond issue. Consequently, the results can diminish the concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of insurance securitization in hedging catastrophe risk which became 
evident in the last chapter. It is also shown that issuers which are more exposed to 
either catastrophe or default risk benefit from Cat bonds by realizing larger 
reductions in default risk. It is argued that these insurers are placed to reap the 
benefits of lower catastrophe exposure as well as of lower counterparty and lower 
liquidity risk which Cat bonds offer vis-a-vis traditional reinsurance. Further, results 
show that while basis risk matters, it is not so large as to prevent Cat bonds with non-
indemnity triggers from lowering the default risk of the issuer. Finally, this chapter 
finds that changes in the issuers’ default risk are more pronounced during hard 
reinsurance markets (when the supply of catastrophe coverage via traditional 
reinsurance is restricted). 
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6.6 Appendix 
Table 6-8 
Effect of Catastrophe Bonds on the Issuers’ Industry-Adjusted Default Likelihood (IADL) 
Using the Issue Date Instead of the Announcement Date 
 N mean (%) median (%) ΔIADL<0% 
  (t-stat) (z-stat) N % 
IADL: Pre-Issue Period (α-61;α-2) 81 1.145* -0.048   
  (1.701) (-1.165)   
      
IADL: Post-Issue Period (α+2;α+61) 81 -0.196 -0.067***   
  (-0.535) (-2.590)   
      
ΔIADL 81 -1.342*** -0.047*** 51 63.7 
  (-2.671) (-2.513)   
Notes: The table reports the mean (median) industry-adjusted default likelihood for a sample of Cat 
bond issuing firms. Both the default likelihood in the pre-issue period (computed as the default 
likelihood over the period from -61 days to -2 days relative to the issue date α) as well as the default 
likelihood in the post-issue period (computed as the average of the default likelihood over the period 
from +2 days to +61 days relative to the issue date α) are displayed. The effect of Cat bonds on the 
issuers’ industry-adjusted default likelihood (ΔIADL) is the difference between the post-issue and 
pre-issue period. Also included are t-statistics (two tailed) and the non-parametric Mann–Whitney–
Wilcoxon Z-scores to evaluate if the mean and median IADL and ΔIADL are equal to zero. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6-9 
Regressions on the Effect of Catastrophe Bonds on the Issuers’ Industry-Adjusted Default 
Likelihood (IADL) Using the Issue Date Instead of the Announcement Date 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE -4.908** -4.904** -4.506** -4.804** -4.597** -4.653** 
 (2.55) (2.63) (2.29) (2.45) (2.34) (2.44) 
HIGHDEFAULT -4.049** -3.914** -4.270** -4.030** -4.170** -4.125** 
 (2.41) (2.27) (2.46) (2.35) (2.42) (2.37) 
ROA 0.605 0.555 0.531 0.549 0.515 0.517 
 (1.36) (1.37) (1.36) (1.35) (1.37) (1.38) 
CAR -0.087 -0.071 -0.107 -0.066 -0.068 -0.082 
 (0.72) (0.55) (0.83) (0.51) (0.57) (0.67) 
SIZE 0.367 0.169 -0.192 0.066 -0.182 -0.155 
 (0.48) (0.22) (0.28) (0.09) (0.25) (0.22) 
LEVERAGE   0.051  0.037 0.039 
   (0.79)  (0.54) (0.62) 
LOSSRATIO  0.020  0.019 0.018 0.016 
  (0.93)  (0.91) (0.85) (0.79) 
UWRISK  0.017 0.037 0.025  0.023 
  (0.36) (0.76) (0.52)  (0.50) 
PREV    0.074 0.018  
    (0.44) (0.10)  
INDEM -2.723** -2.511* -2.587** -2.317 -2.467* -2.524* 
 (2.13) (1.80) (2.06) (1.61) (1.79) (1.87) 
ISSUESIZE 0.326 0.217 0.191 0.191 0.184 0.171 
 (0.97) (0.66) (0.60) (0.59) (0.61) (0.53) 
BONDRATING  0.110    0.096 
  (0.66)    (0.56) 
REPRICES -0.034* -0.031* -0.032* -0.030* -0.035* -0.032** 
 (1.68) (1.86) (2.03) (1.79) (1.68) (2.08) 
GDP -0.312 -0.381 -0.499 -0.355 -0.460 -0.495 
 (0.60) (0.76) (1.06) (0.66) (0.92) (1.06) 
 
      
Constant 2.707 3.022 8.392 5.798 9.075 6.683 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.66) (0.40) (0.57) (0.50) 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.441 0.427 0.435 0.425 0.429 0.422 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the issuers’ industry-adjusted default likelihood calculated as the 
difference between the post-issue (α-61, α-2) and pre-issue period (α+2, α+61) relative to the issue date α. The 
model is estimated with country- and year-fixed effects and Huber-White corrected standard errors clustered by 
the issuing firm. t-Statistics are in parentheses. Issuer characteristics include a dummy indicating if the issuer is 
listed in the highest quartile of the distribution of pre-announcement exposure to catastrophe risk 
(HIGHCATEXPOSURE), a dummy indicating if the issuer is listed in the highest quartile of the distribution of 
pre-issue industry-adjusted default likelihood (HIGHDEFAULT), the ratio between pre-tax profit and total 
assets (ROA), the market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return over -20 to +1 days relative to the 
announcement date (CAR), the log of the issuer total assets (SIZE), the ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
(LEVERAGE), the loss ratio of the issuer (LOSSRATIO) defined as claim and loss expenses plus long-term 
insurance reserves scaled by premium income, the standard deviation of loss ratios over a four-year period prior 
to the issue announcement (UWRISK), and the number of previous Cat bond transactions undertaken by the 
issuer (PREV). Cat bond characteristics include a dummy which equals 1 if the Cat bond has an indemnity 
trigger (INDEM), the value of the Cat bond issue scaled by the book value of equity (ISSUESIZE), and the bond 
rating applied by Standard &Poor’s or Moody’s with 1 being the highest rated bond and 18 being not rated 
(BONDRATING). Market characteristics include reinsurance prices (REPRICES), estimated by the Guy 
Carpenter world catastrophe rate on line index (Guy Carpenter, 2010), as well as the real GDP growth rate 
(GDP). Accounting data (unless stated differently) refer to the last accounting year prior to the issue 
announcement of the Cat bond. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6-10 
Effect of Catastrophe Bonds on the Issuers’ Industry-Adjusted Default Likelihood (IADL) 
without the ten Most Costly Catastrophes during the Examination Period 
 N mean (%) median (%) ΔIADL<0% 
  (t-stat) (z-stat) N % 
IADL: Pre-Issue Period (α-61;α-2) 58 1.362 -0.069   
  (1.509) (-1.157)   
      
IADL: Post-Issue Period (α+2;α+61) 58 0.083 -0.122**   
  (0.160) (-2.280)   
      
ΔIADL 58 -1.278** -0.014* 33 56.9 
  (-2.005) (-1.721)   
Notes: The table reports the mean (median) industry-adjusted default likelihood for a sample of Cat 
bond issuing firms. Both the default likelihood in the pre-issue period (computed as the default 
likelihood over the period from -61 days to -2 days relative to the announcement date α) as well as the 
default likelihood in the post-issue period (computed as the average of the default likelihood over the 
period from +2 days to +61 days relative to the announcement date α) are displayed. The effect of Cat 
bonds on the issuers’ industry-adjusted default likelihood (ΔIADL) is the difference between the post-
issue and pre-issue period. Also included are t-statistics (two tailed) and the non-parametric Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon Z-scores to evaluate if the mean and median IADL and ΔIADL are equal to zero. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6-11 
Regressions on the Effect of Catastrophe Bonds on the Issuers’ Industry-Adjusted Default 
Likelihood (IADL) without the ten Most Costly Catastrophes during the Examination Period 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE -3.322* -2.891* -3.556* -3.765* -3.529* -4.628* 
 (1.75) (1.79) (1.77) (1.89) (1.80) (2.02) 
HIGHDEFAULT -3.353* -4.567* -3.288* -4.337* -4.112* -3.018 
 (1.98) (2.03) (1.84) (1.82) (1.70) (1.43) 
ROA 0.692 0.639 0.599 0.667 0.703* 0.607 
 (1.51) (1.56) (1.50) (1.58) (1.81) (1.65) 
CAR -0.211** -0.145 -0.190* -0.166 -0.184 -0.139 
 (2.10) (1.32) (1.86) (1.60) (1.60) (1.20) 
SIZE 1.028 1.230 0.605 0.739 0.964 1.035 
 (1.34) (1.46) (0.67) (0.90) (1.05) (1.17) 
LEVERAGE   0.030  -0.005 0.023 
   (0.44)  (0.06) (0.35) 
LOSSRATIO  0.021  0.008 0.013 0.019 
  (0.84)  (0.31) (0.59) (0.72) 
UWRISK  0.058 0.077 0.109  0.068 
  (0.71) (0.97) (1.07)  (0.78) 
PREV    0.392 0.285  
    (1.30) (1.03)  
INDEM -4.213** -4.292** -3.869** -3.837** -4.261** -4.351** 
 (2.61) (2.15) (2.24) (2.47) (2.71) (2.14) 
ISSUESIZE 0.446 0.422 0.321 0.330 0.421 0.398 
 (1.37) (1.29) (0.99) (1.02) (1.31) (1.22) 
BONDRATING  0.406    0.409 
  (1.43)    (1.45) 
REPRICES -0.033* -0.047* -0.052** -0.053** -0.033 -0.048* 
 (1.72) (1.95) (2.28) (2.21) (1.42) (1.96) 
GDP -0.066 -0.300 -0.334 -0.145 0.024 -0.377 
 (0.15) (-0.54) (0.76) (0.27) (0.04) (0.75) 
 
      
Constant -11.467 -16.910 0.125 -1.396 -11.779 -15.043 
 (0.84) (0.76) (0.01) (0.07) (0.76) (0.71) 
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 0.490 0.472 0.473 0.505 0.476 0.466 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the issuers’ industry-adjusted default likelihood calculated as the 
difference between the post-issue (α-61, α-2) and pre-issue period (α+2, α+61) relative to the issue 
announcement date α. The model is estimated with country- and year-fixed effects and Huber-White corrected 
standard errors clustered by the issuing firm. t-Statistics are in parentheses. Issuer characteristics include a 
dummy indicating if the issuer is listed in the highest quartile of the distribution of pre-announcement exposure 
to catastrophe risk (HIGHCATEXPOSURE), a dummy indicating if the issuer is listed in the highest quartile of 
the distribution of pre-announcement industry-adjusted default likelihood (HIGHDEFAULT), the ratio between 
pre-tax profit and total assets (ROA), the market-adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return over -20 to +1 days 
relative to the announcement date (CAR), the log of the issuer total assets (SIZE), the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets (LEVERAGE), the loss ratio of the issuer (LOSSRATIO) defined as claim and loss expenses plus 
long-term insurance reserves scaled by premium income, the standard deviation of loss ratios over a four-year 
period prior to the issue announcement (UWRISK), and the number of previous Cat bond transactions 
undertaken by the issuer (PREV). Cat bond characteristics include a dummy which equals 1 if the Cat bond has 
an indemnity trigger (INDEM), the value of the Cat bond issue scaled by the book value of equity (ISSUESIZE), 
and the bond rating applied by Standard &Poor’s or Moody’s with 1 being the highest rated bond and 18 being 
not rated (BONDRATING). Market characteristics include reinsurance prices (REPRICES), estimated by the 
Guy Carpenter world catastrophe rate on line index (Guy Carpenter, 2010), as well as the real GDP growth rate 
(GDP). Accounting data (unless stated differently) refer to the last accounting year prior to the issue 
announcement of the Cat bond. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6-12 
Regressions on the Effect of Catastrophe Bonds on the Issuers’ Industry-Adjusted Default 
Likelihood (IADL) without Country- and Year-Fixed Effects 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
HIGHCATEXPOSURE -2.766** -2.933** -2.720** -2.819** -2.637* -2.801* 
 (2.05) (2.07) (2.06) (2.07) (2.01) (2.04) 
HIGHDEFAULT -4.211*** -4.204*** -4.442*** -4.344*** -4.395*** -4.390*** 
 (3.67) (3.56) (3.68) (3.62) (3.89) (3.77) 
ROA 0.547 0.569 0.561 0.567 0.547 0.571 
 (1.28) (1.41) (1.39) (1.42) (1.33) (1.42) 
CAR -0.126* -0.130* -0.124 -0.135* -0.125* -0.129* 
 (1.69) (1.82) (1.58) (1.80) (1.76) (1.80) 
SIZE 0.214 0.258 -0.041 0.206 -0.033 0.068 
 (0.44) (0.52) (0.09) (0.44) (0.06) (0.12) 
LEVERAGE   0.025  0.024 0.025 
   (0.44)  (0.40) (0.44) 
LOSSRATIO  -0.002  -0.004 0.002 -0.004 
  (0.08)  (0.20) (0.09) (0.19) 
UWRISK  0.068* 0.066 0.072*  0.069* 
  (1.91) (1.65) (1.95)  (1.92) 
PREV    0.086 0.064  
    (1.18) (0.90)  
INDEM -1.448* -1.772* -1.735* -1.663* -1.386* -1.821** 
 (1.74) (2.01) (1.95) (1.93) (1.68) (2.10) 
ISSUESIZE 0.172 0.177 0.120 0.187 0.147 0.152 
 (0.66) (0.72) (0.53) (0.74) (0.57) (0.63) 
BONDRATING  0.093    0.081 
  (0.70)    (0.60) 
REPRICES -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.028*** 
 (3.17) (2.89) (3.00) (2.94) (2.93) (2.91) 
GDP 0.264 0.293 0.257 0.284 0.246 0.273 
 (1.35) (1.46) (1.27) (1.40) (1.15) (1.31) 
       
Constant 2.319 -0.208 4.170 1.999 4.776 1.495 
 (0.26) (0.02) (0.60) (0.26) (0.65) (0.19) 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Year Dummies No No No No No No 
Country Dummies No No No No No No 
Adjusted R2 0.495 0.498 0.505 0.501 0.480 0.493 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the issuers’ industry-adjusted default likelihood 
calculated as the difference between the post-issue (α-61, α-2) and pre-issue period (α+2, α+61) 
relative to the issue announcement date α. The model is estimated with Huber-White corrected 
standard errors clustered by the issuing firm. t-Statistics are in parentheses. Issuer characteristics 
include a dummy indicating if the issuer is listed in the highest quartile of the distribution of pre-
announcement exposure to catastrophe risk (HIGHCATEXPOSURE), a dummy indicating if the 
issuer is listed in the highest quartile of the distribution of pre-announcement industry-adjusted default 
likelihood (HIGHDEFAULT), the ratio between pre-tax profit and total assets (ROA), the market-
adjusted mean cumulative abnormal return over -20 to +1 days relative to the announcement date 
(CAR), the log of the issuer total assets (SIZE), the ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
(LEVERAGE), the loss ratio of the issuer (LOSSRATIO) defined as claim and loss expenses plus 
long-term insurance reserves scaled by premium income, the standard deviation of loss ratios over a 
four-year period prior to the issue announcement (UWRISK), and the number of previous Cat bond 
transactions undertaken by the issuer (PREV). Cat bond characteristics include a dummy which equals 
1 if the Cat bond has an indemnity trigger (INDEM), the value of the Cat bond issue scaled by the 
book value of equity (ISSUESIZE), and the bond rating applied by Standard &Poor’s or Moody’s 
with 1 being the highest rated bond and 18 being not rated (BONDRATING). Market characteristics 
include reinsurance prices (REPRICES), estimated by the Guy Carpenter world catastrophe rate on 
line index (Guy Carpenter, 2010), as well as the real GDP growth rate (GDP). Accounting data (unless 
stated differently) refer to the last accounting year prior to the issue announcement of the Cat bond. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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7  
Conclusions 
7.1 Background to the Thesis 
Insurance and reinsurance firms have experienced a remarkable increase in both the 
frequency and magnitude of underwriting losses associated with natural catastrophes 
in the past decade. At the same time, historically low interest rates have caused the 
investment income of insurance and reinsurance firms to significantly decline which 
means that insurance and reinsurance firms have increasingly been facing difficulties 
in relying on their investment income to offset underwriting losses. 
Yet, capacity constraints in the market for catastrophe risk prevent insurance 
and reinsurance firms from sharing their exposure to catastrophe losses efficiently 
among each other. Given the recent growth rates in physical asset values and in 
populations living in high-risk zones, it has, therefore, become a widely accepted 
view that a single natural catastrophe could result in very substantial financial losses 
for insurance and reinsurance firms and cause insurer insolvencies and disruptions in 
insurance and reinsurance markets. 
Insurance securitization is a tool for insurance and reinsurance firms to 
access capital markets for additional underwriting capacity. Insurance securitization 
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could be particularly useful to finance the mounting losses from natural catastrophes. 
While the market for insurance securitization has undergone rapid growth in 
response to the general increase in the amount of catastrophe-related underwriting 
losses, the overall volume of insurance securitization (as compared to traditional 
insurance and reinsurance) has remained surprisingly low to date. The extant 
literature on insurance securitization provides various, but mostly theoretical, 
explanations for the relatively limited use of insurance securitization by insurance 
and reinsurance firms to date. Inter alia, these explanations include relatively high 
transactions costs (Gibson et al. 2011) and the involvement of basis risk for 
insurance and reinsurance firms (e.g. Harrington and Niehaus, 1999; Froot, 2001; 
Cummins et al., 2004), as well as behavioral factors such as ambiguity and loss 
aversion by investors (Bantwal and Kunreuther, 2000). 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide empirical evidence which can help to 
explain the hitherto underwhelming use of insurance securitization by insurance and 
reinsurance firms. For this purpose, this thesis analyses the performance and risk 
implications of natural catastrophes and insurance securitization for insurance and 
reinsurance firms. In doing so, it is possible to study the following three research 
questions: (i) What are the expected losses associated with natural catastrophes? 
(ii) What are the reasons for insurance and reinsurance firms to engage in insurance 
securitization? (iii) How effective is insurance securitization in transferring 
catastrophe risk? 
The results in Chapter 4 show that insurance firms realize valuation losses 
when a natural catastrophe occurs. Consequently, the results show that insurance 
securitization vehicles such as Cat bonds may have a role to play in mitigating the 
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effects of natural catastrophes on the firms which underwrite catastrophe risks. 
However, at the same time, the market valuation losses are only small in absolute 
terms and, thus, cast some doubt on the need of insurance and reinsurance firms for 
additional underwriting capacity. 
Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis draw a more positive picture on insurance 
securitization in general and advocate a more widespread use of Cat bonds by 
insurance and reinsurance firms. Thus, while Chapter 5 reveals that insurance 
securitization can provide insurance and reinsurance with potential cost advantages 
(as compared to other forms of catastrophe risk management), Chapter 6 shows that 
insurance securitization is an effective tool for transferring catastrophe risk to capital 
markets. 
As a result, while the potential benefits of insurance securitization to firms 
exposed to catastrophe risk are limited ex ante, the results presented in this thesis 
show that insurance and reinsurance firms still benefit from issuing Cat bonds. It 
could be argued that the ex ante limited potential for firms to benefit from Cat bonds 
provides a possible explanation for the hitherto reluctance of insurance and 
reinsurance firms to make more extensive use of insurance securitization. 
7.2 Summary of Findings 
7.2.1 Insurance and Reinsurance Firms Can Cope with 
Underwriting Losses from Natural Catastrophes 
Chapter 4 of this thesis gauges the expected losses linked to mega-catastrophes as 
reflected in equity markets. For this purpose, Chapter 4 uses a large dataset on 
homeowners’ insurance coverage by state, firm, and year, and examines the stock 
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returns of U.S. property-liability (P&L) insurers in response to a series of nineteen 
large U.S. natural catastrophes (mega-catastrophes) spanning from 1996 to 2010. 
The rationale is to provide new empirical insights into the ability of 
insurance and reinsurance firms to financially cope with the underwriting losses from 
natural catastrophes. This is an important factor which can help to explain the limited 
use of insurance securitization as a vehicle to increase global underwriting capacity. 
Insurance and reinsurance firms may not have made extensive use of insurance 
securitization if the capacity constraints and financial losses associated with natural 
catastrophes are not severe enough. In fact, firms with underwriting exposure may 
benefit from the capacity constraints in the market for catastrophe risk. 
For example, capacity constraints may permit premium increases in the 
catastrophe risk market in response to a catastrophe event as both the consumer and 
institutional demand for catastrophe risk insurance increase (Zanjani, 2002 or Froot 
and O’Connel, 2008). In line with this argument, the use of insurance securitization 
and the provision of additional underwriting capacity could, therefore, be (at best) 
redundant for insurance and reinsurance firms. 
The results presented in Chapter 4 provide evidence that mega-catastrophes 
cause negative market returns for insurance firms. Further, the results also reveal that 
this finding is driven by insurers with loss exposure to mega-catastrophes. 
Nevertheless, the relatively small magnitude of share price losses during the event 
period suggests that insurance and reinsurance firms are (on average) able to cope 
rather well with the financial losses of mega-catastrophes. This finding provides a 
possible explanation for the underwhelming use of insurance securitization as a tool 
for increasing the underwriting capacity for catastrophe risks, as it challenges the 
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view that firms exposed to catastrophe risks have much to gain from additional 
underwriting capacity and, therefore, puts a ceiling on the potential benefits of 
insurance securitization for insurance and reinsurance firms. 
7.2.2 Insurance Securitization Offers Cost Advantages 
Chapter 5 further examines possible explanations as to why the use of insurance 
securitization has been limited to date. Specifically, it analyzes the perception of 
equity market investors as regards the engagement of insurance and reinsurance 
firms in insurance securitization. Chapter 5 assesses the validity of the two most 
prominent arguments proposed by the literature as to why firms may benefit from 
insurance securitization, namely, that (i) insurance securitization allows firms to 
hedge against catastrophe-related underwriting losses (e.g. Niehaus, 2002; 
Harrington and Niehaus, 2003; Cummins et al., 2004) and that (ii) insurance 
securitization can help firms with catastrophe exposure to realize costs savings on 
catastrophe-related risk management (e.g. Jaffee and Russell, 1997; Niehaus, 2002). 
For this purpose Chapter 5 examines the changes in the market value of insurance 
and reinsurance firms which announce their engagement in insurance securitization 
by issuing Cat bonds. 
Consistent with the hitherto underwhelming contribution of Cat bonds to 
global catastrophe coverage, Chapter 5 does not provide evidence that Cat bonds lead 
to strong wealth gains for shareholders in the issuing firm. More importantly, results 
show large variations in the distribution of wealth effects in response to the issue 
announcement. The analysis of these variations show that the wealth effects for 
shareholders in firms which issue Cat bonds appear to be driven by explanations 
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according to which Cat bonds offer cost savings relative to other forms of 
catastrophe risk management (and less by the potential of Cat bonds to hedge 
catastrophe risk). Thus, abnormal returns are particularly large for issues by firms 
which face low levels of loss uncertainty (which reduces the information acquisition 
costs in financial markets) as well as for issues during periods when prices for 
catastrophe coverage (including Cat bonds) are low. 
As a result, Chapter 5 reveals that insurance securitization can offer 
potential cost advantageous to insurance and reinsurance firms (as compared to other 
forms of catastrophe risk management). However, the chapter casts doubt on the 
ability of insurance securitization as a tool for efficiently transferring catastrophe risk 
to capital markets. 
7.2.3 Insurance Securitization Provides an Effective 
Transfer of Catastrophe Risk 
In the final empirical chapter of this thesis, the effectiveness of insurance 
securitization in transferring catastrophe risk is examined. Arguably, the hitherto 
limited use of insurance securitization can be explained by its inefficiency in 
transferring catastrophe risk to capital markets. To gauge the effectiveness of 
insurance securitization in transferring catastrophe risk, Chapter 6 analyzes the 
impact of Cat bonds on the default risk of insurance and reinsurance firms which 
issue them. 
Using the Merton distance to default model to gauge default risk, Chapter 6 
shows that Cat bonds lower the default risk of the issuer. Further, and consistent with 
explanations according to which insurance securitization reduces exposure to 
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catastrophe risk and to default risk more generally, results reveal that Cat bonds lead 
to larger risk reductions for issuers with higher exposures to either catastrophe or 
default risk. Finally, the results show that basis risk does not prevent issuers from 
realizing risk benefits. Consequently, the results in Chapter 6 can diminish the 
concerns regarding the effectiveness of insurance securitization in hedging 
catastrophe risk (which emerged in the preceding chapter) and advocate a more 
widespread use of insurance securitization as a vehicle to finance catastrophe risks. 
7.3 Policy Implications 
Insurance serves an important purpose. It enables policyholders to share their 
exposure to financial losses linked to unexpected events with other parties. For this 
purpose, policyholders usually have to buy insurance coverage in advance, but the 
value of the insurance lies in the future performance of the various contingent 
obligations such as the reimbursements of insured property. If insurance firms 
become insolvent and cannot meet their obligations, the consequences for the insured 
and their beneficiaries can be devastating. As a result, insurance is a highly regulated 
industry. 
The threat of insurer insolvencies caused by natural catastrophes and the 
alternative ways of sharing catastrophe risks has increasingly come under regulatory 
scrutiny in recent years (Klein and Wang, 2009). Insurance regulators have an 
important impact on future volumes of insurance securitization, because they can 
impose constraints or bar insurers from using certain instruments as well as facilitate 
or inhibit catastrophe risk financing by affecting the rules governing accounting and 
financial reporting of catastrophe risk transactions. Also, regulators define the 
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amount of capital which insurance and reinsurance firms are required to hold in order 
to maintain solvent. Consequently, the results of this thesis have three main policy 
implications for regulators. 
First, Chapter 4 of this thesis shows that mega-catastrophes only have 
marginal negative performance implications for insurance and reinsurance firms and 
that, consequently, insurance and reinsurance firms are in a position to absorb the 
losses caused by mega-catastrophes. Even though these findings apply to the U.S. 
insurance market only (and it remains to be tested whether these result hold for other 
countries too), they provide some evidence that the capital reserves held by insurance 
and reinsurance firms in the sample are sufficiently large to absorb the financial 
losses caused by mega-catastrophes. Therefore, the results challenge the 
appropriateness of regulatory initiatives (such as the NAIC’s Solvency 
Modernization Initiative or Solvency II) which will require insurance and 
reinsurance firms to hold much higher capital reserves in order to remain solvent 
following a catastrophe event. While the results reported in this thesis have little to 
say about the desirability of higher capital holdings against other types of 
underwriting risk, the results show that the expected financial losses linked to natural 
catastrophes for U.S. insurers do not appear of the magnitude to justify substantially 
higher capital holdings against catastrophe underwriting risk. 
Second, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 show that insurance securitization can 
provide insurance and reinsurance firms with potential cost advantageous (as 
compared to other forms of catastrophe risk management) and that insurance 
securitization is an effective tool for transferring catastrophe risk to capital markets, 
respectively. Therefore, the use of insurance securitization should be encouraged by 
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regulators. This is particularly important given the increasing systemic relevance of a 
number of large insurance firms (Billio et al, 2010; Cummins and Weiss, 2011). Due 
to their increasing interconnectedness with other financial firms (including banks), 
the failure of a large insurance or reinsurance firm is likely to cause financial distress 
beyond insurance markets. 
Third, and related to the previous point, the results in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis imply that the adoption of Cat bonds should be encouraged irrespective of the 
underlying trigger type. Presently, solvency regulations only permit issuers of Cat 
bonds with indemnity triggers to treat Cat bonds like reinsurance (and hold lower 
reserves against the associated underwriting risks). This is because regulators are 
concerned that non-indemnity triggers involve basis risk which thwarts risk transfers 
which are sufficiently large to warrant lower capital holdings. The results of 
Chapter 6 are at odds with the present regulatory treatment of Cat bonds because the 
results show that non-indemnity based Cat bonds also reduce the default risk of the 
issuer. Therefore, insurance regulators should extend some form of favorable 
solvency treatment to non-indemnity based Cat bonds. 
7.4 Constraints of the Thesis 
A number of shortcomings of this thesis can be identified. 
First, throughout this thesis, the focus of the analysis is on the issuers of Cat 
bonds, that is insurance or reinsurance firms. Thus, Chapter 4 looks at the 
performance implications of natural catastrophes on insurance and reinsurance firms, 
and Chapters 5 and 6 look into the risk and performance effects of Cat bonds on the 
firms which issue them. However, as well as the effects on issuers, the future 
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development of the market for insurance securitization will equally depend on the 
willingness of investors to purchase Cat bonds. The attractiveness of Cat bonds to 
investors will depend on whether insurance securitization provides attractive risk-
adjusted returns as well as on the risk and return effects resulting when investors 
combine Cat bonds with more standard financial assets in a single portfolio. In so far, 
as this dissertation tries to generalize why the development of the market for 
insurance securitization has lagged behind expectations, it has to be pointed out that 
the analysis performed in this thesis does not consider the investor perspective. 
Second, while the results of this thesis draw a positive picture on insurance 
securitization from the perspective of a firm issuing Cat bonds, insurance 
securitization may well have additional and more universal positive effects on firms 
with catastrophe-related risks which the empirical approach used in this thesis is 
unable to detect. For instance, insurance securitization may have increased 
competition for catastrophe reinsurance and, thereby, lowered catastrophe 
reinsurance premiums for all insurers, including those which have not been engaged 
in insurance securitization at all (see Froot, 2001). In the same vein, it is likely that 
the risk benefits of insurance securitization reported in Chapter 6 go beyond 
individual insurers. For instance, the global insurance and financial industry may 
have become less vulnerable to systemic distress as a result of more insurers 
engaging in insurance securitization. 
Third, due to the lack of data the results of this thesis have to be interpreted 
with suitable caution. For instance, the results presented in Chapter 4 (which show 
that the expected losses linked to natural catastrophes are not as severe as often 
expected) refer to the U.S. insurance market only. Arguably, results would differ 
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when the same analysis is applied to gauge the impact of mega-catastrophes in other 
countries. Relatively, the market for insurance securitization is still a young market 
and, consequently, the number of successful insurance securitizations is relatively 
low. Thus, even though Chapters 5 and 6 examine the near population of Cat bonds 
ever issued by listed insurance and reinsurance firms up to May 2010, the results 
should be seen as suggestive rather than compelling. 
Finally, all results presented in this thesis refer to listed companies only. As 
a result, it remains to be tested whether natural catastrophes and insurance 
securitization have similar performance and risk implications for non-listed insurance 
and reinsurance firms. This is especially important, given that non-listed firms play a 
large role in the market for insurance securitization (e.g., approximately half of the 
risk capital issued through insurance securitization is associated with catastrophe 
risks borne by non-listed firms). 
7.5 Directions for Further Research 
The constraints identified above indicate that further research in the area of natural 
catastrophes and insurance securitization is warranted in order to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the risk and performance implications of insurance 
securitization. Three possible extension of the work reported in this thesis are 
discussed here. 
First, future empirical research needs to be directed towards the investor’s 
perspective to identify other reasons which might influence the future success of 
insurance securitization. For example, one commonly used argument for investing 
into Cat bonds is that they offer attractive risk/return opportunities when included in 
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diversified stock and bond portfolios as the returns from Cat bonds are believed to 
show no or little correlation with traditional asset classes (Litzenberger et al., 1996). 
However, no empirical study has yet examined whether Cat bonds have actually 
lived up to this expectation. Especially the more recent years (including the financial 
crisis commencing in 2008) are exceptionally suitable to test whether the returns of 
Cat bonds indeed show very little correlation with other (more traditional) asset 
classes. 
Second, future research should examine whether the impact of insurance 
securitization is limited to firms which engage in insurance securitization (i.e. firms 
which issue Cat bonds). As argued above, insurance securitization might have had 
(universal) systemic stability effects or, alternatively, it may have increased 
competition for catastrophe reinsurance and, thereby, lowered catastrophe 
reinsurance premiums for all insurers (see Froot, 2001). Relatively, while the 
employed default likelihood approach in Chapter 6 picks up expected changes in 
default risk around the time that a Cat bond is issued, it would equally be useful to 
understand the realized default risk implications of a large natural catastrophe. For 
instance, future research could examine the default risk effects of the recent Japanese 
earthquake on firms with underwriting exposure to this catastrophe and gauge if the 
risk effects were mitigated for insurers which have issued Cat bonds. By the time of 
completing this thesis, the data to implement such an approach was not readily 
available. 
Third, future research should turn to qualitative data to complement the 
quantitative results presented in this study. For this purpose, future studies on 
insurance securitization could collect more primary data through interviews and 
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questionnaires targeted at insurance and reinsurance firms as well as (potential) 
investors. Especially the reasons for insurance and reinsurance firms to engage in 
insurance securitization are well suited for this approach. Also, this approach can 
provide a better understanding of the effects of insurance securitization on non-listed 
insurance and reinsurance firms.□ 
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